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1 THE COURT: This is a summary judgment hearing, right? 
2 MR. LALLI: Yes, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Are you Mr. Lalli? 
4 MR. LALLI: Yes, I am. 
5 THE COURT: All right, it's your motion. 
6 MR. LALLI: Thank you, Your Honor. This case, at its 
7 core, is about who should pay for the losses of the failed 
8 joint venture that was formed several years ago to develop a 
9 Holiday Inn here in Moab. So far, the plaintiffs, Robert 
10 and Diane Norman, have shouldered the majority or all of the 
11 loss and their claims here are to shift or share that loss 
12 with some of the other people who are involved. We're not 
13 here today--and this is a motion of partial summary 
14 judgment--we're not here to adjudicate whether my client, 
15 Mark Arnold, was liable, or whether the Normans are going to 
16 ultimately entitled to share it or shift that loss. And 
17 rather, our purpose here is to try to focus the issues for a 
18 trial that begins on the 28th of this month. As things have 
19 developed through the course of this litigation, the facts 
20 simply do not fit most or several of the legal claims that 
21 were asserted at the outset of the lawsuit in the complaint, 
22 which is a fairly common situation. 
23 And so our purpose here today is to try to focus the 
24 Court on the claims that should go to trial and those that 
25 shouldn't. There are four claims. The second one connprn* 
4 
1 liability of several co-obligors on a promissory note and 
2 that is--that is the claim on which we have not moved for 
3 summary judgment and we acknowledge that that should go 
4 forward for trial. There are three other claims in the 
5 complaint, however, for which there are no facts to support 
6 and the law doesn't support the facts under those legal 
7 theories. There's a claim that my client, Mark Arnold, 
8 breached a joint venture agreement. That's the first claim. 
9 The third claim is that my client, Mark Arnold, owed and 
10 breached a fiduciary duty to the Normans, as their personal 
11 lawyer. And the fourth claim, which is really not a claim, 
12 although it's styled in the complaint as such, is seeking 
13 punitive damages. 
14 Really the Court can address these—all of these claims 
15 with two very simple questions. The first question is, was 
16 Mark Arnold a party to the joint venture agreement, such 
17 that he could ever breach it? And the second question is, 
18 was Mark Arnold the lawyer for Robert and Diane Norman 
19 personally, as opposed to the lawyer for the joint venture, 
20 such that his attorney fiduciary duties ran to the Normans 
21 rather than the joint venture? And as I will demonstrate, 
22 the answer to both of those questions is no. 
23 Let me start with the first one. Was Mark Arnold a 
24 party to the joint venture agreement? We have submitted to 
T u
-*"^  ^ nnfher set of exhibits here for the 
5 
1 || Court, if it would be helpful. 
2 II THE COURT: Yeah, that would be great. 
3 MR. LALLI: These are—these are the exhibits we 
4 attached to our papers. That may be more handy. 
5 The Exhibit 2 to that is the Moab Land Development 
6 Joint Venture Agreement. And as the Court can easily see 
7 on--I think it's the fifth page of this agreement, all of 
8 the signatories, all of the participants in the joint 
9 venture are noted down there. And you could spend days and 
10 weeks scouring this document and you would not see Mark 
11 Arnold anywhere as a party to this agreement, and he's not 
12 mentioned in the agreement, he's not referred to obliquely 
13 or otherwise in the agreement, and for very good reason. At 
14 the time the joint venture partners entered into this 
15 agreement, Mark Arnold was not in the picture. None of the 
16 joint venture partners, at that time, had ever even heard of 
17 Mark Arnold. Mark Arnold became involved only weeks or 
18 months later when he was asked by a gentleman named Norman 
19 Larson, who's also a defendant in this lawsuit, but 
20 significantly not a joint venture partner. Arnold was asked 
21 to do certain things. And so the answer to the question, 
22 was Mark Arnold a party to this joint venture agreement, 
23 such that he could've breached it, is no, on the face of the 
2 4 document. 
25 Now, the plaintiffs have made what I think is a fairly 
6 
1 clever argument here, and that is, they say, they 
2 acknowledge that Arnold was not a party to this joint 
3 venture agreement on its face, but they say that sometime 
4 later he purchased the interest of Pete Lanto, who was one 
5 of the signatories to the agreement. They say that Mark 
6 Arnold purchased Lanto's interest and, by doing so, became 
7 first a partner and that by becoming a partner he, 
8 therefore, acquired indirectly the obligations under this 
9 contract. 
10 Well, let me say first of all that whether or not 
11 Arnold purchased Lanto's interest, and whatever are the 
12 legal consequences flowing from that, that is the subject of 
13 the second cause of action that we're not moving on. That's 
14 the one we say should go to trial. What we are moving on 
15 is-~and what we do say is that even if a jury ultimately 
16 concludes that Arnold purchased Lanto's interest, that 
17 doesn't make him a partner in the joint venture, as a matter 
18 of law. The law is very clear on this, and we've cited this 
19 in our papers, but the agreement itself, Article 1.7 of that 
20 agreement says, "Additional joint venturers may be added to 
21 the joint venture at any time," significant language here, 
22 "upon agreement of all of the then existing joint 
23 venturers." So, if Arnold became a joint venture partner, 
24 he had to have the consent of all of the joint venture 
25 partners. All right. That's not only the contract, that's 
7 
1 I  Utah law. Utah Code 48-1-15(7) says this — subject to a 
2 joint venture agreement like this, "No person can become a 
3 member of a partnership without the consent of all the 
4 partners." 
5 The Utah Supreme Court, in a case we cited in our 
6 papers, Folsom v. Fenstrum, and I quote: "Of course, 
7 defendant could not become a member of the partnership 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
without the consent of the original members of the firm/7 
And for good measure, we've also cited American 
Jurisprudence that says, "No person can become a member of a 
partnership without the consent of all of the partners/' 
That's the law. It is uncontradicted that Mark Arnold never 
had the consent of the joint venture partners, most notably 
Robert and Diane Norman, to become a partner in this joint 
venture. We have cited to the Court excerpts of the 
Normans' deposition transcripts. 
Mr. Norman, question is asked to him: "Did you ever 
give your consent for any other individual to become a 
member of the joint venture?" 
Answer by Mr. Norman, the answer is, "No. Mrs. Norman 
corroborated that." 
Question: "Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold 
becoming a partner?" 
Answer: "Never." 
Both Robert and Diane Norman have testified, under 
8 
1 oath, that they never consented to Mark Arnold becoming a 
2 partner and that, therefore, he could not—whatever the 
3 legal consequences of the Lanto purchase — he could not 
4 become a member of the joint venture, because the Normans 
5 never consented. We've also cited one other provision of 
6 American Jurisprudence, and I que4 ~ here: "A partner may 
7 sell his interest in the partnership to a third party/7 
8 which, for purposes of today's argument, we assume—we 
9 assume Lanto sells his interest to Arnold, but the sale does 
10 not alone make the third party a partner in the firm against 
11 the will and consent of the other partners. 
12 So, the first question is, was Mark Arnold a party to 
13 the joint venture agreement? On the face of the document, 
14 no, he was not. Did he become a partner to the joint 
15 venture agreement—or party to the joint venture agreement 
16 because he became a partner to the joint venture? No, he 
17 never became a partner to the joint venture because the 
18 Normans never consented. The first cause of action for 
19 breach of the joint venture agreement is the wrong legal 
20 theory for this case and it should be dismissed. 
21 Let me turn now to the second question. The second 
22 question is whether Mark Arnold was a personal lawyer for 
23 Robert and Diane Norman, as opposed to the lawyer for the 
24 joint venture. In their complaint, in their claim for 
25 breach of fiduciary duty, paragraph 56 of their complaint, 
9 
1 I which is Exhibit 1 to our motion, the Normans assert that 
2 Mark Arnold was their lawyer and, in fact, that is the 
3 predicate for their breach of fiduciary duty claim. That 
4 assertion is not only withdrawn in their opposition to this 
5 motion, but the Normans again, in their deposition, they 
6 were absolutely clear that Mark Arnold did not represent 
7 them personally—he only represented the joint venture. 
8 Their testimony, which we've cited in our brief, Diane 
9 I Norman's is the most clear here. 
10 || Question: "You've told me that you believe that Arnold 
11 
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25 
was the lawyer for the group, right?" 
Answer: "Uh-huh." 
Question: "Arnold represented the group, and do you 
know if he represented Page, Barney or Lanto individually?" 
Answer: "No, I don't." 
Question: "And did he represent you individually?" 
Answer: "Never." 
Robert Norman—and I won't take the time to read it — 
but he says the same thing in his deposition. Mark Arnold 
was never our lawyer personally, he was lawyer for the joint 
venture. Well, what is the legal consequence of that? 
Well, to have a breach of fiduciary duty claim you have to 
have a fiduciary duty and, in this case, that fiduciary duty 
is predicated on an attorney/client relationship. There is 
no other evidence of any other kind of confidential 
10 
1 relationship. But the law is —and we've cited multiple 
2 sources in our papers—that an attorney does not owe duties. 
3 An attorney for a partnership or joint venture does not owe 
4 fiduciary duties to the individual partners; rather, his 
5 duty runs to the partnership, which is a separate legal 
6 entity. We have cited the leading malpractice treatise, 
7 Mallen and Jeffrey. I quote: "A lawyer who represents a 
8 partnership does not thereby become counsel for or owe a"'*"" 
9 duty to the partners/7 I cited to the Court — and this not 
10 an ethics case—but Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.13 
11 makes clear that a lawyer employed or retained by an 
12 organization represents the organization. So, the fact that 
13 Arnold represented the joint venture meant that he did have 
14 fiduciary duties running to the joint venture. It doesn't 
15 mean, as the Normans contend, that he had fiduciary duties 
16 running to them personally, and that's what their claim is. 
17 Now, we have cited to—and the best case we could find 
18 on this is unfortunately not a Utah case, it's out of the 
19 Fifth Circuit, called Hopper v. Frank, and the cite on that 
20 is 16 F.3rd 92. This case is almost directly on point. In 
21 the Hopper case we had a partnership who hired a law firm, 
22 and they hired the law firm to assist them in making a 
23 public offering of partnership interest. And things went 
24 sour and ultimately the offering failed and the partnership 
9R I  contended that it was the lawyer's fault. Well, another 
11 
1 I  wrinkle happened, and that is that the partnership went into 
2 bankruptcy. And so, in that case, the partnership could not 
3 assert a claim against the lawyer, because that claim would 
4 belong to the bankruptcy estate. And so, the individual 
5 partners, the general partners, said, okay, well, we'll sue, 
6 and they tried to do exactly what the Normans are trying to 
7 do here. They tried to sue the lawyer individually and they 
8 said, yeah, you represented the partnership, but you also 
9 represented us individually. And the Court went through and 
10 analyzed that, it analyzed the law I've stated, and it said, 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
it concluded that, no, you don't--if a lawyer represents a 
partnership, his duties run to the partnership, they don't 
run to the individuals. And the Court went through a 
lengthy analysis and granted, and the Fifth Circuit upheld, 
summary judgment for the lawyer, because there—because 
there was no fiduciary duty. And that's exactly what we 
have here is no fiduciary duty. 
The fourth claim is, as I said, punitive damages, and 
that is a claim that is predicated on the breach of 
fiduciary duty. So, if there is no breach of fiduciary 
duty, then there is no other claim in the lawsuit on which 
punitive damages could rest, and we've cited to the Court 
Utah Supreme Court, punitive damages cannot be awarded for 
breach of contract, which, if the fiduciary duty claim goes 
away, that's all we have. 
12 
1 In their papers they have listed a laundry list of 
2 things that they can contend Mark Arnold did wrong. Today's 
3 not the day to determine those kinds of factual issues, 
4 whether Arnold did something wrong or whether he did 
5 something right. It's not the day to determine whether or 
6 not Arnold should pay for part or all of the joint venture 
7 losses. They need to answer two questions — they need to 
8 prove two things to survive this summary judgment motion. 
9 They need to prove, number one, that Arnold was a party to 
10 the joint venture agreement. 
11 THE COURT: Or that there's a factual issue about that. 
12 MR. LALLI: Or that there's a factual issue about that. 
13 But they need to come forward with some evidence, other than 
14 assertions in a brief, which is all they've done so far. 
15 And secondly, they need to come forward with some evidence 
16 that Arnold had a fiduciary duty, and the evidence is 
17 uncontradicted on that point, and that's why we're entitled 
18 to summary judgment on the first, third and fourth claims. 
19 THE COURT: The punitive damage, you just—that falls 
20 because? 
21 MR. LALLI: That falls because the fiduciary duty claim 
22 falls. A punitive—as I've cited, you can't have punitive 
23 damages for a breach of contract. That's Highland 
24 Construction v. Union Pacific, 683 P.2d 1042, Utah Supreme 
25 Court 1984. 
13 
1 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Russell. 
2 MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Your Honor. I have two 
3 inclinations with regard to the motion. One is--the first 
4 one is probably one that the Court would appreciate but 
5 would never happen. (Inaudible) simply that the Court is 
6 familiar with the file and the pleadings to stand up and 
7 say, I don't really need to say anything in response to 
8 these motions. But I'm going to do the opposite of that, 
9 not because I'm concerned about summary judgment, but 
10 because I want the Court to award fees and costs under 
11 78-27-56. And so I want to take some time to tell you why 
12 you should do that, keeping in mind that a lot of what I say 
13 is going to sound like it's my motion for summary judgment, 
14 b u t it's not. All I have to do is raise the question of 
15 fact in your mind to defeat these motions. I probably 
16 could've made a motion for summary judgment but, frankly, I 
17 think that it will do better at trial. 
18 Preliminarily, contextually, this case involves a lot 
19 of things that happened to the Normans. It's our contention 
20 that they got gypped, they got scammed, they were lied to, 
21 they were deceived. They didn't know--they knew maybe 
22 20 percent of what they now know when this case was filed. 
23 We have been finding things out all through the course of 
24 this litigation, through the depositions, through discovery, 
25 and on our own. So that's why, at the end of my response, 
14 
1 I  and I think it's important for the Court to note that we're 
2 asking—one of the things that we're asking is that the 
3 pleadings be allowed to conform to the evidence, because 
4 when the--the evidence is far different now than it was when 
5 we initially filed the complaint, and even the amended 
6 complaint. 
7 Mr. Arnold--we have received documents in discovery 
8 with Mark Arnold's name all over them, that he prepared, 
9 that he didn't give us. We got them from Defendant Larson, 
10 we got them through our own efforts, but we can only 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
speculate on what else Mark Arnold has concealed, and I'm 
sure that there's a lot. We haven't been able to talk to 
Page and Barney, who are significant figures in this whole 
scenario. So we need to be able to have some flexibility 
vis-a-vis the pleadings and the evidence, some of which 
you're going to hear now. 
So, member of a joint venture, of the joint venture. 
In the complaint, it's true, we said the Moab Land 
Development Joint Venture, because it's a piece of paper 
that we had, it's a piece of paper that these people had. 
And, in fact, Mark Arnold purchased an interest in that 
joint venture, but that is not necessarily the joint venture 
that this is about and, in fact, it probably isn't, because 
no one ever behaved as if that joint venture existed, ever. 
That was signed on March 15, 1995. One of the signatures, 
15 
1 I  Eric Rasmussen, is a dummy, is a strawman. He's not even 
2 involved. He signed for Greg Page, because Greg Page was 
3 getting divorced. At the time that it was signed, this 
4 other group, Lanto, Page and Barney, had entered into a 
5 service agreement with Norman Larson to go out and obtain 
6 Financing for not only this project, but another—but two 
7 || other projects, and said, we're going to give you an equity 
interest in this if you get this financing. Nobody told Bob 
9 || and Diane that. They didn't even know who he was. They 
10 didn't know who Mark Arnold was at the time. 
11 The definition of a joint venture, 48-1-31, is an 
12 association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners 
13 of a single business enterprise. That's the legal 
14 definition. Was there a joint venture to develop a Holiday 
15 Inn in Moab? That is not disputable — there definitely was. 
16 That's what this whole case is about, that's what everyone 
17 was doing. So it was a joint venture, there was a joint 
18 venture, and Mark Arnold was a member of it. All you have 
19 to do is look at—and I'll give you some (inaudible) too, 
20 Your Honor—NL 72, which is when Mark Arnold purchased Pete 
21 Lanto's agreement. And let's not forget that Mark Arnold is 
22 an attorney who prepared this document, and I think it's—I 
23 don't think it can be questioned. He's saying he bought—he 
24 bought all right, title and interest to Lanto's interest in 
25 the joint venture. So again, the other one's in Park City--
16 
1 the Normans don't even know about it. 
2 More significantly than that is the last paragraph, 
3 which Arnold, as an attorney, knows very well what he's 
4 doing when he indemnifies Lanto from any and all claims 
5 arising from the loan that was taken out, and that's what 
6 this whole case is about. So he's put himself right in the 
7 thick of it and it's silly to suggest that that document-
8 alone does not create a question of fact. I think it 
9 establishes the fact, but to suggest that there's not a 
10 question of fa-..: after that is, to me, amazing. 
11 So, the thing to focus on, Your Honor, is we are not 
12 saying the Moab Land Development Joint Venture, as a four-
13 square document, there was a joint venture, no question 
14 about it. Arnold was in it, no question about it. His 
15 position to get out (a) he didn't sign it — that's true, he 
16 didn't sign it. You can see that for yourself. Two, the 
17 Normans did not affirmatively consent. That's true. But 
18 the reason that they didn't is because they did it secretly 
19 and they did it dishonestly. 
20 The Normans have been—or the Normans have been deposed 
21 twice. They were deposed by—before Mr. Lalli was counsel 
22 for Norman, and he may or may not have read those 
23 depositions, but they count. Mr. Lalli came in and, as is 
24 fair for him, wanted to try to create a record to support 
25 these motions. That's pretty much what they amounted to. 
17 
1 I But in his —in Mr. Norman's first deposition, the question 
2 was asked regarding the joint venture agreement. It says, 
3 "Additional joint venturers may be added to the joint 
4 venture at any time upon the agreement of all then existing 
5 joint venturers/' And Mr. Norman says, "I'm sure I read it, 
6 but I don't recall the details." 
7 I Then the question, "Did you ever give your consent for 
any other individual to become a member of the joint venture 
9 || agreement?" Answer, "They never asked me." 
10 || "So your answer is, no?" 
11 "Yes, the answer is no." 
12 I think it's very cynical to—when you do something 
13 secretly and dishonestly like this, if Arnold didn't even 
14 pay for that—that interest, that the evidence will show 
15 that it came out of the joint venture funds, that to then 
16 come in and say, well—and because that they didn't agree to 
17 my doing this secretly and dishonestly that I should be 
18 absolved from liability, I think, is the height of cynicism 
19 and shouldn't be acknowledged by this Court. 
20 Moreover, the Normans did learn of the involvement, the 
21 very heavy involvement of both Arnold and Larson and 
22 acquiesced to their involvement. They didn't say, wait, you 
23 guys didn't sign the joint venture agreement so, therefore, 
24 you can't be our partners. They said, oh, good, we now have 
25 an attorney who's with us. Oh, good, we now have somebody 
13 
1 who's supposedly a professional financial person with us. 
2 Yes, you can do that, because that's going to improve our 
3 chances to have this project work. They knew very well 
4 about it. Again, in the first deposition, I could read you 
5 pages of testimony, but — 
6 THE COURT: Well, I'd like to know what it—you say 
7 they were involved. Involved is an ambiguous term. 
8 MR. RUSSELL: I'll give you—I'll give you plenty of 
9 detail. 
10 THE COURT: Did they know—did they—were they informed 
11 that these people had become partners, had bought interests 
12 in the joint venture? 
13 MR. RUSSELL: No, no. They—we didn't find that out 
14 until after the—as I said, until after the litigation was 
15 filed. They weren't going to tell us that. They—Arnold, 
16 at least, saw an opportunity to—if nobody finds out about 
17 that, then I'll — I may be able to get out of this. No, they 
18 weren't told that. 
19 THE COURT: So, they were just—they just aware that 
20 they were involved as — 
21 MR. RUSSELL: Arnold, initially, as attorney. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. RUSSELL: Larson signed the promissory note. 
24 THE COURT: As a guarantor or co-maker of the note? 
25 MR. RUSSELL: Correct. 
19 
1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. RUSSELL: But, for example, they talked about 
3 Mr. Arnold and Mr. Larson coming to their house and what 
4 their involvement was. And Mr. Norman said, I believe the 
5 assets at the time they came to the house, irrespective of 
6 the signatures on the joint venture agreement, that they 
7 were our partners. There's letters going all over the place 
8 showing Arnold and Larson's involvement. But — 
9 THE COURT: How did the Normans finally get the idea 
10 that these folks were partners? Initially, they were never 
11 told that they'd bought an interest. They were — initially 
12 just thought they were — that Arnold was an attorney. When 
13 did the Normans find get the idea that Arnold was a partner? 
14 MR. RUSSELL: There's documentation to the effect, 
15 which —some of which you have in- front of you, and I'll talk 
16 about. They went to a meeting in Mark Arnold's office, on 
17 May the 1st, 1996, where the other partners were there and 
18 the Holiday Inn people, at which point Arnold told them, I 
19 bought Lanto's interest. So then, absolutely, for sure. 
20 And they didn't say, no, you can't. They said, yeah, we 
21 knew that, because Arnold had talked to them about it 
22 before. 
23 So, if there was not direct consent—yes, you may be a 
24 partner—there was definite knowledge and acquiescence, but 
25 the conduct of the parties is the important thing here, Your 
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1 Honor, especially the conduct of Mr. Arnold. October 27, 
2 1995, you have the purchase document in front of you. Look 
3 at the document November 3, 1995. This was being sent to 
4 people in Arizona, supposedly, who were going to line up 
5 millions of dollars. Do you have that in front of you? 
6 THE COURT: I don't. November 3rd you said? 
7 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. I do have that. Letter to Western 
9 Empire Advisors? 
10 MR. RUSSELL: This would be from them. 
11 THE COURT: Yeah, right, from them. Yeah, to Bruce 
12 Holman. 
13 MR. RUSSELL: And it says in there, concerning 
14 financing for the project, "Out in the public, Arnold owns 
15 an equity position in both projects." Do you see that? 
16 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
17 MR. RUSSELL: How do you come in and argue after that, 
18 that he's not a partner in the project? Or at least—well, 
19 how do you argue that he's not? Does it—it creates a 
20 question of fact, definitely. A letter April 10, 1996. 
21 This is after all the money's gone and nothing's happened. 
22 Mr. Larson gets an ultimatum from the group. The group 
23 includes Mark Arnold and Bob Norman. 
24 May 5th or May 1st, 1996, as I just stated, the meeting 
25 I in Mark Arnold's office on how the project is going to 
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1 I proceed and how they're going to get the money back from the 
2 people that they sent it to in Arizona, and Arnold telling 
3 | them, I am your partner, I bought an interest. 
4 I The letter of June 18th, 1996, which you have there in 
5 front of you. 
6 THE COURT: Let's see, go back to April 10, '96, what 
7 does that tell me? What should I look at here? 
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MR. RUSSELL: It's talking about the—it's the group 
giving an ultimatum to Norman Larson--
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: --about what's going to happen to him if 
he doesn't come up with the dough, and the group there, you 
can see who's involved in the group. I say that that shows 
who's involved in the group, but at least shows the question 
of fact--at least raises the question of fact. 
THE COURT: Okay. Greg Page is writing this, but he's 
sending copies to Bob, Duane and Mark. From that, you ask 
me to infer that that meant they were partners? 
MR. RUSSELL: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: It raises the question of fact, at the 
least. June 18, 1996, again, I believe it's another letter 
to Larson, where they're saying, if you perform, you'll get 
an interest in the project, same interest in the project as 
various people, including Mark Arnold. 
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111 Now, there's another provision in the Partnership Code 
2 48-1-13, "Partner by Estoppel." That's a nice legal term 
3 and I think it fits this exactly. I think Mr. Arnold should 
4 be estopped from denying that he was a partner in this 
5 project, by his own conduct--by buying into the project 
6 secretly, by having letters sent out publicly that say, I 
7 have an interest in this project. At least two of them. 
8 And as I said, Your Honor, I know that there's more that we 
9 don't have. 
10 Now, as to the notice, Mark Arnold testified, and 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Norman Larson testified over and over again, because I'd 
always ask them--I said, well, who's telling all this stuff 
to Bob and Diane? They said, well, we assumed that Page and 
Barney were doing it. We--I never talked to them, but I 
assumed that Page and Barney were communicating with them. 
I didn't tell them any of this stuff, we assumed that they 
were getting it. Well, 48-1-9, "Partnership charged with 
knowledge or notice to partner." That fits. For example, 
we talk about the Lanto purchase, and Arnold's testimony on 
that is that Duane Barney and Greg Page asked him to do that 
and that he had their permission to do that. Well, if 
that's the case, then the partnership is charged with 
knowledge of it. And he also assumed that the Normans had 
been told that by Page and Barney. So he can't say that, 
because they didn't affirmatively consent, that I'm not a 
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1 member of the partnership. I mean, I am amazed that someone 
2 could stand up and make that kind of allegation with all of 
3 the facts that we have. He assumed that they knew about 
4 that. 
5 Now, with respect to the--do you have any questions on 
6 that aspect, Your Honor? 
7 THE COURT: No. 
8 MR. RUSSELL: With respect to the breach of fiduciary 
9 duty claim, partners are accountable as fiduciaries, first 
10 of all, under 48-1-18. But that's not where we're going 
11 with that, because I want him responsible as an attorney. 
12 And the question is not whether Arnold was the Normans' 
13 personal attorney. The question is whether he owed them a 
14 fiduciary duty. We don't claim that he was their personal 
15 attorney. We claim that, because of his role as counsel for 
16 the group, which he readily admits and which he--and which 
17 he stated time and time again in his deposition that he 
18 viewed the group as individuals, including these 
19 individuals, that he owed the Normans a fiduciary duty. 
20 There's no question about Arnold's role as attorney for 
21 the group. There's the testimony of Norman Larson, a co-
22 defendant in this case. He certainly saw Arnold as the 
23 attorney for the group. According to Larson, in fact, 
24 Arnold was his attorney, the attorney for the project, the 
25 I attorney for the — for another joint venture in Park City, a 
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1 business partner of his, and Mr. Arnold was responsible to 
2 approve each and every expenditure that Larson made that 
3 resulted in the loss of all of the Normans' money. That's 
4 the co-defendants' testimony. That is enough to raise a 
5 question of fact. 
6 You have the — I'm not sure that I gave you all of them, 
7 but attached to our motion, in a letter dated June 6, 1995, 
8 Mark Arnold, the attorney for the project. July 25, 1995, I 
9 think you have that one. The Rasmussen property purchase 
10 that Arnold was acting as attorney on, using their money on 
11 a project that they didn't even know about. You have 
12 October 4, 1995, a Holiday Inn earnest money letter. 
13 October 20, 1995, a letter to Mark Arnold, the attorney for 
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the project. November 3rd, Mark Arnold, the attorney, will 
come to Phoenix, with regard to the financing. You have 
Arnold's own testimony, which is set forth at length in my 
response--
THE COURT: Well, you're—I think you're proving 
something that's conceded, which is that Mark Arnold was the 
attorney for the joint venture. The question is whether 
individual members of the joint venture or partners can sue 
the lawyer or whether it must be the joint venture or the 
partnership itself that does the suing. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. I've got—I'm going to cover that 
for Your Honor. The July 18, 1996 letter, by the way, which 
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1 I believe you have in front of you. "This firm—" all 
2 right, this is in a letter from Arnold. "This firm has been 
3 retained by/' naming individuals, including Bob and Diane 
4 Norman, enough to create a question of fact right there. 
5 Now, as you say, the question is whether that leads to 
6 the presumption that he owes these people individually a 
7 fiduciary duty. And Arnold says, no, he doesn't. That a 
8 joint venture is a separate legal entity and is — that 
9 representation cannot, as a matter of law, impose a 
10 fiduciary duty toward its individual members. Margulies v. 
11 Upchurch is cited for that proposition. "An attorney 
12 representing a corporation or similar entity owes allegiance 
13 to the entity rather than the shareholders." Have you read 
14 Margulies, Your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: No. 
16 MR. RUSSELL: Interesting case. Our position is that 
17 the representation of the group did lead to a fiduciary duty 
18 toward the Normans, because the Normans were the parties at 
19 risk, and Arnold knew it. The Normans were the only party 
20 with anything at risk. They put up their property for a 
21 loan for this project. Nobody else contributed a thing--
22 zero, zip. And unless money could be obtained to get the 
23 financing to build this Holiday Inn--and this is an 
24 18 percent note, by the way--the Normans are the ones that 
25 are going to be facing foreclosure. Nobody else put 
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1 anything in. So, they are the people who are directly, 
2 individually at risk. And so, does that create a fiduciary 
3 duty? You can look at Margulies, cited by the defendant. I 
4 love this case, because either Mr. Arnold and his counsel 
5 failed to read it, or they were counting on us not reading 
6 it, because from Margulies it is established, as a matter of 
7 law, that Mr. Arnold is 100 percent wrong on what he claims 
8 here. Margulies involves a bunch of doctors who were 
9 limited partners in a venture. The limited partnership was 
10 represented as the plaintiff in a lawsuit by a big Salt Lake 
11 firm. The individual doctors, or some of them anyway, who 
12 were members of the partnership, were sued in a malpractice 
13 action. And the plaintiff in the malpractice action was 
14 represented by the same firm that represented the venture. 
15 So, the defendants—or the doctors said, wait a minute, 
16 you can't sue us. You represent us in this joint venture. 
17 And the lawyer said, no, we represent the joint venture, we 
18 don't represent you. And the Court stated, at page 1,200, 
19 "Unless an attorney/client relationship or some fiduciary 
20 duty existed between the firm and the individual doctors, 
21 there could be no conflict of interest created by the firm's 
22 representation of the malpractice clients." 
23 So the issue before you, Your Honor, is directly four-
24 square addressed in Margulies. And Arnold says, because the 
9R II Normans didn't hire him directly, he owed them no duty, and 
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1 the Utah Supreme Court says that he's dead wrong about that. 
2 At page 1,201, "The law has long recognized an attorney is 
3 held to the highest duty of fidelity, honor, fair dealing 
4 and full disclosure to the client. Jones Waldo contends 
5 that a personal request for legal services or advise by the 
6 client and an acceptance by the attorney is necessary for an 
7 attorney/client relationship to be formed." 
8 Utah Supreme Court says, we disagree. "Even in the 
9 absence of an express attorney/client relationship, 
10 circumstances may give rise to an implied professional 
11 relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client, thereby 
12 invoking the ethical mandates governing the practice of 
13 law/' Now, this is exactly the situation that we have here. 
14 Except — except that this one is stronger, because if you 
15 read through that decision, you'll find that the interests 
16 of those doctors in the joint venture was very minimal 
17 compared to the direct personal interests of the Normans in 
18 this case. Not only was their property at risk, but this 
19 joint venture was to build a Holiday Inn on their property, 
20 and their whole business structure and the whole success of 
21 their water park and the related projects that they had 
22 going on were at risk. They had a huge amount to gain or 
23 lose from this, and Arnold knew it. 
24 As the Court said, "When the individual interests of 
25 the partners or members are directly involved, there may be 
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1 sufficient grounds for implying the existence of an 
2 attorney/client relationship/' Under the Margulies 
3 circumstances, the Court said, "Under these circumstances/' 
4 which I--which are far less than what we have here, "Jones 
5 Waldo's relationship to the limited partnership gave rise to 
6 an attorney/client relationship between the firm and the 
7 individual partners, with a consequent obligation to conform 
8 to all applicable standards of professional behavior/' And 
9 that's why I put that laundry list of things in our 
10 response, Your Honor, because those are all the ways—those 
11 are some of the ways, maybe half of the ways that Arnold 
12 misused his professional responsibilities. 
13 Arnold scoffs at the notion that the Normans were 
14 looking to him to protect their personal interests. Well, 
15 among other things, the Normans went personally to Mark 
16 Arnold for an extension of the note, when they were 
17 initially worried about foreclosure. They went to him for a 
18 lease of acreage of the property for a separate water 
19 development. They went to him for an easement on the 
20 property that had been pledged as collateral. They went to 
21 him because they personally needed money after there was a 
22 fire at their water park. They went to him begging for some 
23 of those funds back that had been sent to Arizona. Arnold 
24 told them then he was their partner. He knew that the money 
25 was in Arizona, he knew the people that were down there, and 
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1 that he would get it for them. He didn't. 
2 They went to Arnold about water and sewer issues, they 
3 went to him about associated water park developments on 
4 adjacent property, and they went to Arnold to protect their 
5 property from foreclosure from Arnold's own clients. The 
6 people that lent the money were also Arnold's--everybody was 
7 Arnold's clients. 
8 So, the notion that there must be a direct 
9 attorney/client relationship in order to have a fiduciary 
10 duty is simply wrong, as a matter of law, based on the 
11 Margulies decision. And in this case, there is more 
12 evidence than we'll even need to put in about — to suggest 
13 that Arnold had direct fiduciary duties to the Normans. For 
14 example, I mean, the stuff that was done in this case is 
15 almost unbelievable. The Normans were told that they needed 
16 $40,000 to purchase the Holiday Inn franchise. That's what 
17 they needed to get the franchise. Everything's going to 
18 fall into place, we'll—we've got all these professionals, 
19 the Holiday Inn will built, everything will be great. And 
20 they understood that they were going to sign a note for 
21 $40,000. And, in fact, their testimony will be that when 
22 Page and Barney came down and asked them to sign the 
23 promissory deed and trust deed note, which Mark Arnold 
24 prepared, that it said $40,000. When it came back, all 
25 signed, it said $160,000. Arnold prepared the documents. 
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1 And if the jury believes that, he had to know. 
2 But not only that, before the documents ever came down, 
3 Arnold had gone to his client, Ann Young, and negotiated a 
4 $160,000 loan, and before the documents ever came down, had 
5 spent almost $70,000 of it, before they ever even signed it. 
6 $8,000 went into his own pocket, $8,000 went into Norman 
7 Larson's pocket. They didn't do anything for it, for this 
8 18 percent loan. He gave another $3,200 to his client, who 
9 had the fully secured 18 percent loan—and all of this 
10 without any disclosure to these people. I think that he 
11 should've mentioned—By the way, folks, we're going to take 
12 20 grand off the top of this, and then go from there. And 
13 by the way, folks, my client, Norman Larson, already has the 
14 franchise, already has it. I sent the check to Holiday Inn 
15 from my office two weeks ago. He's got it, it's in his 
16 name. 
17 One of the first checks out this loan went to Norman 
18 Larson for $40,000, but he didn't transfer the franchise 
19 over. I think that he may have thought about disclosing 
20 that. I think that he may have thought about forming 
21 another entity with Norman Larson, called Joint Venture—or 
22 Venture Properties II. He did that on June 19th, before 
23 they signed the note and trust deed. And the purpose for 
24 that? Who knows what the purpose for that is? Nobody's 
^ I told us yet. They've continued to deny even that it exists, 
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1 even though the State corporate documents are in my—are in 
2 my response. But what we do know is that they took $10,000 
3 out of this money to put it as earnest money to buy property 
4 for another Holiday Inn venture in Park City that they had 
5 no knowledge of, no interest in. I think he might have 
6 thought about disclosing that. 
7 Mark Arnold prepared and notarized a power of attorney 
8 for Greg Page to act as general power of attorney for Duane 
9 Barney. Duane Barney is supposedly the administrative 
10 officer of this joint venture. Duane Barney was a former— 
11 was a convicted felon for fraud. He was going back to 
12 prison in October of 1995. Arnold prepared and notarized 
13 the power of attorney. I think that he may have thought 
14 about disclosing that to the Normans, who were the people at 
15 risk—the only people at risk. 
16 Norman, as you can see from—or Arnold, from the papers 
17 that I gave you, was fully, directly involved in the attempt 
18 to get money from people in Arizona, and sent—authorized or 
19 personally sent $50,000 down to these people in Arizona. I 
20 think that the Normans may have wanted to know about that. 
21 By this time, Your Honor, by October of 1995, they have 
22 basically blasted through the entire $160,000, without 
23 accomplishing anything. I think that Mark Arnold may have 
24 thought about disclosing his relationship to the Four D 
25 Development, which the Normans were not in. Four D was the 
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1 one that was doing the Park City project that was siphoning 
2 money off. Four D was the one that entered into the service 
3 agreement with Norman Larson, secretly giving Norman Larson 
4 potentially a 25 percent interest in the Moab project, even 
5 though Norman Larson had never signed that joint venture 
6 agreement either, but they were just giving chunks of it 
7 out. So— 
8 THE COURT: Well, now, you're talking about things that 
9 were done, but that's not addressing the question of whether 
10 there's a relationship, right? 
11 MR. RUSSELL: Well — 
12 THE COURT: Whether it was breached or not? He's 
13 claiming you can't breach a relation that doesn't exist. 
14 He's not saying there wasn't a breach, if it did exist. So, 
15 I think we could take it as a given, for purposes of the 
16 motion, that the relationship was breached. It's a question 
17 of whether—if it exists. 
18 MR. RUSSELL: I think Margulies handles that—handles 
19 that. 
20 THE COURT: Okay, well, I guess, then that's all you 
21 need to say, I guess. 
22 MR. RUSSELL: With regard to the punitive damages 
23 claim, that existed prior to the fiduciary duty claim that 
24 was in our original complaint. The fiduciary duty claim was 
25 added after we found out in discovery of Arnold's conduct as 
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1 an attorney in all these various things. The punitive 
2 damage claim goes to his conduct, not his relationship. All 
3 of the things that I was just talking about are all things 
4 that would support an award of punitive damages, I would 
5 contend. 
6 So, as I said, I wanted to go through probably more 
7 than I needed to, because I want you to very seriously 
8 consider fees and costs in this case, under 78-27-56. You 
9 know that we have had a number of continuances. It was 
10 October, I think, of last year when we set a March trial 
11 date, and Mr. Arnold was going to get himself an attorney. 
12 He didn't do that until five months later. Now he's got 
13 one. Then we got continuances and allowances for more 
14 discovery, and what we got from all this time was an effort 
15 to come down and depose these people and try to manufacture 
16 a record, so that they could come in and say, well, he 
17 wasn't a member of the joint venture. Well, there was no 
18 direct attorney/client relationship. And I am, frankly, 
19 offended by the attempt. I mean, to suggest that Arnold 
20 wasn't in a joint venture with these people is just patently 
21 absurd, based on all of the evidence that we have, and more 
22 evidence that I could've given you, and more evidence that 
23 exists that we haven't been given. And to suggest that all 
24 of this conduct of his, as an attorney, knowing full well 
25 that they are being kept in the dark, lied to, deceived, 
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1 I  knowing all this, participating in all of this, and knowing 
2 that they're the ones that are going to eat all of the loss, 
3 everyone else — 
4 THE COURT: Well, that—but now you' re--you' re getting 
5 into things that the jury is going to have to decide now. 
6 Was his behavior outrageous? 
7 I MR. RUSSELL: But I'm saying — I'm saying that he had a 
duty. He knows what's going on. He had a duty, as an 
9 I  attorney for the group, these people being members of the 
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group, (inaudible) this, to make sure that they knew what 
was going on. 
THE COURT: Well—but I can't make that finding. 
That's not the decision for me to make at this time. 
MR. RUSSELL: No. You only need to decide that he had 
a fiduciary duty. 
THE COURT: That there's a factual issue about that. 
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. But—and that there's at least a 
factual issue about that, I don't think can be argued 
negatively in good faith. So, we've spent the last two 
months going through and reading every sentence of every 
deposition, going through all of these documents, presenting 
these large folders to you, forty or fifty hours, several 
more months. This thing was dead in the water four years 
ago. You have — you have responsibility, undoubtedly, under 
the note, the purchase of the interest and the 
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1 indemnification. Undoubtedly, the $212,000 is a loss that 
2 nobody can even argue about. Nobody's come forward and 
3 said, well, you know, I think we ought to take care of our 
4 share of that, Bob and Diane. They just--they just went 
5 away and hoped nothing would happen. Some of them declared 
6 bankruptcy, some of them went away, hoped that nothing would 
7 happen, and then later didn't give us things that they 
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should've of when we sued them, and now we get this. 
And so, I think that it's time that they understand 
that this is not a game anymore, and that, you know, these 
guys have been struggling every day since this happened, 
just to keep their heads above water. And if it's going to 
cost them 40 to 50 hours of time and these months, and just 
to have you rule against a partial summary judgment, that's 
a loss for them. That's a big loss for them, because then 
they have to--they have to pay for that, and I think that 
Mark Arnold should have to pay for it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lalli, I'm most interested in two 
points. I'm not going to decide on their request for 
attorney's fees at this time, at least I'm not going to 
grant it. I guess if you want to spend the time trying to 
persuade me that I should deny it, you're welcome to do 
that. But I think the two issues that have been raised here 
is--are, whether under Margulies v. Upchurch you can have a 
fiduciary duty, an attorney/client relationship filter down 
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1 I through the corporation or through the partnership to its 
2 individual members, and whether that might happen in this 
3 case. And the other one is, whether consent occurred by 
4 conduct, even though it never occurred in words, to create a 
5 partnership relationship here. 
6 MR. LALLI: Okay. Maybe I can start with the second 
7 I one first, because I think that's a little bit easier. I 
mean, they're basically making a ratification argument. 
9 || They' re saying that after Mark Arnold did all of these bad 
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things, that at the end, they came into a meeting at his 
office and that's where they learned that Mark Arnold had 
now purchased Lanto's interest. And they said, okay, and 
therefore ratified him being a partnership. I mean, in 
legal terminology, that's essentially what they're arguing, 
although they haven't articulated it that way. 
Well, first of all, that's just flat contradicted by 
the Normans' testimony. Flat contradicted. That's an 
argument that Mr. Russell came up with when he drafted his 
opposition memorandum. I mean, I've cited to the Court the 
Normans' deposition testimony. 
"Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold purchasing Lanto's 
interest?" 
Answer, "Never." 
"Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold becoming a 
partner?" 
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1 II Answer, "Never." 
2 It's not a matter of, did you consent at one time 
3 versus another? They never consented to it. I mean, Mr. 
4 Russell inconsistently told you that it wasn't until this 
5 lawsuit that they even learned about Lanto--the ostensible 
6 Lanto purchase. So, I mean, the Normans are on record, 
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under oath, as saying they never, ever consented in any way 
to Mark Arnold becoming a joint venture partner. 
And the Lanto interest, I admit that is an issue of 
fact for the jury, whether Mark Arnold purchased Lanto's 
interest — issue of fact. But that's cause of action number 
two, it's not cause of action number one. Cause of action 
number one is a breach of contract claim. Did Mark Arnold 
breach a specific written contract? Well, obviously, he 
didn't breach it if he never became a party to it. And the 
error, the logical error that the plaintiffs are making is 
that they are assuming that if you purchase someone's 
interest in a partnership, then you become a partner. Two 
different things. You can purchase--I mean, as we quoted to 
the Court from American Jurisprudence, a partner may sell 
his interest in the partnership to a third party, which is 
what they contend, but the sale does not alone make the 
third party a partner in the firm against the will and 
consent of the other partners. 
Utah Supreme Court, of course, defendant could not 
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1 become a member of the partnership without the consent of 
2 the original members. Utah Code, no person can berime a 
3 member of a partnership without the consent. The contract--
4 you can't become a member of the joint venture without the 
5 consent. 
6 THE COURT: What about the point that — that you can 
7 give consent in ways other than words? Eventually, if 
8 something happens, isn't—doesn't the law have to provide 
9 for consent occurring through conduct? 
10 MR. LALLI: I think the answer to that question is yes, 
11 it's just not one that fits this case. I mean, where—where 
12 in the facts —and he's asserted a lot of them—where does it 
13 say that the Normans consented? I asked them a specific 
14 question. Did you ever consent? No. And if they did—and 
15 think about it in this way, Your Honor. I mean, if, a year 
16 after all of these bad acts occurred, they somehow ratified 
17 Arnold becoming—I mean, haven't they ratified everything 
18 he's done? I mean, that argument just goes nowhere. 
19 But to answer your question, yeah. I suppose it's 
20 possible to consent, but that's not this case, and the 
21 Normans have expressly contradicted it. I mean, you can 
22 consent by somehow manifesting your agreement, but that 
23 never happened. And again, whether Arnold— 
24 THE COURT: Didn't they—weren't they notified that he 
25 I  was calling himself a —someone with an equity interest? 
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MR. LALLI: I don't believe he called himself that. 
THE COURT: We have--
3 I  MR. LALLI: And again, my answer to that, Your Honor, 
4 is so what? Mark Arnold may well have owned an equity 
5 interest in this property and, if he did, if the jury 
6 concludes that he purchased Lanto's interest and, therefore, 
7 owned equity, well, then they're--they're may be legal 
8 consequences that attach to that, but purchasing an equity 
9 interest does not make one a partner--they're two separate 
10 concepts. 
11 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
12 MR. LALLI: Let me move to the fiduciary duty and the 
13 Margulies case. And again, we're talking about apples and 
14 oranges here. The Margulies case--and, again, it says--I 
15 mean, our position on this summary judgment is an attorney's 
16 duty, his fiduciary duty, runs to the entity, all right? 
17 Now, it may be that there are other facts where there's also 
18 a relationship running to the individual members of the 
19 partnership, and that's what—the Hopper case talks about 
20 that, and that's what the partners in the Hopper case 
21 argued. They said, look, you know, we had this separate 
22 relationship, we had separate conversations, there were 
23 separate letters. But the Court ultimately found, no, no, 
24 you represented--you represented the partnership and not the 
25 partners. And in that case, they had something we don't 
40 
1 here. They had affidavits from the plaintiffs testifying 
2 that we had an attorney/client relationship, we relied 
3 individually on the lawyers. We don't have that. We don't 
4 have the Normans saying, we relied on Mark Arnold to be our 
5 lawyer. In fact, Your Honor, we have exactly, exactly the 
6 opposite. What we have is Bob Norman— 
7 Question: "In the event that--" well, let me back up. 
8 Question: "You believed that Arnold was just the 
9 lawyer for the entire group?" 
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Answer: "That's right." 
Question: "In the event that your interest became 
different from, say, Page or Barney, did you believe that 
Arnold would then represent your nterests rather than Page 
or Barney's?" 
Answer: "No. I was just as the group is the only 
thing." 
Your Honor, see, when they needed an independent 
lawyer, they went out and hired one, and that is something 
that's not contradicted. There is no evidence, not even 
their own self-serving testimony that says, yeah, you know 
what, we relied on Mark Arnold to look after our interests. 
We relied on the attorney to make sure all the money was 
spent, which is a (inaudible) anyway. I mean, that's not 
typically an attorney's duty, but there's nothing that says 
that they relied on it. 
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1 I  And you have the Margulies case. It talks about when 
2 you can have an attorney/client relationship. And it is the 
3 law that an attorney/client relationship can be created by 
4 either an expressed or an implied contract. All right, no 
5 argument here. No express contract. All right? And what 
6 Mr. Russell is trying to argue with this case is to say 
7 I that, well, there was an implied attorney/client 
relationship between the Normans and Arnold. And his 
9 || evidence for that is--is again a circular argument. He 
10 says, well, Arnold should've perceived that the other joint 
11 venture partners, Page and Barney, were trying to stick it 
12 to the Normans. I mean, he--and he should've taken the 
13 initiative, since it was their property who was put up, to 
14 make sure that their interest—and to do exactly what Bob 
15 
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Norman testified he wasn't supposed to do. All right? 
But what you don't have and what they have in the 
Margulies case is--is the plaintiffs were there saying, 
yeah, you know, we had an attorney/client relationship. 
Yeah, we relied on the attorney. And--but the law is the 
same. The law is the same. General rule is lawyer 
represents the entity not the individuals. If there's 
something more, if there's something more, then--then maybe 
there's an exception to that general rule, but we don't have 
that here. 
And, in fact, in the best case, which Mr. Russell has 
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1 chosen not to argue today, is one he cited in his opposition 
2 memorandum, and it's Stocks v. United States Fidelity and 
3 Guarantee Company, a Utah Court of Appeals case from this 
4 year. And what it says is, a shareholder may bring an 
5 individual cause of action if the harm to the corporation 
6 also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather than as 
7 a shareholder, and that's essentially what they're arguing 
8 with the Margulies case. But it goes on to say, this 
9 exception applies to cases in which the wrong itself is a 
10 violation of a duty arising from a contract, or otherwise, 
11 and owed directly to the shareholder. Well, we don't ever 
12 get there. We don't get to an implied attorney/client 
13 relationship, because the Normans haven't said that. That's 
14 Mr. Russell talking, in order to salvage a claim in summary 
15 judgment. All right? No evidence that the Normans relied 
16 on Arnold. Evidence is to the contrary. No evidence of a 
17 separate relationship. No evidence of the Normans going to 
18 Arnold independently and saying, hey, will you represent our 
19 interest in this? No evidence that that type of thing 
20 happened by conduct. No evidence of that. 
21 And let me conclude with one thought, Your Honor. Mr. 
22 Russell, obviously, is impassioned about his client's case 
23 here and, as a good plaintiff's lawyer, I would expect that. 
24 And I fully expect a fierce battle at trial, and he's going 
25 to put on a lot of evidence, some of which he's given the 
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1 Court today, to convince the jury that Mark Arnold's the bad 
2 guy here. And I'm going to contradict that, as best I can. 
3 But we, today, have a practical problem. The Court has 
4 a practical problem and Mr. Russell and I have a practical 
5 problem in preparing for trial, and that is this — on 
6 August 28th, we're going to impanel a jury and we're going 
7 to have tell them what the claims are. What legal 
8 pigeonholes do the facts of this case fit into? And that's 
9 our job today is to determine which legal pigeonholes it 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
fits into. 
At the end of the trial, the Court's going to have to 
instruct the jury, with instructions that we'll help prepare 
in advance. You know, when we try our case, we have to put 
on the evidence with specific elements of specific legal 
claims in mind, and we can't do that under a breach of 
contract theory or under a breach of fiduciary duty theory, 
because it doesn't fit. And our job today is to —is to get 
rid of those claims that don't fit, so that we all can focus 
on the claim that does fit, and that's the second one and 
that's what we're asking today. 
THE COURT: You know, it seems to me that when a 
partnership—I'm going to use the word "partnership"—they 
said, this is not a partnership, but that's the law that 
applies. A joint venture, in fact, is a partnership and 
there' s nothing else that—no other law that you can look 
4 4 
1 to. 
2 It seems to me that when a partnership--I know that 
3 it's a fundamental rule that one cannot be partners with 
4 someone with whom one does not wish to be a partner, and if 
5 one doesn't agree to being a partner with someone, no 
6 partnership can exist with that person. It can exist and it 
7 ceases to exist when you've stopped consenting to it. You 
8 can withdraw at any time. That's one of the characteristics 
9 of a partnership. And so, there's no question that one can 
10 sell one's partnership interest without the purchaser of the 
11 partnership interest becoming a partner. And what happens 
12 is—unless the partnership agreement provides differently, 
13 what happens when that occurs is that the act of selling the 
14 partnership interest dissolves the partnership. 
15 I think there—notwithstanding the Normans' statements 
16 that they never consented, I think there's a factual 
17 question as to whether, in fact, the conduct that followed 
18 Mr. Arnold purchasing the equity interest, and that being 
19 communicated to the Arnolds [sic], in fact, did constitute 
20 consent. And I think I can give a fairly understandable 
21 instruction to the jury that, before they can even consider 
22 the breach of contract question, they have .) consider 
23 whether the consent was given, because it's a fundamental 
24 rule of law that consent has to occur. And the jury is 
25 1 going to hear that they said, no, we never consented to it. 
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1 But notwithstanding their testimony that they never 
2 consented, if they understood that question as meaning, did 
3 I ever verbally consent, I think the jury could still find, 
4 from the evidence that I've heard, that, in fact, they did 
5 agree with it, by knowing of it and not objecting to it. 
6 And so, I think there does exist a factual question on 
7 that issue. I'm struggling with the answer to the other 
8 question, because not withstanding Margulies v. Upchurch is 
9 a case where the Supreme Court had to decide, when should a 
10 lawyer—when must a lawyer disqualify himself? And let's 
11 say Mr. Arnold was the attorney for this partnership, and 
12 let's suppose that then someone comes in and, in a 
13 completely unrelated matter, wants to sue one of these four 
14 people or five people or how many there — ever many there 
15 were, who are intimately involved with this company, and 
16 wants to sue one of them for something else. I think all of 
17 us would have some concern about that, as an ethical 
18 question. And Mr. Arnold would say—maybe would say, well, 
19 I only represented the partnership, and that's what happened 
20 in Margulies. And the Supreme Court says, well, you know, 
21 when you're representing the partnership, if they had 
22 something at stake of their own, then you're also—you also 
23 have an attorney/client relationship with them. They didn't 
24 say it, for purposes of interpreting the ethical rules, but 
25 I think the holding of the case has to be, for purposes of 
4 6 
1 the ethical rules, did an attorney/client relationship 
2 exist? Yes, definitely. I think they may not have been 
3 considering the question where a breach of the attorney's 
4 duty, a malpractice claim is being asserted. 
5 And we have the Fifth Circuit case where the Fifth 
6 Circuit said, well, if you want to raise that question, you 
7 raise it—the entity has to raise it. Otherwise, how is a 
8 lawyer going to know, representing an entity, when he has to 
9 consider the interest of each of the people who hold an 
10 investment in that entity? Has he got to go to each 
11 shareholder of a corporation and say, if you lose this 
12 investment, is your life going to be ruined? Does she have 
13 to go to the individual partners and say, are you 
14 individually liable here? It creates a real dilemma for 
15 lawyers. They can maybe avoid the ethical conflict question 
16 by withdrawing when notified that they've just sued somebody 
17 who's a partnership—who' s a partner in a partnership that 
18 they represent. 
19 But to put a lawyer, for purposes of evaluating 
20 fiduciary duty and who the lawyer's supposed to look out 
21 for, in the position of having to not only consider the 
22 interest of the entity, but also the interest of each member 
23 of the entity, then does the lawyer then have to advise each 
24 of them, well, I think this deal is a good deal for you and 
25 it's kind of a bad deal for you, and it's a—I can't tell 
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1 I whether it's a good deal or a bad deal for you. It might be 
2 a good deal if this happens, and a bad deal if this happens. 
3 You'd better each of you get your own lawyer to advise you 
4 about this. And they'll say to him or to her, we just came 
5 here and asked you to prepare some documents so we could 
6 move forward with this. And I'm struggling with what 
7 instruction I'm going to give to the jury about how they go 
8 about deciding that. 
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Mr. Russell, you started out saying that your clients 
agree that Mr. Arnold was just representing the partnership, 
but you finished by saying that he needed to consider the 
interests of your client, and he was also—had a fiduciary 
duty to consider them individually. I'm trying to figure 
out how I'm going to tell the jury how to evaluate these 
things and what the legal standard is. 
MR. RUSSELL: I think it would be based on his direct--
I mean, I can appreciate what the Court was saying if you're 
talking about a corporation that has lots of shareholders, 
or a partnership where you have lots of diverse people who 
may have various interests, but this case— 
THE COURT: You don't have lots of people in this 
partnership, but you have diverse interests, you do have 
diverse interests. And you're not just claiming that Mr. 
Arnold didn't do what he should've done for the partnership, 
you' re claiming that he allowed the other partners to screw 
48 
1 over the Normans basically--
2 MR. RUSSELL: And him--
3 THE COURT: --aren't you? 
4 MR. RUSSELL: And himself. 
5 THE COURT: He allowed himself and the others to screw 
6 over the Normans? 
7 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Well, of course, they--
9 I MR. RUSSELL: (Inaudible). 
10 THE COURT: --they could've--they could've brought an 
11 action, maybe they still can bring an action in fraud, 
12 saying they were screwed over by these other people. But--
13 MR. RUSSELL: In addition to that, if I may, Your 
14 Honor, and related to Margulies, we know that Mark Arnold 
15 also represented Norman Larson, which I think is a conflict, 
16 (inaudible) Lenders and Norman Young, which I think is 
17 conflict; Four D Development, which was a competing venture, 
18 taking money from this and using it for another, which is a 
19 conflict; Venture Properties II, which was doing the same 
20 thing, which is a conflict; Pacific Development, which later 
21 he tried--he actually tried to get this neighboring piece of 
22 property, this very Holiday Inn franchise, which is an 
23 amazing conflict, all the time that he was involved with 
24 these people. And I think that their knowledge of any one 
~r- II ^-p -Hhnc,^  conflicts--
49 
1 I  THE COURT: Why can't they just assert that—why can't 
2 the partnership assert all of those issues? What prevents 
3 this joint venture from asserting all those claims against 
4 Mr. Arnold? Because all of those that you've just 
5 articulated are things that — things that could be asserted 
6 by the partnership, couldn't they? 
7 1 MR. RUSSELL: Well, but as I said at the outset, the 
Moab Land Development joint venturers almost—in fact, it is 
9 I  irrelevant, because none of the so-called partners ever 
10 acted like it was an actual—they—everyone, except the 
11 Normans, had a venture going, which may have included the 
12 Normans, if the project in Moab worked, but only if it 
13 worked, but they were perfectly willing to use their land 
14 and their money to do all of these other things. If it 
15 worked out, fine. If it didn't work out, sorry, Bob and 
16 Diane, we're out of here. 
17 So, while — if a partnership actually existed that was 
18 interested in their interests, yes, they could bring the 
19 claim, but there wasn't. Page and Barney are just as bad as 
20 these other guys, but they're in—they've sought bankruptcy, 
21 and Arnold and Larson had their own deals going. 
22 THE COURT: But the partnership either existed or 
23 didn't exist. Are you saying it never existed? 
24 MR. RUSSELL: The Moab Land Development Joint Venture 
25 basically never existed, but there was a joint venture, as 
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1 I defined for the purpose of developing a Holiday Inn on the 
2 Normans' property in Moab. I don't think anybody could 
3 argue that. 
4 THE COURT: Well, okay. So, this joint—why can't this 
5 joint venture assert these claims? 
6 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I—we're going in circles now, but 
7 there isn't anyone who —the only people who have anything to 
8 recover are Bob and Diane Norman. The Holiday Inn didn't 
9 work. They had to sell their property, at a substantial 
10 loss, in order to avoid foreclosure. It disintegrated. 
11 And, in fact, on the same day that Arnold bought Lanto's 
12 interest, on the same day from Arnold's office, went out 
13 another letter saying, Four D Development is hereby 
14 dissolved. So, already they were scattering. And so, I 
15 guess, while a venture—the joint venture could bring the 
16 action, the only people interested in it are my clients. 
17 THE COURT: But they could still — they can act for the 
18 joint venture. They can say this joint venture was screwed 
19 over by Mark Arnold, he didn't do what he was supposed to do 
20 as the lawyer, committed malpractice, or acted with a 
21 conflict of interest — 
22 MR. RUSSELL: I'd be perfectly happy to do that, and 
23 that's why I indicated initially that it's important for the 
24 Court to keep open the possibility of—the probability that 
25 our pleadings are going to have to be amended to conform to 
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the evidence. That's a fine solution. 
2 I THE COURT: Well, you'll only--
3 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, can I respond to that? 
4 THE COURT: —be able to amend them to conform with the 
5 evidence, if Mr. Lalli let's the evidence in. You don't 
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just--you don't just have--the ordinary way a trial should 
proceed is that the evidence conforms to the pleadings. 
MR. RUSSELL: Correct. 
THE COURT: And if it doesn't conform to the pleadings, 
it ought not to be allowed in. But it frequently occurs 
that the lawyers understand, as they're proceeding to trial, 
that they're actually trying "A," even though the pleadings 
say "B," and if they understand that and act that way during 
the trial, then the pleadings do get amended to that--
conform to that. 
MR. RUSSELL: Okay, I just want— 
THE COURT: Mr. Lalli, I'm going to give you another 
chance. 
MR. LALLI: Yeah, I just wanted to respond to two 
points. One is, I think the fiduciary duty point, you know, 
Mr. Russell is identifying a number of conflicts that he 
thinks Arnold has, but if his fiduciary duty theory is 
correct, what he's saying is that Arnold was obligated to be 
in a relationship where there existed conflicts of interest. 
I mean, if--if Arnold's--! mean, first of all, the joint 
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1 I venture predated Arnold' s involvement and--the Normans and 
2 Page and Barney and Lanto and even Larson got together 
3 before Arnold. They came to him and wanted his help. But 
4 what they're suggesting is that Arnold has not only a duty 
5 to the joint venture, but also to take care of the Normans' 
6 interest personally. If he owes them a fiduciary duty, then 
7 I he still owes Page and Barney and Lanto, and to the extent--
and what they're saying is, because the Normans are the only 
9 || ones who put up property, he should've looked out for their 
10 I interest. Well, it was in the interest of Page and Barney 
11 || and Lanto for the Normans to put up that property; 
12 otherwise, they wouldn't have a joint development. And so 
13 he's proposing—he' s proposing a scenario under which a 
14 lawyer is obligated not only to represent the entity, but to 
15 represent the individuals. No lawyer could ever do that, 
16 because you couldn't get over Rule 1.7 of the Rules of 
17 Professional Conduct. It's a conflict of interest. 
18 And the second point is, why isn't the joint venture 
19 asserting it? The joint venture's not asserting a claim, 
20 first of all, because the joint venture wouldn't, because 
21 the other partners are going to testify just about the 
22 opposite of everything Mr. Russell has testified to today. 
23 But more important than that is—this is not a joint venture 
24 claim. I mean, this is a personal claim. They're claiming 
25 that we, the Normans, lost personally. They're not saying 
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1 the joint venture lost. They're not saying Arnold breached 
2 fiduciary duties, such as duties to disclose or duties to 
3 not have conflicts of interest. They're not saying that 
4 Arnold failed to disclose to the joint venture, because they 
5 know the uncontradicted evidence will be that Arnold was 
6 always talking with Page and Barney, who were the designated 
7 representatives of the joint venture, with whom he was 
8 supposed to deal. I mean, there's no non-disclosure going 
9 from Arnold to the joint venture, nor is there any conflict 
10 that wasn't agreed to by Page and Barney on behalf of the 
11 joint venture. 
12 So, if there were a joint venture claim, you know, I'd 
13 be happy to take that one on, but it would fail on summary 
14 judgment for entirely different reasons. 
15 THE COURT: I'm going to grant the summary judgment 
16 with respect to counts three and four, or cause of action 
17 three and four. Four topples because three topples. But I 
18 just don't think that a lawyer who represents a joint 
19 venture can be expected to, in addition to considering the--
20 in addition to advising the joint venture, advise each 
21 participant in the joint venture as to the particular 
22 relationships between that participant and each other 
23 participant in the joint venture. It means that every 
24 lawyer that represented a joint venture would, by that very 
25 act, have an inherent conflict of interest. 
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1 And I understand that the real claims for damages that 
2 the Normans are asserting have to do with their personal 
3 interests and not from the fact that the joint venture, as a 
4 whole, did not received what it should've received from 
5 Mr. Arnold. And so, I don't think I have to decide the 
6 question of whether the Normans could assert, on behalf of 
7 the joint venture, claims against Mr. Arnold, even though 
8 the majority of the joint venturers don't want to. 
9 MR. RUSSELL: One thing, Your Honor? 
10 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: I need clarification on why four topples 
12 because of three. As I said, the punitive damage claim was 
13 in initially before the fiduciary duty claim ever existed. 
14 THE COURT: Well, I don't think you—because they're 
15 both breach of—the remaining claims are both breach of 
16 contract now, and you don't get punitive damages for breach 
17 of contract. You could get it for breach of a fiduciary 
18 duty, but not for breach of contract. That's what I--that's 
19 the way I understand it. What you're left with now is 
20 contractual claims, and you don't get punitive damages on a 
21 contractual claim, you only get it on a tort claim. 
22 MR. RUSSELL: Well--
23 THE COURT: Have you got some authority that's 
24 different than that? 
?S I  MR. RUSSELL: No, but I don't think our claims are 
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1 I  limited to breach of contract claims. I mean, we're—we are 
2 alleging intentional, purposeful deception, like with the 
3 $40,000 or the $160,000 note, taking $8,000 off the top of 
4 the note and putting it in his own pocket, diverting funds 
5 to other ventures that the Normans were not involved in and 
6 had no knowledge of—basically theft. 
7 I THE COURT: Well, I have to just go by your complaint. 
If you had a—what is the name of the tort that you've 
asserted? 
10 || MR. RUSSELL: I didn't — I didn't assert it by name, but 
11 || I asserted conduct, which breached—I don't have my original 
12 || complaint with me--the Joint Venture Agreement and 
13 || (inaudible) asserted that it was done intentionally, 
14 I  maliciously, and with the—and to deprive them of their 
15 rights. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Well, do you have a case that says, 
17 if someone breaches a contract, and does so with terrible 
18 bad faith, that you can get punitive damages? 
19 MR. RUSSELL: I don't have one right in front of me, 
20 but I think—what I'm saying is that I think that the 
21 pleadings include more than a breach of contract claim. 
22 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, if that's the case, I don't 
23 know how I'd prepare for a trial. I mean, if I can't go by 
24 the complaint, I would go and just prepare for every 
25 possible cause of action that could possibly exist under any 
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scenario? 
2 I MR. RUSSELL: And that's—well, this is what I said at 
3 the beginning. We found out what happened after—nobody was 
4 going to tell us what they did. We didn't find out until 
5 after we sued them. We knew virtually nothing at the 
6 beginning, except that these folks were out over $200,000. 
7 Then we found out all of this—all of this (inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: Well, when—what happens, when you sue on a 
9 contract theory, and what you find out is that torts have 
10 been committed, what you can do is amend to assert a tort. 
11 In fact, that's what you did. But I threw the tort out that 
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you asserted, and if you don't have any other torts—if you 
don't—I guess your only option is to find a case that says, 
terrible con 'uct in breaching a contract does entitle you to 
punitive damages. If you find that and bring it to me 
before the trial starts, I can always undo what I've done 
here today. But my understanding of the law is that you 
don't get punitive damages on contract claims, you only get 
them on tort claims. And Mr. Lalli's—I guess, that's your 
position, isn't it? 
MR. LALLI: That is my position, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LALLI: And, moreover, Your Honor, I mean, there's 
been talk about the malicious breach of a contract, but that 
imDlies that there is some prohibition in a written contract 
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1 I  that he could've breached maliciously. But, you know, 
2 they've never said which provision of the joint venture 
3 agreement we breached, nor have they—and the only thing 
4 that was said on the promissory note is that we became an 
5 obligor on the promissory note, and I'm not sure how you 
6 would maliciously breach a promissory note. I mean, it 
7 doesn't make sense. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lalli, you can submit an order, 
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and I'll sign it. I am planning to have the trial on 
August 28th. If I can help you in some way to settle the 
case between now and then, I'm all in favor of it, but I'm 
proceeding on the assumption that we'll have a trial at that 
time. The Court will be in recess until 1:30. 
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1 THE COURT: Counsel, I'm sorry I wasn't here at 10:00. 
2 It's entirely my fault. I didn't have it written down on my 
3 calendar. It's probably because I originally had something 
4 scheduled at 9:00, and didn't think it was necessary, but 
5 when the thing at 9:00--the hearing at 9:00 disappeared, I 
6 didn't realize I needed to be here at 10:00 anyway. 
7 Do we just have your motion to amend, Mr. Russell, or 
8 did you file a 54 (b) motion? 
9 MR. RUSSELL: I didn't file a 54(b) motion. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Was there anything else besides your 
11 motion to amend? 
12 MR. RUSSELL: No. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. I'll permit you to speak first, but 
14 let me tell all of you the kind of—the way I understand the 
15 law in this area and then ask you, if you can, to help me 
16 with what I think is the biggest issue there. When a case 
17 is filed, I have maximum discretion to grant an amendment. 
18 In fact, my discretion is so maxed--is so great, initially, 
19 that I don't even have to give permission, it's automatic 
20 before the answer is filed, and I have no discretion at that 
21 time to deny a motion to amend. And as time passes, as we 
22 move from the time of filing a complaint to the time of 
23 trial, my discretion to grant narrows and my discretion to 
24 deny expands until, at the time of trial, I have no 
25 discretion to grant a motion to amend and every right to 
4 
1 deny a motion to amend right at trial, with the one 
2 exception, that if it appears that notwithstanding what the 
3 pleadings say, the parties have agreed to try a case that's 
4 different than what they pled, I can go ahead and try the 
5 case that they--I can go ahead and decide the case that they 
6 tried rather than the one that they pled. That narrowing 
7 and expanding of discretion occurs with the passage of time 
8 and also as certain milestones in the resolution of the 
9 lawsuit are passed. 
10 So, in looking at the amount of discretion I have, one 
11 looks not only at the passage of time, but where we are in 
12 the process. Is pleading completed? Is discovery 
13 completed? Have we had a scheduling conference? Has there 
14 been a pretrial order? Have the witnesses been designated? 
15 Have the exhibits been designated? So, I'm looking not just 
16 at the passage of time, but the occurrence of certain events 
17 along the way. 
18 My question is, and this is not the first time I've--
19 the question has occurred to me, I think it occurred to me 
20 when I was in practice, and I never got an answer. I don't 
21 know of any case that addresses the question. What happens 
22 in that unusual situation where you—that discretion to 
23 grant a motion to amend has narrowed down to nothing at the 
24 time of trial? When the trial doesn't actually occur and it 
?s I is put off for some period of time, for whatever reason, but 
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1 usually just for reasons — convenience of the Court—do we go 
2 back to where we were at that stage or do we say that the 
3 passage of time has —or do we say that the fact that the 
4 trial has come and gone means that we no longer may amend? 
5 Do I have no discretion whatsoever? Is my--or is my 
6 discretion exactly what it would've been three months, or 
7 whatever, before trial? Or is it somewhere in between? And 
8 if there's any case on that, I'd be thrilled to know what it 
9 is. So, go ahead, Mr. Russell. 
10 MR. RUSSELL: That's a good question, Your Honor, and I 
11 do not have a case that addresses that specifically. 
12 However, I think that the—by far the overriding provision 
13 of Rule 15 is that section that states that leave to amend 
14 shall be liberally granted in the interest of justice, or 
15 language to that effect. And I agree completely with the 
16 Court's analysis of the situation that led up to here, but— 
17 and there are a lot of cases out there that say that the 
18 Court—that it's not an abuse of a discretion for the Court 
19 to deny a motion to amend that's made on the day of trial. 
20 But there we get into law by head notes. 
21 This is not the case in that situation. There is not a 
22 case that I am aware of where the issue came up that 
23 involved such a kind of bizarre mistrial that occurred in 
24 this place, and then a subsequent setting four months hence. 
25 Now, that we were here, jury panel was here, we were ready 
6 
1 to try the case, the mistrial occurred, jury was dismissed. 
2 We couldn't come to an agreement on how to try the case and 
3 a mistrial was declared and a date for a new trial was set 
4 in January. Then we discussed the motions in limine, and 
5 the Court made certain rulings. I'm still unsure of exactly 
6 what they are—we haven't seen an order on those yet, nor on 
7 the summary judgment motion. 
8 But in any event, that factual situation, what actually 
9 happened, I think, is far more analogous to the situation 
10 where you have a pretrial where issues are defined or 
11 narrowed or certain things about the trial are changed as a 
12 result of the pretrial ruling, and then the cases say that 
13 leave to amend—the Court, once again, has a great deal of 
14 discretion to allow that. And so, I think that that's the 
15 situation that we're in. None of the cases cited in favor 
16 of the Court denying our motion has a fact situation even 
17 remotely like what actually occurred in this case. 
18 So, our effort in—our effort in amending the complaint 
19 was to try to make the complaint incorporate what I 
20 understand to be some of the Court's ruling and what I 
21 understand to be some of the positions of the defendant. 
22 For example, Western Empire Advisory should be a party, 
23 okay? Lanto should be a party. You can't get the relief 
24 that you are requesting without Lanto being a party. Well, 
25 I I mean, personally I disagree with that, but if that's — if 
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1 that is the ruling of the Court and that's the position of 
2 the defendants, it can hardly be said to be prejudicial to 
3 allow us to go ahead and do that now, and that's really what 
4 we're attempting to do with the motion to amend, and there's 
5 a motion to further amend, which incorporates —after the 
6 motion—the motion to amend was filed, again looking at it 
7 from the plaintiffs' perspective, and it seemed like some of 
8 the ways that we were seemingly being required to proceed 
9 was just going around in a circle to get back to where we 
10 thought we should be in the beginning. And so the motion to 
11 further amend was, okay, incorporating what we understand to 
12 be the Court's rulings, the defendants' position—why not 
13 just do it directly, instead of going around in a circle and 
14 to get back to the logical starting point? 
15 And so I'll submit it on that basis, unless the Court 
16 has any questions, which I'd be happy to answer, about the 
17 motions. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Russell. 
19 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, the Court's discretion to grant 
20 or not grant this motion to amend are unaffected by the 
21 fortuity of a mistrial that Mr. Russell has tried to 
22 capitalize on. And the reason that the Court's discretion 
23 is unaffected is not because I can cite the Court to a case 
24 where this has arisen, but I can only cite the Court to the 
25 Supreme Court's policy statements, which makes clear that 
1 they don't contemplate what happens in this situation 
2 because it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter if you get to 
3 the day of trial and one of jurors fails to disclose that 
4 he's been charged with a felony. That situation hasn't 
5 arisen in the case law, because it doesn't matter. What 
6 does matter—and I cite the Court to the Staker case, which 
7 is a Utah Supreme Court case we've cited in our papers — and 
8 the Court in that explains the grounds or the basis for 
9 which a motion to amend can be made, and it outlines the 
10 factors, as do numerous, numerous cases. 
11 But the reason that it doesn't matter if you get to the 
12 day of trial and then it gets postponed is because the 
13 reason for the rule that says, once you get to the date of 
14 trial, you can no longer amend, is because—it's one of 
15 timeliness, it's one of justification, and it's one of 
16 prejudice, and those are che factors that the Courts are 
17 instructed to look at. You have a situation where—and this 
18 is—and I'm referring to page 1190 of the Staker v. 
19 ft Huntington Cleveland Irrigation case, 664 P.2d. In that 
20 case, it was just the reverse—the motion to amend was made 
21 by the defendant rather than the plaintiff—the defendant 
22 wanted to amend his answer. But the Court denied that and 
23 then the Supreme Court upheld the denial, and it says—and 
24 this is the policy justification. It says, "In going to the 
25 1 expense of discovery and preparing for trial, the plaintiff 
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1 relied on defendant's answer, filed over two years prior to 
2 trial. Plaintiff pleaded his case and responded to 
3 discovery with specificity setting forth all relevant facts, 
4 events and dates. The essential facts upon which the 
5 proposed defense could've been asserted were known to the 
6 defendant from the beginning, defendant alleges no surprise, 
7 discovery of new evidence relating to the defense, or other 
8 justification for its delay in asserting a proposed defense, 
9 only insert amended complaint." 
10 What the Supreme Court is saying there is that the 
11 reason you can't amend shortly before or at or after the 
12 first day of the scheduled trial is because the other party 
13 has relied on your pleading, which we've done here, and 
14 that's our entire point. We have relied on their pleading, 
15 we've taken discovery, we've filed dispositive motions, 
16 we've filed motions in limine, we've prepared all of our 
17 witnesses for trial, we've prepared trial outlines. We've 
18 come to the Court prepared to try the case that they pled 
19 two years ago, and we've spent tens of thousands of dollars 
20 in that process, and it's not fair for us to now have to go 
21 into a situation where they've got new claims that require 
22 new discovery and new motions. 
23 THE COURT: But isn't it not quite as prejudicial as it 
24 was, because, on the day of trial, there was no way you 
25 could prepare for the new claims? But under the 
10 
1 circumstances we find ourselves in now, it is conceivable 
2 that you could prepare to try these claims, but you would 
3 have to do so at additional expense. Your trial 
4 preparation, which presumably would be sufficient, if I 
5 don't permit an amendment, could still take place, but it 
6 would involve additional preparation, additional discovery. 
7 1 mean — 
8 MR. LALLI: It'd require us— 
9 THE COURT: --it's not — the prejudice is not exactly 
10 the same as it would've been if I had granted the motion on 
11 the day of trial. 
12 MR. LALLI: In the sense — I mean, if — if the Court is 
13 considering the prejudice to be the ability or inability to 
14 prepare a case, then—then that is true. And my point, and 
15 I think what the Supreme Court is telling us, is that that's 
16 not the prejudice you look at. What you look at is, have 
17 the parties prepared their case, taken discovery, prepared 
18 motions in a reliance on the pleadings? 
19 And then you get to the second factor, which is the 
20 justification factor. What's the justification for the 
21 plaintiffs not having proposed this amendment earlier? Is 
22 it because there was some newly discovered fact or some new 
23 rule of law that came down from the Supreme Court two days 
24 before trial? No, that's not it. The only reason we don't 
2 5 II have or we didn't have a proposed amendment earlier is 
11 
1 because that's not the case they wanted to plead. And we 
2 did what we're supposed to do--we take their claims, we do 
3 our discovery, we prepare our motions. And the Court does 
4 what it's supposed to do—it rules on the motions and it 
5 appropriately granted our motion for summary judgment, and 
6 it appropriately granted our motions in limine. And it's 
7 only when that happens that the plaintiffs sit back and they 
8 say, well, gee, maybe we ought to try and do an end run. 
9 Maybe we ought to try something else. What we've tried so 
10 far, our strategy to date hasn't prevailed, and so let's try 
11 something else. Well, they can't do that. I mean, there's 
12 no principle of law that allows them to do that. There's no 
13 justification, which is the second element that the Courts 
14 look at. You've got the timeliness first, and the second is 
15 the justification. 
16 What they said in their papers is very telling, and I'm 
17 quoting from their reply brief: "The unusual circumstances 
18 of this case require the Court to be sensitive to the 
19 plaintiffs' need to amend their pleadings, as necessary, 
20 and/or allow the pleading to be deemed amended to conform to 
21 the evidence." What are the unusual circumstances of this 
22 case that prevented them from pleading, what they're now 
23 trying to do, a year or two years ago? This is not an 
24 unusual case. They're trying to plead causes of action. 
25 There's—and by their own admission, they knew of the facts 
12 
1 on which they're now predicating these proposed new claims 
2 over a year ago. There's no new law and, in fact, in a 
3 minute I'm going to explain to the Court why the claims that 
4 they've tried to plead don't fit any sort of legal theory, 
5 but there's no justification. The only justification is we 
6 lost our motions, and now we still want to try and get all 
7 of that bad evidence in the back door. 
8 And there's a fundamental problem here that has plagued 
9 their case from the beginning. And it's because they have 
10 ignored things like burden of proof. They begin with the 
11 premise that Mark Arnold did a whole bunch bad things and, 
12 therefore, is liable, and they become indignant at our 
13 motions because we have asked them and the Court to say, 
14 well, let's put those facts into specific legal claims. But 
15 their view is that actually having to plead specific 
16 elements of specific claims is a nuisance and a 
17 technicality, because they've already prejudged Arnold 
18 liable. Well, of course, that just turns things on its 
19 head. And as the Court knows, they have a burden of proof, 
20 and we have rules of procedure and rules of evidence for 
21 good reason. It's so that we can have a disciplined 
22 principled basis for assessing liability, rather than 
23 sympathy or prejudice, which is where they're going on this 
24 case. 
25 Speaking of prejudice, that's the third factor that the 
13 
1 Courts look to in determining whether or not a motion to 
2 amend should be granted, and I don't need to repeat myself, 
3 because the prejudice is simply that we've already prepared 
4 for the case once. They pled it, we did what we were 
5 supposed to do, and it's too late. We don't — there's no 
6 justification for requiring us to start this case over. 
7 The last basis on which the Court can deny this motion 
8 is simply futility. And if you take a look—and this is not 
9 a motion for summary judgment, I realize that, but if I.can 
10 persuade the Court--I mean, if I've been unsuccessful in 
11 persuading the Court that this is just flat out untimely and 
12 no justification, then let's look to the substance of what 
13 they're trying to do here, because it doesn't make sense on 
14 that level either. 
15 THE COURT: Didn't one of our Appellate Courts recently 
16 address the question of futility with respect to motions to 
17 amend, just in the past month? 
18 MR. LALLI: Well, we've cited a case in our papers, 
19 Your Honor, and I don't know if it's the one that the Court 
20 is focusing on. 
21 THE COURT: I think it was after you filed your brief. 
22 MR. LALLI: The case—the case we're talking about is 
23 the Andalux case, which is a 1994 case. 
24 THE COURT: Yeah. 
25 MR. LALLI: But that just talks about the futility. 
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1 THE COURT: We just — I think I just picked it up off 
2 the Internet in the past month, and I don't remember the 
3 details of it. 
4 MR. LALLI: Well, I — 
5 THE COURT: What I do remember is that the trial judge 
6 got reversed for finding that there was futility. It said 
7 you've got to be a little bit more generous in evaluating 
8 these claims. 
9 MR. LALLI: Well, and I don't know the facts and 
10 circumstances of that case. I'm sure that if that were 
11 something that happened at the outset of the case, that that 
12 would be different. And this is — it's, in some measure, a 
13 balancing test. 
14 THE COURT: Yeah, it may have been a motion — it may 
15 have been on a motion to set aside also a—to set aside a 
16 default. 
17 MR. LALLI: It may have been, but I am not aware that 
18 the futility point has been overruled. 
19 THE COURT: Well, futility's still there, I'm just 
20 wondering what the standard is. Is it—it certainly isn't 
21 you have to prove to me what you prove at trial. 
22 MR. LALLI: No. I think— 
23 THE COURT: And it can't—is it—you'd have t o — 
24 MR. LALLI: I—Your Honor, I think I can best explain 
25 the futility within the facts of this case, because they are 
15 
1 purporting to amend to add causes of action that either 
2 don't exist or don't make sense. And what — the first one 
3 that they' re--and let me take one step back—they have 
4 essentially filed two motions to amend, and I don't know if 
5 the Court has touched on that procedural history, but they 
6 filed their motion to amend, with a proposed amended 
7 complaint. We opposed it, and then they replied, and then 
8 they filed another one, and yet a second amended complaint, 
9 with yet a second motion to amend. And so I am lumping them 
10 all together in this case. But as I go through it, they're 
11 trying to do three things. One is, they're trying to add a 
12 new claim, which they have styled— 
13 THE COURT: Is this plan "B" or plan "A"? 
14 MR. LALLI: Well, it's both. 
15 THE COURT: You're going to tell me after plan "A" and 
16 plan "B" are both merged together— 
17 MR. LALLI: Right. 
18 THE COURT: —this is what they have left? 
19 MR. LALLI: This is what they have. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. LALLI: And I think that this—this graphically 
22 describes the futility of it. The first point is liability 
23 under the joint venture. And what they do is they go 
24 through and they note the provision of the joint venture 
25 agreement that says profits and losses of the joint venture 
16 
1 will be distributed among the partners, according to 
2 percentages that are identified on tapes, and a very common 
3 provision in a —and very common profits and loss division 
4 provision. Well, what they then go on to say, and their 
5 claim reads more like a jury verdict than an actual claim, 
6 because that's really all they're doing is saying that 
7 because everybody's liable, it ought — liability should be 
8 distributed evenly along Larson, Arnold, Page and Barney, 
9 because they all became partners in the joint venture 
10 agreement, and the Normans, even though they were partners 
11 in the joint venture agreement, they're saying that we 
12 don't—we don't have to share in the losses because we 
13 contributed the property. 
14 Well, you need to take a step back and analyze what 
15 they're saying here. And really what they're talking about 
16 is an accounting for the partnership. They're talking about 
17 dividing out the profits and losses. Well, what they want 
18 the Court to do in this case is just a partial accounting. 
19 They just want the Court to take the $212,000 that they say 
20 they lost on this promissory note and just divide that up. 
21 They don't want to take into account any other losses that 
22 any of the other so-called partners had, nor do they want to 
23 take into account just the distribution of the profits. I 
24 mean, if we take them at their word, what they've pled in 
25 their complaint, they contributed that property to the joint 
17 
1 venture. Well, they also sold that property and made about 
2 $160,000 in the process. So, if we're going to have an 
3 accounting of the partnership, that $160,000 goes back in. 
4 1 mean, they're talking about pleading a cause of action 
5 that doesn't exist, which is this partial accounting that 
6 they don't have to participate in. It doesn't exist. 
7 Moreover, the premise of that cause of action is they 
8 say that there was some oral agreement among all of the 
9 parties, parties to the joint venture agreement and the 
10 promissory note, and remember that my client, Mark Arnold, 
11 even under their theory, wasn't a party to either of those 
12 documents until well after they were made. But their theory 
13 is that—about why the Normans don't have to share in the 
14 profits and losses is because there was an oral agreement 
15 early on that said the Normans weren't going to have to pay. 
16 Well, that violates not only the parole evidence rule, but 
17 the statute of frauds, and aside from being the first time 
18 we've heard about that was when they filed this new amended-
19 -proposed amended complaint. So, the first cause of action 
20 doesn't exist, you don't have a partial accounting, it's 
21 barred by the parole evidence rule and the statute of 
22 frauds. 
23 The second cause of action, which just mystifies me, 
24 and I'm quoting here, it is for "individual liability for 
25 losses incurred by the business venture." Your Honor, I 
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1 have absolutely no idea what that cause of action is. This 
2 is, again, the plaintiffs making up law, making up 
3 procedure, making up legal claims, and instructing the jury, 
4 through their proposed amended complaint, that here's how 
5 you ought to divide it up. Well, that's not the way it 
6 works. I mean, as this Court said last time we were here, 
7 you don't just get to throw all of the evidence in and not 
8 let the jury decide who wins and loses. You have to pled 
9 specific claims, specific elements of claims, and they 
10 haven't done that. And they've got this—this, you know, 
11 just bizarre "individual liability for losses incurred by 
12 the business venture." Is that a tort? Is it a contract 
13 claim? I have no idea. I mean, that is the definition of a 
14 futile claim, if you don't even know what it is. 
15 And then the last thing they've tried to do, the third 
16 thing that they're trying to amend to include is to d o — t o 
17 get in their fiduciary duty claim through the back door, and 
18 the Court has already denied the breach of fiduciary duty 
19 claim that they had in their amended complaint, which has 
20 been operative for now almost a year—denied that on summary 
21 judgment, concluding that Mark Arnold did not owe a personal 
22 duty to the Normans and, therefore, did not, you know, could 
23 not have caused their personal losses. 
24 Well, now what they've done is they've latched onto 
?5 II this idea, which has been discussed in our arguments, that, 
19 
1 well, you know, maybe they can sue on behalf of the joint 
2 venture. Since Arnold's fiduciary duties ran to the joint 
3 venture rather than the Normans personally, well, let's just 
4 change the names and we can still have the same claim. 
5 Well, I mean, it just falls apart. I mean, you can't do 
6 that, because when you're talking about fiduciary duty or a 
7 negligence claim, I mean, the duty has a relationship to the 
8 damages. And what they were claiming in the first place is 
9 that Mark Arnold owed them a fiduciary duty, which meant he 
10 needed to tell them all of these things that were going on, 
11 a duty of disclosure, and because he didn't tell them, then 
12 he's, therefore, liable for causing their personal losses--
13 and it is their personal losses that we're talking about 
14 here. 
15 But in this case, the duty doesn't run to the Normans 
16 personally, it runs to the joint venture, but yet their 
17 claim is that he's still--by breaching duties to the joint 
18 venture, he somehow caused them personal loss. I mean, that 
19 just is two ships passing in the night. And the duty's got 
20 to relate to the loss, and you have to owe the duty to the 
21 same person who suffers the loss, and if Arnold's duty is to 
22 the joint venture, we need to be talking about joint venture 
23 losses, not the Normans' losses, and that's what their claim 
24 is. 
25 Now, one other point on the, you know, new fiduciary 
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1 duty claim is that the breach of duty—if they can sue on 
2 behalf of the joint venture, Arnold's breach needed to be a 
3 breach to the joint venture, not a breach to the Normans. 
4 Well, what they say in their papers is this — if Defendant 
5 Arnold had bothered to inform the plaintiffs of his conduct, 
6 as counsel for the joint venture, we would not be here 
7 today. What they're saying is that if Arnold had informed 
8 the Normans, that is, had he disclosed to them—again, 
9 that's the fiduciary duty that they're suggesting Arnold 
10 breaches, failure to disclose—had Arnold told them the 
11 things that were going on, well, then they wouldn't have a 
12 case. Well, that is precisely the claim that this Court 
13 dismissed on summary judgment. And by now saying it's on 
14 behalf of the joint venture, it's just a ruse. I mean, 
15 that's not what they're asserting. They're asserting their 
16 same personal fiduciary duty claim, only slapping a 
17 different label on it, and they can't do that, it doesn't 
18 work. And because it is undisputed that—that Page and 
19 Barney, the representatives of the joint venture, which the 
20 Normans admit in their deposition testimony that Page and 
21 Barney were the ones who are interfacing with Arnold, they 
22 knew all about this. And so there was no duty, there was no 
23 failure to disclose to the joint venture. 
24 So, in other words, what you have is them trying to 
25 assert the personal fiduciary duty claim, only slapping a 
21 
1 different label on it, but, in substance, it's the same 
2 thing. And so, the three claims are futile because they 
3 don't go anywhere. I mean, if anywhere, we're going in 
4 circles. I mean, the first two claims don't even exist, and 
5 the last one is simply a circular attempt to get back in 
6 what this Court has already dismissed once. 
7 Let me conclude by emphasizing that we don't have to 
8 amend this case, because there are two claims, the claims 
9 that they've pled from the outset that are still alive, and 
10 we came here prepared for trial on that, and we're still 
11 prepared to go to trial on that. They have a claim that 
12 Arnold became a partner, that he became a member of the 
13 joint venture, that he became a party to the joint venture 
14 agreement, and that he breached that, and if they can 
15 establish that, well, then they can recover. That's their 
16 claim. The other claim they have is for default on the 
17 trust note, on the promissory note. They say that Arnold 
18 somehow became Lanto and obligated on the promissory note 
19 and that when they had to pay the full amount of the 
20 promissory note, the other co-obligor should have to 
21 contribute to that. 
22 THE COURT: Well, they didn't say contribute, they said 
23 jointly and severally liable. 
24 MR. LALLI: Well, they did--the did say that, but as I 
25 understood the Court's leanings--! understood the Court to 
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1 be of the mind that they could treat that as a contribution 
2 claim. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. LALLI: I may have been mistaken in that, but my 
5 point, Your Honor, is--
6 THE COURT: Are you willing that I do that? Are you 
7 willing that we go ahead with a contribution claim, under 
8 the promissory note, and a claim that they bre ched the 
9 partnership agreement? 
10 MR. LALLI: Well, I mean, as far as the breach of 
11 partnership agreement, I don't think there is any kind of a 
12 dispute, because—and I think we're talking about the same 
13 thing. As far as the contribution, in this sense, I mean, 
14 as I understand the existing second claim, they have to--and 
15 they have to overcome several hurdles, and I think they're 
16 losing, and I'm going to be making an argument in closing or 
17 on directed verdict, because I don't think that claim 
18 survives either, I mean, I don't think they win on it. But 
19 what they would have to establish under that claim is that 
20 Arnold became—that by signing this one-page document we've 
21 referred to as the "Lanto Purchase Agreement" that he 
22 somehow became obligated on the promissory note and, you 
23 know, we're going to argue that he didn't become obligated 
24 on the promissory note, that the only thing that happened 
25 was that that meant that the Normans have to sue Lanto, and 
23 
1 if Lanto is found liable then he's entitled to 
2 indemnification from Arnold and Larson. 
3 But, I mean, if the Court's question is on 
4 contribution, you know, can we put that to the jury in a way 
5 that says, if you--if you find that Arnold became obligated 
6 to the Normans, as co-obligors, then they can be liable for 
7 what would—what would be one-half of a one-sixth interest, 
8 then that is my understanding of what the Court was ruling 
9 previously. I'm not sure if that answers your question. 
10 THE COURT: Right. Okay. 
11 MR. LALLI: But I don't think that requires any sort of 
12 amendment. I think that's just what their claim is. And, 
13 as I say, I--and there are many reasons why I think they're 
14 going to lose that and why they should lose it, but it's 
15 what they pled and it's in the complaint. 
16 THE COURT: Should they lose the promissory note claim 
17 because they said jointly and severally liable, instead of 
18 right of contribution? 
19 MR. LALLI: Well, I think that they should be bound by 
20 their pleadings, and last time I was here, or maybe it was 
21 the time before, I was arguing that they should lose because 
22 it says joint and several liability, and there's no such 
23 thing, and that is the context in which I understood the 
24 Court to rule, that the Court would treat that as 
25 contribution, rather than joint and several liability. 
24 
1 THE COURT: I may have said that. I don't remember 
2 saying that. I remember recognizing the problem, pointing 
3 it out. 
4 MR. LALLI: But, I mean, if--if the question is, you 
5 know, assuming they get over all of the hurdles on the 
6 breach of the trust deed claim, and it comes down to whether 
7 Arnold is held liable jointly and severally for 100 percent, 
8 or whether he's held liable for his percentage share of 
9 contribution, which would be one-half of one-sixth, then, 
10 yes, the latter is the way I think it should be done. So 
11 the answer would be yes, it would be on a contribution 
12 P r o rata kind of basis, rather than joint and several. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I'm just wondering if they had 
14 established everything in order to get one-half of one-
15 sixth. I'm very clear, they can't get 100 percent under 
16 that theory--
17 MR. LALLI: Right. 
18 THE COURT: —because under that theory then, it's like 
19 a dog chasing its tail. 
20 MR. LALLI: Right. 
21 THE COURT: Each signer of a promissory note would sue 
22 another signer for joint and several liability, and I don't 
23 know when that ends. 
24 MR. LALLI: It doesn't. I mean— 
25 I  THE COURT: Yeah. 
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1 MR. LALLI: — I think the Court's analysis on that is 
2 right on. 
3 THE COURT: So it's got to be a right of contribution 
4 theory. But supposing they established everything that they 
5 would be entitled to as consigners on a promissory note, 
6 everything that they would be required to establish a right 
7 of contribution, are you saying they should not have a right 
8 of contribution because they pled for something different? 
9 MR. LALLI: Well — 
10 THE COURT: I guess I'm asking whether you give 
11 something up that you might raise as a legal issue, as a 
12 legal bar to--
13 MR. LALLI: Well, I mean, my response to the joint and 
14 several liability is that's just simply incorrect law. 
15 THE COURT: Well, and you sold me on that. 
16 MR. LALLI: Right. 
17 THE COURT: The question i s — 
18 MR. LALLI: And—and— 
19 THE COURT: You didn't need to sell me on it, in fact. 
20 MR. LALLI: --and so, you know, my directed verdict 
21 argument is going to be that because it's incorrect law, I 
22 mean, you don't get joint and several liability, the claim 
23 fails. I mean, if--if the Court--
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. LALLI: If the Court says, which I understood the 
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1 Court to say, that, well, it--I mean, joint and several 
2 liability is a matter of whether it's 100 percent versus— 
3 which is what they' re claiming—versus one-half of one-
4 sixth, then, you know, I'll argue on that basis. 
5 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
6 MR. LALLI But I — 
7 THE COURT: So, I'll be facing a question of whether 
8 I--to use an analogy from the criminal law—whether I can 
9 give them a lessor included offense. They aren't entitled 
10 to the whole ball of wax, but they might be entitled to this 
11 lessor included thing. 
12 MR. LALLI: I think that's — 
13 THE COURT: Which might be considered as included under 
14 their grand theory of—under the promissory note. 
15 MR. LALLI: Right. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. And you'll be objecting to that, but 
17 I might say they can—they can get that. 
18 MR. LALLI: Right. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. I want to bring you back to the 
20 question that I suggested when we started and see if you can 
21 just help me at all with—you're taking the position that 
22 once you've gone to trial, all of the policy questions are 
23 exactly the same, and the language from the Supreme Court 
24 applies whether or not the case actually ends up resulting 
25 1 in a verdict on the date of the original trial. Once you 
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1 start a trial, according to your theory, that's it, you're 
2 out. You can't amend, unless something is tried by consent, 
3 by implied consent. But I've pointed out that at least 
4 there's — at least the nature of the prejudice changes 
5 somewhat if we get a new trial date three or four months 
6 later. You could prepare, you'd prepare at considerable 
7 expense, but you could prepare. It would not be impossible 
8 to prepare. Are there some—are there some—well, before I 
9 ask that question, it seems to me like this—this could 
10 arise in different circumstances. It could arise where the 
11 case does go to verdict, but it's reversed, and the case is 
12 sent back for a new trial. After the case is sent back for 
13 a new trial, can the parties move to amend, or have they 
14 kind of frozen? Have their legal theories been frozen by 
15 the appeal process? 
16 MR. LALLI: Well, in that situation — I — I don't know. 
17 I'm not aware of any cases on that. To me, the answer to 
18 the question is, you know, first of all, what is the policy 
19 that the rule addresses? And the policy is not merely one 
20 of do you have enough time to prepare? It is more a policy 
21 of, you know, having relied on (inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: It is—it is more than that. 
23 MR. LALLI: (Inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: It is more than that. 
25 MR. LALLI: But I think—I think the solution to the 
1 dilemma that the Court has, whether it's in a reverse, a 
2 reversal on appeal, or in this situation, is that you--you 
3 need--I mean, with the narrowing of the discretion in mind, 
4 you need to look at the factors that the Supreme Court has 
5 given us for determining when you can allow an amended 
6 pleading. And as the discretion gets narrower, their 
7 justification has to be more and more and more compelling. 
8 And so, you know, I think that's what you'd look to is, what 
9 is the justification of this? Is it something new, is it 
10 something they could have done earlier, it is something 
11 that, by their own choice, or some other reason, that they 
12 just strategically chose not to do? And that's clearly the 
13 case here. So--but I think you need to look at the factors. 
14 THE COURT: What kind of incentives do we want parties 
15 to have as they're approaching a trial? 
16 MR. LALLI: Well, I think you want--I think you want to 
17 narrow the issues for trial, which is what we've done here. 
18 And, you know, part of our strategy is to narrow the issues 
19 for trial, and we've admitted right from the beginning. Our 
20 first motion for summary judgment was for partial summary 
21 judgment. Now, we said, you know, look, there are some 
22 claims where they're disputed issues of fact and we're going 
23 to have to try them. 
24 But, you know, and I go back to a point I made earlier 
25 on, what they want to do, I mean, they stated it — and they 
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1 have stated as their expressed goal — and I'm quoting from 
2 their reply brief: "Plaintiffs' only goal is to get the 
3 evidence, the whole story as it were, before an impartial 
4 jury and let them decide who should be responsible for the 
5 losses." And they want a free-for-all (inaudible) to our 
6 summary judgment motion and our motions in limine. And all 
7 we've required them to do is everything that every other 
8 plaintiff in every other case has to do. They've got to 
9 plead the facts, they've got to fit into specific claims, 
10 and they've got to have evidentiary support. And the Court 
11 has appropriately limited the scope of trial. And that's 
12 certainly one of the objectives that you have preparing for 
13 trial. And I think one of the other objectives is cost 
14 effectiveness, judicial economy and, you know, I mean, if 
15 this motion to amend is granted, we're throwing those 
16 policies right out the door. 
17 THE COURT: Well, I want people, as they approach 
18 trial, to have an incentive to go with what they've got, 
19 rather than trying to come up with a reason to continue the 
20 case, so that they might do something else. 
21 MR. LALLI: I think that's right. And I'm—that's 
22 exactly why--and I think that's one of the policies behind 
23 the narrowing of the discretion, when it comes to amended 
24 pleadings. I mean, it's—our system of discovery is very 
25 wide open at the beginning of a case. And as the Court 
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1 indicated, you can freely amend as you're going through 
2 discovery. I mean, the rules of discovery are broad, but, 
3 you know, and—but then you get at the summary judgment 
4 procedure, which is specifically intended to limit issues 
5 for trial, you have motions in limine where you address--I 
6 mean, it's all a narrowing effect, and what they're asking 
7 the Court to do is open the flood gates. 
8 THE COURT: And if—and if—when we use the summary 
9 judgment process to narrow, all we do is educate people that 
10 they should've been over here and they end up expanding it 
11 again, then the summary judgment process is not having its 
12 intended purpose to narrow, right? 
13 MR. LALLI: Absolutely. Well, I mean, ask yourself 
14 this question, when does it end? I mean, let's say they 
15 amend now, we go out, we take more discovery. I can 
16 guarantee you we'd be making more motions. We'd be making a 
17 motion for summary judgment, I mean, for the futility 
18 reasons that I described. We'd be making motions. I think 
19 there's a reasonably good chance we'd win those, and then 
20 we'd be making more motions in limine. And then what are 
21 they going to do? They're going say, okay, well, you know, 
22 we need to amend our complaint again, because that didn't 
23 work either. And when does it end? 
24 I mean, if you don't narrow for trial and if you don't 
25 hold people to that, you have exactly what they want, which 
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1 || is a free-for-all, and our system of justice can't tolerate 
2 || that. I mean, everything about it is designed to prevent 
3 II that, 
4 I  THE COURT: .If I deny the motion to amend, then they 
5 still go forward on their claim of a breach of the 
6 partnership agreement, which you tried to get summary 
7 judgment on, but did not succeed? 
8 MR. LALLI: That's right. 
9 THE COURT: And they still go forward on their 
10 liability under the promissory note theory, which you didn't 
11 ever seek to--
12 MR. LALLI: We did not. 
13 THE COURT: —knock out. Do you think you could knock 
14 it out on summary judgment? 
15 MR. LALLI: It was our belief, at the time, that the 
16 circumstances of the Lanto purchase agreement created 
17 disputed issues of fact. I don't know if the Court recalls, 
18 my client's position is that he made that purchase not for 
19 himself, but on behalf of the other partners. And so, we 
20 believe that that was a disputed issue of fact that 
21 prevented us from prevailing in summary judgment. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. LALLI: I mean, that, you know, that's not to say 
24 that I'm conceding they're going to win on those cases. I 
25 mean, I'm going to--
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1 THE COURT: Yeah. You certainly made clear you don't 
2 think it's a very strong--
3 MR. LALLI: No, and I'm—I--my real feeling about this 
4 case is, they don't have a case against my client, because 
5 he didn't owe them a duty, he came in after the fact, and 
6 the only reason he's a plaintiff in this lawsuit is because 
7 he and Norm Larson are the only two left standing. I mean, 
8 the real defendants, the partners who got the Normans into 
9 this, are bankrupt, and they're not defendants. And, you 
10 know, that's why it's been so difficult for the plaintiffs 
11 to plead a case against Mark Arnold is because they've got 
12 the wrong guy and, you know, I don't need to disclose my 
13 entire closing argument, but that's really our view of this 
14 case. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Thanks. 
16 MR. LALLI: Thank you. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Haskins, aren't you the one that asked 
18 for this oral argument, or was that Mr. Lalli's fault? 
19 MR. HASKINS: What's that? 
20 MR. LALLI: I think— 
21 MR. HASKINS: We all joined in it. 
22 THE COURT: All right, well, go ahead then. 
23 MR. HASKINS: And I'm not going to reiterate what 
24 Mr. Lalli said--I echo his sentiments regarding this case, 
25 with a couple of exceptions. He makes some inferences that 
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1 he draws from the complaint that I cannot do. Frankly, the 
2 Court asked—queried us earlier about, you know, how narrow 
3 has the discretion of the Court come with regard to granting 
4 the plaintiffs an ability to again amend the complaint? 
5 Actually, they filed two motions to amend the complaint in 
6 the last — since September 15th, I received the first 
7 September 25th. I received a second motion to amend the 
8 complaint, which was, frankly, in response to our filed 
9 objections to the content of the amended complaints that 
10 were filed. 
11 But if you look at the case, this case was filed two 
12 years ago. Initially, they nam^a all of the original 
13 partners, two of which filed bankruptcy, and Mr. Lanto, who 
14 now they plead they want to bring back in some two years 
15 later. They want to bring in Western Empire Advisor and 
16 another defendant. So we're going to bring in new parties, 
17 one of which was made part of this matter from the very 
18 inception. Western Empire Advisors, they acknowledge in 
19 their own memorandum, was placed and made part of all of the 
20 documents in discovery when they filed the original motion 
21 to amend the complaint, over a year ago, when they modified 
22 and tried to establish fiduciary claims against Mr. Arnold, 
23 which the Court dismissed on summary judgment. So, it's 
24 just not timely. 
25 The biggest problem I see with their motions to amend, 
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1 even if you acknowledge I'm going to give them, I'm going to 
2 assume that they've got that very--what I consider to be a 
3 very small window of opportunity to amend, I'm going to 
4 allow that. It's just not going to stand up. It's an 
5 effort in futility. There are no allegations of duty, tort, 
6 or contract, specifically against Mr. Larson. 
7 They acknowledge, in the disposition taken by Mr. 
8 Norman in July of 1996, which was over a year after this 
9 original joint venture agreement had been prepared, 
10 Mr. Norman was specifically asked--and I'm referring to his 
11 deposition on page 91, "Did you have any agreements with 
12 Norm Larson?" 
13 "No, sir." 
14 Mr. Larson, through Western Empire, had written him a 
15 letter in June of 1996 stating, I will become part of the 
16 joint venture, if you can meet these terms. Mr. Norman's 
17 response to that was, he wasn't part of our joint venture, 
18 I'm not going to allow him to be part of the joint venture. 
19 It is not in conformance with the joint venture agreement we 
20 signed with these other joint venture people in 1995. So, 
21 based on that, they can't impute any liability or any duty 
22 to Mr. Larson. 
23 Now--and they don't even allege it. I mean, when I 
24 read this complaint, I can't even determine that—what their 
25 claims are, in all candor. If you review that complaint 
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1 Mr. Larson spend flying to Nevada trying--and Arizona trying 
2 to recover monies, flying all over the United States trying 
3 to get funding for this joint venture agreement, which he's 
4 never made a claim on? Those are claims that then he makes. 
5 And you've got to do an accounting with regard to all of the 
6 contributions that were made by each joint venture. Mr. 
7 Arnold, the Normans, Mr. Lanto, if he's allowed to now come 
8 in after a trial date, after discovery cutoffs have been 
9 done and all of these other issues. It opens up a whole new 
10 ball game. It's not just contribution on the promissory 
11 note, because Mr. Norman's position was, if you remember, he 
12 had purchased the actual franchise agreement from Holiday 
13 Inn Express. He was told, if you don't sign on the 
14 promissory note, we're not going to reimburse you the 
15 $50,000 that Western Empire Advisors spent to buy that 
16 franchise for Four D Development. So, he says, I'll sign 
17 it, the property is secured by the Normans' property. I've 
18 looked at the appraisals, they show 450--I have no exposure. 
19 So, then now what we're talking about is accounting as 
20 a joint venture, and it's acknowledged by the Normans that 
21 Mr. Larson was never part of the joint venture. The only 
22 other claim they've made, which makes no sense--I mean, they 
23 establish no duty, tort or contract—is that somehow he had 
24 a duty to them as a financial expert. Well, there's no law, 
25 there's no theory of law that we can rat-hole the facts into 
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1 that they can hold Mr. Larson liable on. 
2 The real problem comes down to this. The real culprits 
3 in this, if they are, and I don't know, filed bankruptcy. 
4 The automatic stay provisions of federal law applied to them 
5 and they were dismissed. They're the real culprits in this 
6 case. And what they're trying to do now is find someone 
7 else to pay for their damages and, unfortunately, Mr. Larson 
8 should not be one of them. And if you could get past that 
9 window of opportunity that Mr. Lalli so eloquently discussed 
10 with you, and I'm not going to reiterate our position on 
11 that--our papers and memorandum that we filed address that 
12 issue — it's just not going to stand up any way. 
13 So what we're going to do is we're going to spend a lot 
14 of money in attorneys' fees, we're going to do a — 
15 substantial more discovery, not to find out anything else, 
16 because they can't establish any duty to these people, they 
17 just can't do it. And on that basis alone, I think the 
18 motion to amend should be denied. And there is case law on 
19 that issue, that if the court determines that it is futile 
20 and that they can't beat the burden necessary to get it to a 
21 jury to make an appropriate decision, then it ought to be 
22 denied, and that's our position. Any questions? 
23 THE COURT: No. Thank you. 
24 MR. HASKINS: Thank you.' 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Russell? 
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111 MR. RUSSELL: Did you f i l e ( i n a u d i b l e ) ? 
2 MR. HASKINS: I did. 
3 MR. RUSSELL: I didn't get it. 
4 MR. HASKINS: I filed responses to both—both 
5 1 (inaudible). 
MR. RUSSELL: (Inaudible). Is that in the Court's 
file? 
THE COURT: I have something from Mr. Haskins in the 
9 || file. "Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to File Second 
10 || Amended Complaint/' filed September 20th. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: Oh. 
12 I THE COURT: You're on the mailing certificate, 
13 || September 18th. Is that all you filed, Mr. Haskins? 
14 MR. HASKINS: I did, and I recently filed a second 
15 objection to the motion received last week to file a 
16 second—or, actually, I guess in this case, would be a third 
17 amended complaint. 
18 THE COURT: That's not in my file. 
19 MR. HASKINS: That—frankly—what's interesting about 
20 this, Your Honor, I just received that last week. We were— 
21 it was even due. (Inaudible) I filed it in a hasty fashion, 
22 so that we could respond to it today, (inaudible) brought it 
23 down from Salt Lake City. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. RUSSELL: I believe you. All I'm saying is I never 
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1 (inaudible)— 
2 MR. HASKINS: You didn't ever-
3 MR. RUSSELL: --got to me (inaudible). Judge, if it is 
4 impossible for the Normans to recover their losses in this 
5 case, I wish you'd just say that clearly and maybe we could 
6 get an order that says that and we'll do what we need to do. 
7 This case is unusual and it is complicated. One thing, 
8 I don't think anybody—well, I'm not even going to say that. 
9 But one thing that I believe is certain is that a $160,000 
10 loan was obtained with the Normans' property pledged as 
11 collateral for that, and all of that money is gone, and the 
12 Normans solely had to bear that loss. Now, I can show you, 
13 with testimony of the defendants, and with evidence, some. 
14 things that you can hold in your hand, exactly where all of 
15 that money went and exactly who had responsibility for it. 
16 And that's—and when I say, what we want to do is, we 
17 want to give that to the jury and let them decide. If 
18 that's just throwing things into a pile and letting the jury 
19 decide, I thought, I guess naively, that that's what the 
20 purpose of a trial was. We have tried to get the Court to 
21 see that this Moab Land Development Joint Venture is really 
22 just a piece of paper. I mean, we've said that from the 
23 very beginning. The defendants have latched onto one 
24 paragraph of it that says that unless all parties agree, 
oR II then they're not partners. And they have latched onto that 
4 0 
1 as a means of avoiding liability, because there's no 
2 question that Mark Arnold and Norman Larson got that—got 
3 those loan proceeds and had sole authority for what happened 
4 to it. So they've taken that and they said, okay, we're not 
5 responsible. We don't have any duty to anybody. Somehow we 
6 just got this $160,000 deposited in my account, and I spent 
7 it, but I'm not responsible to anybody for that. 
8 If you look at the other provisions of the Moab Land 
9 Development Joint Venture, you'll see that it never existed 
10 in reality. Duane Barney was the one who was supposed to 
11 have a checking account and write the checks. He didn't — 
12 Norman Larson did, out of his own account. That — and that's 
13 why—that's why the case has been unusual. 
14 Now, we came in on the motion for partial summary 
15 judgment, and the Court said, Arnold's duty is to the joint 
16 venture, excuse me—to the joint venture, fine. That's the 
17 Court's ruling. If they' re —they' re determined to have the 
18 joint venture exist, so that they can rely on that provision 
19 in order to escape liability, then let's have the joint 
20 venture in as a partner or as a plaintiff, as the Court 
21 suggested. 
22 And it wouldn't be like a dog chasing its tail on the 
23 liability, because we show that the joint venture lost this 
24 money, but we also show that the Normans paid it all. And 
25 so, they're entitled to recover it from the other joint 
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1 venturers, and on the--and on the note, which says joint and 
2 several liability. Once again, the Court's decision, which 
3 we're not arguing with, is that that joint and several 
4 provision went to the Youngs. The Normans can't take 
5 advantage of it. But there, again, if they were to able to 
6 recover that, if they got joint and several liability, for 
7 example, for the entire amount against Mark Arnold, then he 
8 would have a claim against the other people for 
9 contribution, not endless joint and several. He would have 
10 a claim for contribution. And the reason that there is 
11 joint and several — 
12 THE COURT: Why does Mark Arnold only have a right 
13 of contribution, but Mr. Norman has a right to recover 
14 100 percent? 
15 MR. RUSSELL: Under our theory, he--they stepped into 
16 the shoes of the makers by paying the whole note off. But, 
17 again--
18 THE COURT: That can't be done. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: —the Court ruled and— 
20 THE COURT: Did they get an assignment from the maker 
21 of the promissory note? 
22 MR. RUSSELL: No. The original maker wasn't even in 
23 the picture any more, by the time they (inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: Did they get an assignment from the 
25 assignee of the original maker? 
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1 MR. RUSSELL: No. 
2 THE COURT: Well, of course, there's--there's problems 
3 with merger, even if you do that, but that's the way it's 
4 done. They might have been able to find some third party 
5 who was willing to buy it and assert this. 
6 MR. RUSSELL: But the Court's ruling on that is what it 
7 i s . 
8 THE COURT: Yeah, and I'm not very—I am not at all in 
9 doubt about that aspect of the law. There are certainly 
10 aspects of this case where I am in doubt, but that's not one 
11 of them. 
12 MR. RUSSELL: There has been some discussion about an 
13 amendment to the complaint engendering a whole lot more 
14 work. The facts are the same as they've always been since 
15 the beginning. The defendants were more aware of the facts 
16 than the plaintiffs were. We're not—we're not trying to 
17 change any facts at all. There is nothing new in the case 
18 under the amended complaints. We will--
19 THE COURT: Well, there would be the additional 
20 question of what were the dealings, because, at least on 
21 your fiduciary duty to the partnership aspect, the question 
22 is not what dealings were there between Mr. Norman and Mr. 
23 Larson or Mr. Arnold, it's what dealings were there between 
24 the partnership and Mr. Arnold or Mr. Larson? And there's 
25 probably more information about that than has been 
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1 || disclosed, to this point. 
2 || MR. RUSSELL: I'd love to hear it. They can--they had 
3 || those people listed as witnesses for trial. I assume that 
4 I they were going to come down here and say something, but 
5 they claim they don't have any duty to the partnership 
6 either. Never—we heard Mr. Haskins say that Mr. Larson was 
7 hired by Four D Development. Well, that's--
8 THE COURT: I think Mr. Larson says he has no duty to 
9 the partnership. I don't think Mr. Arnold says that, does 
10 he, Mr. Lalli? 
11 MR. LALLI: Mr. Arnold was the lawyer to the 
12 partnership for certain events. 
13 THE COURT: Yeah, so he would have some duty with 
14 respect to those actions, right? 
15 MR. LALLI: Yeah, and our position is that the Normans 
16 may not have known, but the joint venture knew and directed 
17 everything that Arnold did. 
18 THE COURT: Uh-huh, but unless there was something so 
19 out of the ordinary for these kinds of deals that Mr. Arnold 
20 should've known that the--that the persons acting for the 
21 partnership did not have that authority. He's entitled to 
22 rely on those people, right? 
23 MR. LALLI: That's right. 
24 MR. RUSSELL: Oh, and, Judge, I mean, Mr. Larson or 
?sllw.E.A. has no responsibility to the partnership, he was 
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1 hired. There's a contract the Court has seen, and for him 
2 to get this financing. And if he got financing, he would've 
3 been a 25 percent owner. 
4 THE COURT: Well, I'm not —I'm not accepting Mr. 
5 Haskins' position on that. I'm just saying I understand 
6 that to be Haskins' position that Larson had no duty to the 
7 partnership. He did not have a relationship that creates a 
8 duty. 
9 MR. RUSSELL: And all I want to do is be able to 
10 present the facts to a jury and let them—that they will — 
11 the only thing that we've done in this case, since we 
12 started doing anything, and we didn't do anything until 
13 Mr. Lalli was hired, is eliminate things from the case. 
14 Nothing has been added to the case. We've been chipping 
15 away at the case, to the point where it's not where—when I 
16 say it, I mean it. That's no longer our case. I don't 
17 recognize what it is, what our case is any more. 
18 THE COURT: And it's not viable. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: Pardon? 
20 THE COURT: It's not viable the way it is, right? I 
21 mean, you—there may be—Mr. Lalli says you can still go to 
22 trial on these two claims, but you really don't have much 
23 hope of prevailing on those, the way I've limited you on 
24 those, right? 
25 MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. RUSSELL: Because if Mr. Arnold can stand up and 
3 say, even though I secretly bought into this partnership and 
4 thereafter—and was in complete control of all of its 
5 assets, and told the whole rest of the world that I was a 
6 partner, I'm not a partner, and so I'm not liable, and I 
7 don't get to put in any of the evidence that shows that he 
8 really was, then I can't — then I can't prove it. But I 
9 think that I should be able to do that. 
10 The defendants today admit or have stated to the 
11 Court--not admit, but have stated the—what is absolutely 
12 obvious, that the losses in this case were born solely by 
13 the Normans. Now, if the—if the law, like I said right at 
14 the beginning, if the law precludes them from recovering, 
15 just tell us that, so we don't have to keep trying, because 
16 clearly they lost. There was no profit when they sold the 
17 land to Mr. Winkler—there was additional loss when they 
18 sold the land to Mr. Winkler, because they had to sell it 
19 for less than the property was worth. And Mr. Larson's 
20 expenses for flying all over the country, which I haven't 
21 heard about him flying anywhere except to Arizona, and I 
22 don't even know if he flew there, but that was part of his 
23 contract that he signed, which gave him this big, fat 
24 ability—if he'd just talked somebody in Arizona to lend him 
25 some money, he'd own 25 percent of the project. So let's 
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have the accounting. I know what the other people 
contributed—zero. Let's have it, if that's the way that we 
need to go. 
My understanding of the Court's ruling—again, we don't 
have the benefit of an order on the motions in limine--was 
that, no, the Arnolds don't have —can't recover joint and 
several liability, but they do have a claim in contribution. 
That's my understanding of it. So when we say, when we 
claimed that here's the note, here's the people that are 
responsible under it, here's how much it should be, that's 
our complaint. 
If they say, well, your figures are wrong, you come in 
and you put on evidence and the jury decides what the split 
is. It doesn't get kicked out because they don't agree with 
it. They—it's our claim that they're entitled to "X" 
contribution from these people. It's their claim that it's 
something different. Let them--make them prove something. 
There was a lot that came up in there, Your Honor, but 
really what we're after--I'm telling you honestly that, 
after the motions in limine, which the rulings on that which 
occurred after the joint—after the mistrial occurred, the 
trial was set four months down the line, I'm really not sure 
what we have left. And I think that what we have left is an 
unfair restriction on these folks' ability to recover. 
Because again, when the Court had liberal discretion to 
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1 I  amend, we didn't know what the facts were. We didn't know 
2 what the facts were until we—until we forced them out of 
3 these defendants. And saying that the real culprits are 
4 Page and Barney just--I mean, that's — let them prove that. 
5 THE COURT: So, if I don't grant your motion to amend, 
6 we're going to be wasting our time having a trial? 
7 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I mean, I'd have to — 
8 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
9 MR. RUSSELL: —before I give up on that totally, I 
10 need to see—I need see an order to see exactly where we 
11 are, but I don't. 
12 THE COURT: But you think we probably will be. So, if 
13 I'm not going to grant the motion to amend, you think I'll 
14 make a mistake by not granting the motion to amend? 
15 MR. RUSSELL: No. I think if you don't grant our 
16 motion, it would be —there' s—we couldn't get that reversed 
17 on appeal, because you certainly have the discretion to deny 
18 it. I don't think there's any question about that, under 
19 the circumstances, and I think an appeal on that issue would 
20 be futile. I d o — 
21 THE COURT: But you think I made a mistake on the 
22 summary judgment and on the motions in limine that— 
23 MR. RUSSELL: Well, the summary judgment we intended— 
24 we will appeal, eventually. On the motions in limine, I'm 
?R I  not —like I say, I'm not really sure what the Court's orders 
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1 were. I think that we certainly have a claim under the 
2 note. I think that we certainly should be able to try to 
3 prove that Mr. Arnold and Larson, W.E.A. are liable under 
4 the express indemnification of Mr. Lanto. We have--we have, 
5 by the way, we've hired a private investigator. We found 
6 Mr. Lanto and Mr. Rasmussen. The statue of limitations 
7 hasn't run yet on them. I don't—Mr. Lanto was never 
8 served. If the Court denies our motion, frankly, just 
9 giving everyone a heads up, we intend to sue Rasmussen and 
10 Lanto in a separate action, because we still have our 
11 contractual claims against them. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, I'd like to visit with you 
13 in my chambers, if it's all right. Are you willing to do 
14 that? 
15 MR. RUSSELL: Sure. 
16 [RECESS] 
17 THE COURT: Okay. I'm denying the motion to amend the 
18 complaint, and the reason I'm doing that is that I think 
19 it's certainly very late in the process. If I have any 
20 discretion to grant, I think I should do so only under 
21 circumstances where the equities overwhelmingly favor 
22 granting the amendment. And in this case, it seems to me 
23 that these facts were known earlier than right at trial, and 
24 that what is--what is really placing the plaintiff in the 
25 bind is a failure to predict what the ruling would be on 
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1 legal issues that the Court has made, and I think those 
2 might have been predicted better. 
3 Also, the — there certainly would be expense to the 
4 defendants in preparing for trial with the expanded claims, 
5 and they could prepare, but it would be expensive to do so. 
6 And I also think, as Mr. Lalli has argued, that there is 
7 real doubt about the viability of these claims and, although 
8 they may not be subject to attack on a motion for summary 
9 judgment, the likelihood of their succeeding is 
10 significantly less than 50 percent, particularly the--in 
11 effect, a derivative partner claim on behalf of the limited 
12 partnership is — or on behalf of the joint venture is 
13 something that I'm aware of no authority to support. It's 
14 an analogy to the derivative actions by shareholders. This 
15 may be the case where the Supreme Court would say, yeah, it 
16 should—there should be such a derivative action, but 
17 there's some—they are some legal theories that have not yet 
18 been approved, as far as I know, by any Appellate Courts in 
19 Utah. 
20 So, I'm denying the motion to amend the complaint, and 
21 I think that resolves all of the issues. Anything I didn't 
22 address that you needed me to resolve, counsel? 
23 MR. RUSSELL: I have a request, Your Honor. In order 
24 to get the record in the proper state, I think we need— 
25 THE COURT: The orders on the motion in limine? 
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1 MR. RUSSELL: --the findings of facts and conclusions 
2 of law and order on the motion for partial summary judgment. 
3 I think we need the findings and orders on the motions in 
4 limine, and then--and then this, as well. 
5 THE COURT: Did I--didn't I sign the partial summary 
6 judgment already? 
7 MR. RUSSELL: It's never been submitted. For that 
8 matter, Mr.--there's been no order reversing Mark Arnold's 
9 default judgment. If it's been submitted, I (inaudible). 
10 THE COURT: Well, both of you are entitled—or all of 
11 you are entitled to check the file and look and see what's 
12 there. I'll see that it's downstairs, if you want to look 
13 at it, or send somebody to look at it. 
14 MR. LALLI: I will check our file, and if we have — I'm 
15 pretty sure we filed orders on the summary judgment motion. 
16 THE COURT: I thought I'd signed one. 
17 MR. LALLI: Yeah. 
18 THE COURT: I thought I'd signed one. 
19 MR. LALLI: That's our recollection and (inaudible). 
20 THE COURT: You haven't submitted anything on the 
21 order—on the motion in limine? 
22 MR. LALLI: Motion in limine, we wanted to get the 
23 transcript first, and we've gotten that. That's—we'll 
24 submit that, as well. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. LALLI: And (inaudible). 
2 I THE COURT: And you submit one on the motion to amend, 
3 Mr. Lalli. Anyone else who thinks he's not acting quickly 
4 enough has the right to submit a proposed order, as well. 
5 And so, if he's--if you think he's delaying for some reason, 
6 to gain an advantage, I can sign your order, 
7 I MR. HASKINS: Your Honor, just for clarification, there 
were two motions to amend the complaint filed in the last 
9 I month. You're denying both of those motions (inaudible)9 
10 THE COURT: Right, they're both denied, 
11 MR. HASKINS: Okay. 
12 1 THE COURT: The Court will be in recess until 1:30. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. RUSSELL: And, Your Honor, I can combine my 
3 response to the defendants' motion and my own motions, so 
4 maybe it would makes sense for the defendants' motions to 
5 proceed. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Do you want to go first, Mr. 
7 Haskins? 
8 MR. HASKINS: Sure. Good morning, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Morning. 
10 MR. HASKINS: There are—can I seen (inaudible), 
11 please? There are essentially two causes of actions, as the 
12 Court is probably well aware, that are left remaining in 
13 this particular complaint. All the parties have filed 
14 motions for summary judgment with regard to those two 
15 particular causes of action. I think there's some key facts 
16 that I need to recite, but I'm not going to recite all the 
17 facts. Everyone has recited those facts in their motions. 
18 The Court has now had an opportunity to review all of those. 
19 I think the Court is well aware of all those essential 
20 facts. 
21 I think there are a number of things that are very 
22 important. First, there's a failure to join indispensable 
23 parties. Mr. Lanto's never been joined in this action. Mr. 
24 Rasmussen's never been joined in this action. Moab Land 
25 II Development, the joint venture that's at issue here, has 
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1 never been joined in this action. Western Empire Advisors, 
2 W.E.A., has never been joined in this action, even though 
3 now, for the first time, two weeks ago, we received a motion 
4 for summary judgment where it is first .alleged that W.E.A. 
5 is the alter ego of Mr. Larson, never made part of the 
6 complaint, and never made part of any affirmative pleadings, 
7 other than this motion for the first time we received a few 
8 weeks ago, prepared by counsel. 
9 It is agreed, and I think finally the plaintiffs agree, 
10 that Mr. Larson is not a member of the Moab Land Development 
11 Joint Venture. And for the first time, in their response to 
12 our motion for summary judgment, it is now raised that we've 
13 got this phantom joint venture that was created, including 
14 Mr. Larson and, pursuant to their pleadings, and/or Western 
15 Empire Advisors--never been pled, but for the first time in 
16 Mr. Norman's affidavit, and in their motion they claim, 
17 well, we have to agree that, based upon my deposition 
18 testimony and all of those things, indeed Mr. Larson was not 
19 a member of the joint venture, thus he--under the terms of 
20 the complaint and the allegations in the complaint, he has 
21 no responsibility under that joint venture agreement. 
22 Now we have this phantom joint venture that's unnamed 
23 and undefined, and the joint venture folks aren't even named 
24 or specified in their response and in the affidavit that's 
25 prepared by Norman, which is contradictory and contrary to 
1 the deposition testimony that we've alluded to in our 
2 motions. 
3 As the Court remembers, the joint venture agreement 
4 that was alleged and made part of in the complaint required 
5 consent of all the members to become a member of the joint 
6 venture. It is agreed now and conceded that with regard to, 
7 frankly, Arnold and Larson, there was no concession that—by 
8 the joint venture members that Mr. Larson would be a member 
9 of that joint venture. And nor did the Normans ever consent 
10 to Mr. Larson becoming a member of the joint venture. 
11 Their complaint, the first cause of action is a claim 
12 for breach of the joint venture agreement, in the first 
13 amended complaint. They attach a copy of that joint venture 
14 agreement. Two essential things are involved in that. The 
15 agreement requires that if there are going to be any 
16 modifications in that agreement, those modifications have to 
17 be made in writing. And they're--any additional joint 
18 venturers can only be included by consent of all parties, 
19 which didn't happen with regard to Mr. Larson. 
20 The only document that ties Mr. Larson to a joint 
21 venture is the document signed by Defendant Arnold, not 
22 signed by my client, purchasing Mr. Lanto's interest by 
23 Arnold and Western Empire Advisors, not Mr. Larson. Western 
24 Empire Advisors is not a party to this action, even though 
25 there's a veiled attempt in the motion for summary judgment, 
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1 filed by the plaintiffs in this case, to make a claim that 
2 the Court ought to allow W.E.A. be joined as a party under 
3 Rule 15. No motion's been filed to amend, again, other than 
4 the motions the Court previously addressed and denied. 
5 Under the first cause of action, the first step that 
6 is — that must be shown, and is undoubtedly conceded by the 
7 plaintiffs, is that Larson, to breach the agreement, must be 
8 a member of the joint venture and must be required to meet 
9 the standards and requirements imposed by the agreement. 
10 They can't meet that. They finally acknowledge it in their 
11 motion for summary judgment when they create this phantom 
12 entity they claim to be a joint venture. 
13 The only potential claim they can make, even if they 
14 could breach that, and then you've got the issue with regard 
15 to indispensable parties, who they have not joined, is that 
16 W.E.A. might be a member of the joint venture, if you can 
17 get past the consent issue, if you can get past the writing 
18 amendment issue. Then you come to the point, as was 
19 addressed by Mr. Lalli in his motions before trial, as to 
20 when the time line kicks in and, under the time line, there 
21 could be no damages assessed under the note or any damages 
22 assessed for breach of the joint venture agreement anyway. 
23 So, the way the pleading stands, as a matter of law, 
24 there is just no claim that the Normans can make against the 
25 Larsons, or excuse me, Mr. Larson. 
7 
1 I  THE COURT: The Normans' surviving claims right now are 
2 a claim that there's--a joint venture agreement is breached? 
3 MR. HASKINS: Right, it's breached. 
4 THE COURT: And they claim that others are responsible 
5 for the note that they ended up paying? 
6 MR. HASKINS: Right. And I'm going to address that. 
7 The second cause of action is this promissory note. Just a 
8 couple of things with regard to establishing a joint 
9 venture. The law is clear—there's got to be a community of 
10 interest, which the Normans agree there was not, with Mr. 
11 Larson. There's got to be a joint proprietary interest, 
12 which they agree with Mr. Larson there was not. There's got 
13 to be a mutual right to control in a joint venture. They 
14 testified--and we included the deposition testimony in our 
15 motion—that they agree that Mr. Larson never had any power 
16 with regard to this joint venture. And there's got to be a 
17 duty to share in losses, and they agree that there was no 
18 
19 
20 
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22 
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24 
25 
duty to share in losses. 
So they can't meet any of the standards imposed law to 
establish that Mr. Larson breached this joint venture. And 
they essentially, finally, in their motion for summary 
judgment, acknowledge that, with regard to the joint venture 
that they pled in their complaint, and that's when they 
create this fictional joint venture, in hopes, I think, to 
put a band-aid on the pleading problems that they have to 
1 address. 
2 There's no claim of partnership accounting. Of course, 
3 then you've got all these indispensable parties who 
4 should've been bought into the action. They now file a 
5 motion saying, well, we're going to file an independent 
6 action against Mr. Lanto, in March of 2001, and we're going 
7 to try and bring in these other parties now. In their 
8 motion for summary judgment, for the first time, agree that 
9 they should've brought in this party, but now they're going 
10 to try and solve or salvage that issue by claiming they're 
11 going to bring an independent action against Mr. Lanto. 
12 There's no--the partnership accounting also is 
13 interesting to me. In the response to our motion for 
14 summary judgment, they claim that Mr. Larson ought to pay, 
15 as a matter of law, the sum of $106,000. They don't add in 
16 all the other partners. There's no partnership accounting, 
17 because they've never pled it. No third party beneficiary 
18 claims, because there is no third party beneficiary action. 
19 Then, in the motion for summary judgment, directly 
20 contrary to what they claim in their response to our motion 
21 for summary judgment, then they ask the Court another—to do 
22 it another way. They ask the Court to apportion it as a 
23 matter of law on a 20 percent basis and try and bring in the 
24 other partners. And they claim now that Mr. Larson should 
25 pay $70,667. And I think what this goes to--goes to show 
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1 is, the way the pleadings sit, the way the file sits today, 
2 they don't even know what their position is, because, as a 
3 matter law, they can't bridge the gap to Mr. Larson, and 
4 they can't get past the fact that the pleadings, the way 
5 they sit now, do not allow for them to recover. There are 
6 no partnerships claims, no third party beneficiary claims— 
7 no claims that they can bridge to get a jury, or even if it 
8 was a bench trial, a judge to make a decision that meets the 
9 standard required by law. All they want to do is propose 
10 that, hey, our clients were wronged. We've only got two 
11 people standing. Two of the partners filed bankruptcy. We 
12 haven't joined Mr. Lanto, we haven't joined W.E.A., we 
13 haven't brought in Moab Land Development J.V. So, what we 
14 think is, we think our people have been wronged, thus, let's 
15 do it this way, as a matter of law. And the problem is, as 
16 a matter of law, they just cannot prevail. They can't do 
17 it. They can't meet the standard as required by law, based 
18 upon the first and second causes of actions that are left 
19 standing and that would be tried if we proceed to trial in 
2 0 January. 
21 Now, with regard to the issue concerning this joint and 
22 several liability and the promissory note. As the Court may 
23 well remember, my client signed, was one of the cosigners 
24 with seven other people on a note obligating themselves to 
25 the Youngs. Their claim is, because the Youngs were paid 
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1 off, and because there's this language in the promissory 
2 note that states that there's joint and several liability, 
3 even though it doesn't flow to the Normans, it flows to the 
4 Youngs, then my client, Mr. Larson, that Mr. Arnold is 
5 obligated under that joint and several liability provision 
6 to pay them for their losses. And as the Court stated, and 
7 which is consistent with the law, it would create this 
8 eternal round. I mean, you know, the other obligors would 
9 be suing each other. It would be impossible--just doesn't 
10 make any sense. It just doesn't make any sense, as a matter 
11 of law. 
12 Not only that, they haven't pled any contract causes of 
13 action—they can't, because there aren't any. And under 
14 tort law, there's no joint and several liability. So that 
15 cause of action fails the way it's pled. It just can't 
16 stand up. Any joint and several liability that would go to 
17 anyone would be Mr. Larson to the Youngs, not to the 
18 Normans. 
19 And as the Court stated—in our research and in our 
20 motion, we included—the only potential way that they could 
21 have the signers of that note jointly and severally liable 
22 to them would be if they would've purchased the Youngs' 
23 interest, under a third party beneficiary proceeding, which 
24 they did not do. Which they did not do. And not only that, 
25 the only claim they now make is that W.E.A., Western Empire 
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1 Advisors, Mr. Larson's corporation that he works with, that 
2 W.E.A. was obligated in any form, because they now allegedly 
3 became involved in this new joint venture that's not pled. 
4 And then for the first time, in their motion for 
5 summary judgment we received two weeks ago, they're now 
6 pleading an alter ego theory that, well, yeah, we concede 
7 now, we've got real problems in that we did not join the 
8 party that we should've joined, possibly, but now we're 
9 going to claim, well, how do we bridge that gap? Well, 
10 let's claim alter ego, even though it's never been pled, 
11 W.E.A. has never been joined in the complaint. Just the 
12 nature of the complaint, the way it sits today, they just 
13 can't prevail on that cause of action. 
14 Other than we've pled this thing, we've filed responses 
15 to their response to our motion, we've responded to their 
16 I motion for summary judgment, which addresses the same 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
.issues. Frankly, I think we've written and discussed this 
thing ad nauseam and I just don't think, as a matter of law, 
that they can prevail. Any questions? 
THE COURT: No. Thank you. Mr. Lalli? 
MR. LALLI: Thank you, Your Honor. Preliminarily, I--
THE COURT: I take it everybody's agreeing that these 
things are right and all the briefing that is required has 
come in--
MR. LALLI: Well--
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1 THE COURT: --and no one's claiming the right to file 
2 an additional brief, is that true? 
3 MR. LALLI: That was exactly the claim I wanted to 
4 make. We had our conference telephone call the other day, 
5 which I assume was not on the record, and it was my 
6 understanding, from that, that this was an agreement with 
7 the Court and the parties that our motion could be heard on 
8 shortened time, and based upon the briefing that's been 
9 submitted, and there's been multiple briefs by all the 
10 parties. So I would like to clarify that, for the record. 
11 (Inaudible). 
12 THE COURT: Does anyone object to that? 
13 MR. HASKINS: I agree. 
14 MR. RUSSELL: We agree. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. LALLI: With that, Your Honor, what I'd like to do 
17 is identify the two bases on which we believe we should be 
18 entitled to summary judgment. By negative implication, that 
19 also means that the plaintiff should not be entitled to 
20 summary judgment. So I'll approach it that way. 
21 What we have here is two breach of contract claims. 
22 The Normans are saying that Mark Arnold became a party to 
23 and breached a joint venture agreement and that he somehow 
24 became a party to or acquired obligations under a promissory 
25 note and breached that. 
13 
Let me talk about the breach of — 
2 I  THE COURT: Now, he didn't actually sign the promissory 
3 note, right? 
4 MR. LALLI: He didn't sign either one of them. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. But he didn't sign the promissory 
6 note? 
7 MR. LALLI: No. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 I MR. LALLI: No. Let me talk about the joint venture 
10 I  agreement first. He's just not a party to that agreement, 
11 and I've got another copy, although the Court's been 
12 provided with many didn't different copies. I think it's a 
13 stipulated fact that Mark Arnold is not a signatory to the 
14 joint venture agreement that he's accused of breaching. And 
15 the way they try to get around that, they try to go through 
16 the back door in two ways. The first thing they say is, 
17 well, even though he's not a signatory on the agreement, 
18 some eight or nine months after the agreement was entered 
19 into, Arnold became a partner in the joint venture, and they 
20 say he became a partner by purchasing Lanto's interest. 
21 Well, first of all, you don't become a partner in a 
22 joint venture by purchasing someone's equity interest. When 
23 we cited in our papers, okay, just a general proposition of 
24 law from Am. Jur. that says, "A partner may sell his 
25 I interest in the partnership to a third party, but the sale 
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1 I does not alone make the third party a partner in the firm, 
2 against the will and consent of the other partners/' 
3 So, even if Arnold had purchased Lanto's interest, 
4 which is a fact we dispute, but even if that had occurred, 
5 Arnold still does not become a partner in the joint venture, 
6 because the law requires that for somebody to become a 
7 partner, you have to have the unanimous consent of all the 
8 other partners. Now, that's set forth in the joint venture 
9 agreement. It's paragraph 1.7, where it says, "Additional 
10 
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joint venturers may be added to the joint venture at any 
time upon agreement of all of the then existing joint 
venturers." 
The Utah Code, Section 48-1-15(7) says that no person 
can become a member of a partnership without the consent of 
all the partners. Folsum v. Fenstrum, a case--a Utah 
Supreme Court case we've cited in our papers--of course, the 
defendant in that case could not become a member of the 
partnership without the consent of the original members of 
the firm. There's no dispute about the law. You don't 
become a partner if you don't have the consent. 
There's also no dispute on the facts. The Normans, in 
particular, never consented. And we've cited to the Court 
their deposition testimony. This is Mr. Norman's. 
Question: "Did you ever give your consent for any 
other individual to become a member of the joint venture?" 
15 
1 Answer: "The answer is no." 
2 And this is Mrs. Norman's deposition. 
3 Question: "Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold 
4 becoming a partner?" 
5 Answer: "Never." 
6 The Normans have unequivocally stated that they never 
7 consented. That right there means Arnold never became a 
8 partner. But we can take it even one step further. The law 
9 is that for Mark Arnold to have been a partner in the joint 
10 venture, you had to have all the consent of all of the 
11 partners. Even if the Normans--and they've tried to do that 
12 now, they've tried to go back and say, well, you know, we 
13 really never consented, but we somehow acquiesced by not 
14 objecting. Well, that argument doesn't make sense either, 
15 because they're two different things. I mean, not objecting 
16 is something different from giving consent. But even if we 
17 give them that, you don't have any evidence of consent from 
18 Page, from Barney, or from Lanto. There's an utter absence 
19 of evidence. 
20 And I will point out for the Court that this—this is a 
21 renewed motion on this first cause of action. We brought 
22 this motion originally last May, so the plaintiffs have had 
23 ample time to come forward with evidence that Page, Barney 
24 or Lanto consented to the partnership, but they haven't, and 
25 that's a failure of their burden of proof on summary 
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1 judgment. The only evidence that we have is Mark Arnold's 
2 affidavit where he says, nobody ever consented to me 
3 becoming a partner in the joint venture. 
4 So, on the law you have to have unanimous consent on 
5 the undisputed facts. You don't have them. The Normans 
6 denied giving their consent, and there's an absence of 
7 evidence from the other joint venturers about consent, and 
8 the conclusion is inescapable. Arnold can't be liable on a 
9 contract he didn't sign. And even if by becoming a joint 
10 venture partner that somehow made him liable on the 
11 contract, which I think is a dubious point, but he didn't 
12 become a partner, as a matter of law. 
13 The second cause of action is for liability under the 
14 promissory note. And again, like the joint venture 
15 agreement, Arnold didn't sign it. There were six people who 
16 signed it — Robert and Diane Norman, Page, Barney, Lanto and 
17 Larson. They all signed it and they agreed to be jointly 
18 and severally bound to the lender and the holder of the 
19 note, who were the Youngs. They wanted $160,000. Arnold is 
20 nowhere around. 
21 Now, again, the Normans tried to get Arnold liable on 
22 that note through the back door, and their argument is—and 
23 it goes back to this Lanto purchase agreement that, again, 
24 was executed some eight or nine months after the promissory 
25 I  note. They say that Arnold bought Lanto's interest and then 
17 
1 I  became—and, therefore, became liable on the note. Well, 
2 that is just a flat out misreading of the contract and a 
3 flat out misstatement of the law. The contract — and it's 
4 Exhibit 7 to our papers—but all it says is, the purchaser 
5 who—the purchaser is defined as Mark Arnold and Western 
6 Empire Advisors, collectively. It says, ''Purchaser agrees 
7 to hold seller/' that's Lanto, "harmless from any and all 
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claims arising out of the development of the above-mentioned 
projects, including but not limited to tort claims and 
claims on any notes for monies previously borrowed, totaling 
$160,000." 
So—and there's a big factual dispute about the fact 
and efficacy of this agreement and what the parties 
intended, but setting aside and assuming, for purposes of 
this motion, that Arnold did purchase Lanto's interest, the 
only connection between this purchase agreement and the 
promissory note, under which the Normans are suing, is that 
it says that the purchaser will hold the seller harmless. 
In essence, indemnify him against any claims on the 
promissory note. That does not create an obligation of Mark 
Arnold under the promissory note. What it creates, at most, 
is a contractual indemnification claim by Lanto against 
Arnold, and the Normans are at least two steps removed from 
that. 
THE COURT: So, if Lanto eventually has to pay that 
1 5 
1 promissory note, or a part of that promissory note, because 
2 Arnold didn't, then Arnold would have to pay Lanto? 
3 MR. LALLI: Well, Lanto would have a claim. 
4 THE COURT: Right. I'm setting aside the factual 
5 questions, assuming everything is resolved Lanto's way. 
6 Lanto can recover from Arnold what Lanto has to pay on the 
7 promissory note? 
8 MR. LALLI: In concept, yeah. 
9 THE COURT: Yeah. 
10 MR. LALLI: And subject to defenses and things like 
11 that. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. LALLI: And that's the way it would have to work. 
14 I mean, that's the way an indemnification--first of all--
15 THE COURT: Unless there's a—unless it was intended 
16 that the Normans and other signers of the note be 
17 beneficiaries of that contract between Lanto and Arnold? 
18 MR. LALLI: Well, that's a third party beneficiary 
19 argument that the Normans have presented in their papers. 
20 And, as Mr. Haskins points out, that's not in their 
21 complaint. But even so, I mean, other than the bare 
22 argument that the Normans were third party beneficiaries, 
23 there's absolutely no evidence to that effect. I mean, 
24 there's—the Normans admitted—have admitted that they 
25 didn't even know about that and they didn't see that 
19 
1 document until after this litigation was filed. 
2 But more importantly, I mean, the relevant intent would 
3 be the intent of the parties to that purchase agreement, 
4 which would be Arnold, Western Empire Advisors, and Lanto. 
5 And certainly there's nothing on the face of the document 
6 that suggests Lanto's co-obligors on the promissory note are 
7 intended third party beneficiaries. There's no evidence 
8 otherwise. I mean, there's no testimony, there's no 
9 document that suggests anybody ever intended that. And 
10 again, that's what summary judgment is. You got to come 
11 forward with some evidence to support your theory, and 
12 there's not--all there is, is a theory. So, you know, they 
13 don't—they don't get over the hurdle by that either. 
14 And it's a subtle point, but I think worth making, that 
15 even if somehow, rather than providing an indemnification 
16 obligation between Arnold and Lanto, this purchase agreement 
17 actually had the effect of placing, you know, taking Lanto's 
18 signature off the promissory note and putting Arnold's on 
19 that—I mean, it doesn't do that, but even if it did, the 
20 obligation is not among the co-obligors. I mean, Lanto, 
21 Normans, Larson, Page, and Barney, their obligation wasn't 
22 to one another. They had an obligation to the holder of the 
23 note. 
24 THE COURT: So, what you're saying is the promissory 
25 note really only defines the obligation between the 
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1 obligors, as a whole — 
2 MR. LALLI: Right. 
3 THE COURT: —and the obligees, as a whole. 
4 MR. LALLI: Right. 
5 THE COURT: And doesn't really define what the 
6 relationship is between the obligors. You must look 
7 elsewhere for--to define that. 
8 MR. LALLI: You've got to look elsewhere. And, you 
9 know, I'm hesitant to rewrite the plaintiffs' complaint for 
10 them, but if we were to do that, the way I see this 
11 unfolding is—what could've happened in a different lawsuit 
12 is the Normans claim that they have shouldered the entire 
13 burden of this promissory note. Well, they would, at least 
14 in theory, have some action for a contribution or, more 
15 appropriately, for a partnership accounting of the profits 
16 and losses. And they could've--they could have sued their 
17 partners on some theory. And if Lanto had been found liable 
18 for any share of that, then Lanto could have said, okay, 
19 well, Arnold, I've got this indemnification with you and 
20 Western Empire Advisors, so I'm going to sluff off my 
21 obligation on you. I mean, that is a theory that may have 
22 made sense. It's not one that's ever been advanced here. 
23 The bigger problem with that, and one that the Normans 
24 just simply refuse to acknowledge, is that they gave this 
?S I  property to the joint venture. And if we were to have this 
21 
1 contribution action or this partnership accounting action, 
2 the property is not the Normans' personal property after 
3 they gave it away. I mean, they donated that to an entity, 
4 a joint venture. And so, if there were an accounting 
5 action, you'd throw all of the assets and all of the 
6 liabilities into the pot. And, you know, the fact of the 
7 matter is here is--is the Normans treated that property as 
8 their own. I mean, they sold it in a private arms-length 
9 transaction that they chose to enter into. And they got, 
10 you know, over $100,000 in profit. Now, they didn't get as 
11 much as they think the property was worth, and that's how 
12 they get to this analysis (inaudible). 
13 THE COURT: Well, there's all sorts of possibilities 
14 for that, aren't there? Maybe the facts are that they 
15 didn't donate the land to the partnership, they loaned it to 
16 the partnership. They allowed the partnership to use it in 
17 order to borrow some money. That's—there's all sorts of 
18 factual questions there, aren't there--
19 MR. LALLI: Yes, I mean— 
20 THE COURT: —about what the terms were of this 
21 partnership agreement, as far as what their plans were for 
22 what each party was contributing? 
23 MR. LALLI: You're right. I mean, it's—there's no 
24 evidence that this (inaudible). That's— 
25 THE COURT: There's no partnership agreement. Is there 
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1 a partnership agreement that says the Normans are donating 
2 this? 
3 MR. LALLI: Well, sure. I mean, if you look at — it's 
4 Exhibit 2 to our papers — if you look at —if you look at 
5 paragraph 3.1, on page two, it says, "Each joint venturer 
6 shall make a contribution to the joint venture in cash, 
7 property, or expertise/' And then as you go to the exhibits 
8 to the agreement, it shows that the ^ormans' contribution is 
9 acreage — 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Okay, right. 
MR. LALLI: —and the others — 
THE COURT: That suggests they weren't—they weren't 
lending it — 
MR. LALLI: Right. • 
THE COURT: —they were giving it. 
MR. LALLI: Right. You know, and—you know, there are 
other provisions in there that make it clear. I mean, they 
say that this property is supposed to be conveyed to an LLC, 
once it's formed. It says that—you know, what didn't 
happen is the Normans never deeded the property to the joint 
venture, but that's, you know, that's a ministerial or 
clerical kind of miscue that this partnership did. 
In any event, I've gotten off on a tangent, and I don't 
want to go— 
THE COURT: Really, it doesn't have to do with you, I 
23 
1 mean, your theory, because your guy never was a member of 
2 the partnership anyway. 
3 MR. LALLI: Right. 
4 THE COURT: What does the care? 
5 MR. LALLI: Right. And the reason I go off on that 
6 tangent is because the Normans have, throughout this case, 
7 tried to articulate some equitable theory about, you know, 
8 how it's just not fair for them to have to shoulder the 
9 entire burden of this partnership. But the problems is, is 
10 their shouldering the burden of the partnership is not an 
11 accurate statement, first of all, because they also got a 
12 substantial amount of the benefit of the partnership that 
13 wasn't shared either. I mean, if we were going to have an 
14 accounting here, the Normans--you know, if you put all of 
15 the partnership losses into it, and the partnership profits, 
16 which was the sale of the real property, well, you're 
17 probably still going to be in a deficit situation, but it's 
18 not going to be $212,000, and it's not all going to go to 
19 the Normans. 
20 And so, I don't think that equitable fairness type of 
21 argument that they've advanced has even the least bit to do 
22 with our motion, because our motion is simply Arnold's not a 
23 party to either of the contracts he's accused of breaching 
24 and he didn't become a partner, and there's just no evidence 
25 that he ever did. It's as simple as that. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. LALLI: Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Russell? 
4 MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Your Honor. Do you mind if I 
5 take off my coat? 
6 THE COURT: No. 
7 MR. RUSSELL: It's hot in here. Your Honor, I don't 
8 know whether this case reminds me more of our recent 
9 election fiasco or Alice in Wonderland. 
10 As I understand it, we're here pretty much at the 
11 Court's invitation to see if can get this case wrapped up 
12 into a package, and so everyone has taken their shot at 
13 that, and we hear nothing, absolutely nothing new from the 
14 defendants. And it's true that, as we've gone along, we've 
15 been—how long have we been doing this, Your Honor, about 
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eight months or so? And I'm pretty sure that one of the 
first things, if not the first thing out of my mouth, the 
first time before you in Court, was that this case is an 
unusual case. The pleadings are admittedly not perfect, 
because we didn't know all of the facts when the claim was 
filed—in fact, we found out most of them afterwards. And I 
have been trying, trying, trying, ever since we first got 
here, to see if I could get you to understand that and make 
allowance for the fact that evidence was withheld from the 
Normans. 
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1 I  The property was never donated to the partnership. I 
2 || think we all understand the statute of frauds. There is no 
deed from Robert and Diane Norman to the Moab Land 
4 || Development Joint Venture. And that is just the beginning 
5 || of all of the reasons why the Moab Land Development Joint 
6 || Venture never really existed, other than on a piece of 
7 || paper. The defendants take great comfort in two things. If 
8 you de-construct all of their arguments, it goes back to two 
9 things. The first thing is, the Moab Land Development Joint 
10 Venture, which, if it ever existed, and it probably didn't, 
11 they, Arnold and Larson, by themselves, with no help from 
12 anybody else, destroyed. And second, one line from that 
13 joint venture agreement that says that you can't be a 
14 partner unless all of the other partners agree. All of it 
15 goes back to that. So you have to—in order to buy the 
16 position, you have to set aside all of the real facts, all 
17 of the real evidence, everything that we know happened, 
18 everything that we know two people, Arnold and Larson, 
19 nobody else did, they did--they did everything that got us 
20 to this point, with a failure, an utter failure of the joint 
21 venture, destruction of the joint venture. So let's look at 
22 that joint venture, Your Honor. You've seen it a lot. 
23 You have partners, Robert and Diane. You have Pete 
24 Lanto, he's "the builder. You have Duane Barney, he's the 
25 administrative agent. You have Eric Rasmussen, well, who's 
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1 I that? He never even arrived on the scene. Greg Page took 
2 his place. Is that not a violation of the joint venture? 
3 Does that not end the joint venture right then and there? 
4 You have the requirement that Duane Barney controlled the 
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joint venture funds, that Duane Barney have the checking 
account for the joint venture. Well, Duane Barney never did 
that--Norman Larson did that. He had sole control of the 
joint venture funds, he had sole control of the checking 
account. Does that not work at dissolution of the joint 
venture? 
You have another agreement requiring unanimity in 
there, which is that joint venture funds can only be used 
for the Moab project. Well, we know that Mark Arnold and 
Norm Larson, themselves, nobody else, Norman Larson 
individually developed their little side venture, Venture 
Properties II, and in that syphoned off money from the Moab 
project to the Park City project. They didn't get anybody's 
permission to do that. So they're acting outside this joint 
venture. The joint venture was destroyed from the 
beginning. It never—it never operated at all. It was just 
something that they got the Normans to sign, so that they 
could have this property available to go get this loan. 
Now, we also know--just a little reality check, and 
I'll say some things that sound like questions to the Court, 
and you can ignore them or not, but just as a reality check, 
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1 I  two pieces of paper that I think are important, one being 
2 the purchase agreement. You've seen it many, many times. I 
3 think it's an integrated document. I think it's perfectly 
4 clear and it's totally unambiguous. It's very clear what 
5 the intent is and, if you don't get it from the document 
6 itself, you get it from their sworn testimony, which is in 
7 my pleading. They intended to purchase Lanto's interest, 
8 take his place in the venture. That's what they intended, 
9 and that's what they did. And not only did they do that, 
10 but they did it by, in fact, stealing the money from the 
11 joint venture itself. They used money from the joint 
12 venture to purchase their way in, and they never paid it 
13 back. They never paid back the $10,000 that they had 
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syphoned off for the Park City project. They stole it. 
That's an implied word, but that is what they did. So, we 
have that. 
And the other piece of paper is the promissory note. 
Mark Arnold went—prepared it, went to his client, made this 
screaming deal at 18 percent interest, $16,000 to the 
defendants, those two defendants individually, and there's 
people that signed on it. Now, if you sign a promissory 
note, are you not liable on the note? Could not Ann Young 
have gone to Norman Larson and said, hey, you know, the 
90 days have passed, you haven't paid anything. You haven't 
paid any interest, you haven't paid anything. You've got 
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1 I  all the money. I want to be paid. 
2|| THE COURT: She couldn't have. 
MR. RUSSELL: She could have. 
4 || THE COURT: No, she couldn't have. She'd had--she'd 
5 || have had to foreclose on the property first, because of the 
one action rule. 
7 I MR. RUSSELL: Okay. But we know, we know from the 
8 defendants' sworn testimony that the reason that Norman 
9 Larson individually—not W.E.A., but that Norman Larson 
10 I  individually—signed the note was because Ann Young wanted 
11 || him there. Told her attorney, Mark Arnold, I don't know 
12 these ctner people. I want Norman Larson on this note, 
13 because I want to be sure that I--
14 THE COURT: His credit's good with me. 
15 MR. RUSSELL: —that I get paid back. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. That doesn't mean that the one 
17 action rule is obviated. That's statute. It's— 
18 MR. RUSSELL: I understand that. 
19 THE COURT: --(inaudible). 
20 MR. RUSSELL: I understand that. And—but we—but we 
21 hear all of these arguments about different beneficiaries, 
22 about you haven't joined indispensable parties, you haven't 
23 done this, you haven't done that. But so let's just take 
24 it. Let's just take it into the real world and let's say 
25 1 that the Youngs did foreclose and, by the way, they did 
2 9 
1 threaten to, according to Arnold, and so that's when he 
2 scurried off and got another client to take over the note, 
3 because he--they--he knew that he would have to pay if she 
4 foreclosed, and Norman Larson would have to pay if she 
5 foreclosed. So we got somebody else who would hold on to it 
6 longer. But let's just say that she did--I mean, I just--
7 what I want (inaudible) is just put this case in the real 
8 world. 
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If there was a foreclosure by Young, Winkler, anybody 
else. Okay, they filed the action, there's 90 days to 
redeem, to cure the default. So, what are the--what happens 
when that notice comes out? The people who are liable on 
the note are going to get together and they're going to say, 
how are we going to pay off this note? We're all jointly 
and severally liable. You know, if this note doesn't get 
paid off, whoever has to pay it is going to end up with a 
claim against the others. This is the reality of it. And 
if it was foreclosed and the property was sold, then there 
would be a loss. There would be a loss of at least the 
amount of the note, plus the accrued interest. 
THE COURT: What evidence do you have about any 
discussion amongst the makers of the promissory note, those 
people that signed it, as to what would--who would be 
responsible to pay it? 
MR. RUSSELL: We have the April 10th letter. I believe 
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ill it's an exhibit to Mr. Larson's objection to plaintiffs' 
2 motion for summary judgment. This is the April 10th letter 
3 from Greg Page to Norm Larson, in which it's obvious, quite 
4 obvious that Norm Larson's being treated as an individual, 
5 I  not as W.E.A. 
THE COURT: Where is that letter? 
MR. RUSSELL: It's Exhibit "D" to Larson's response to 
8 I  plaintiffs' motion. 
9 THE COURT: What day was that filed on? I'm having 
10 trouble finding that. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: I can give you a copy, Your Honor. I'm 
12 getting (inaudible). I'll just let you use mine. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate it. 
14 MR. RUSSELL: And that letter states that the partners, 
15 including Norm Larson, as a partner, if you'll note, got 
16 together and it basically goes through the history of what's 
17 happened. Larson got the money, he spent the money, he 
18 didn't get the financing. And so the partners, all of them 
19 are saying, Norm, you've got to pay this back. And it's 
20 written as if that was the agreement, at least that's the 
21 way I read it. So, there's one thing, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. So, this is evidence of what Greg 
23 Page — the position Greg Page was taking after things had 
24 gone sour. But do you have any documentation as to what the 
25 agreement was between the makers of the promissory note that 
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1 was contemporaneous with the agreement? 
2 MR. RUSSELL: No. 
3 THE COURT: This is, you know, it can be looked at as 
4 pretty self-serving for Mr. Page to say this, at this point. 
5 And, of course, he's--where is he? 
6 MR. RUSSELL: Bankrupt. But as I was saying, Your 
7 Honor, if there was a foreclosure, there's going to be a 
8 loss--there's a loss in the amount of the note, plus 
9 interest, plus it's a foreclosure sale. It's probably going 
10 to be sold for less than it's worth. Then you're going to 
11 have this number. And then the people that are liable under 
12 the note fight about who owes it. And the note says "joint 
13 and several," and I realize that that goes to Young, but 
14 that's what it says. It's going to be divided up between 
15 them. (Inaudible). 
16 THE COURT: That's not what joint and several means. 
17 That's--I keep coming back to the--to my son going out and 
18 buying—wanting to buy an automobile. He doesn't have any 
19 money. And the bank says, we'll lend you the money, but 
20 your credit--you don't have any credit history. Your dad's 
21 going to have to cosign this loan for you. He comes to me, 
22 he says, cosign the loan for me, so I can get this car. And 
23 I say, well, okay, I'll do it, but I don't want the car, and 
24 I'm not going to make these payments. And then my son 
25 doesn't make the payments, the bank comes and repossess the 
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1 Hear. Is my son going to sue me, because I didn't pay off 
2 the car? 
3 MR. RUSSELL: No. Well, but that's your son. But 
4 that's not—that's a different scenario. And I appreciate 
5 that analogy, because I think it works for the Normans here. 
6 If the bank repossess the car and there's a deficit, guess 
7 who's going to lose? You. 
8 THE COURT: Me. I'm going to have to pay, but then I'm 
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going to say to my son, I'm taking that one out of your 
hide, you know. 
MR. RUSSELL: Correct. 
THE COURT: I'm taking it out of your inheritance, you 
owe it me, whatever. Someday I'm going to get it back from 
him, because I got—there's no reason for me to have done 
this, for my own benefit. I just did it for him. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
THE COURT: Now, Larson wasn't acting entirely 
altruistically here, but—well, I'm searching for some 
evidence of what it was that caused Norman Larson to sign 
this promissory note, and the best I've heard is that he 
signed the promissory note, the only reason is that the 
bank, so to speak, insisted on it. Not because any of the 
other makers of the note insisted on it, but because the 
bank insisted on it. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. Right, and so he was—he was the 
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1 one who was going to have to pay it if things fell through. 
2 THE COURT: He was the guarantor, in effect. 
3 MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. He was—it was—it's a perfect 
4 analogy of the same as you and your son, except, in this 
5 case, remember, by the time Larson signed the note, he had 
6 also entered into the service agreement with Four D, which 
7 gave him potentially 25 percent equity interest in the 
8 project. 
9 THE COURT: Right. He was interested in this thing— 
10 MR. RUSSELL: He wasn't--
11 THE COURT: —because he wanted it to go. 
12 MR. RUSSELL: He wasn't doing it as a favor to 
13 anybody--
14 THE COURT: Yeah. 
15 MR. RUSSELL: --he was doing it for his own benefit. 
16 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
17 MR. RUSSELL: He was doing it because, if he didn't 
18 sign the note, they weren't going to get the loan. 
19 THE COURT: But nobody—these folks, apparently, for 
20 all w e c a n tell, didn't have any discussion amongst them as 
21 to who was going to have to pay Mr. Norman back if his 
22 property ended up getting foreclosed on and there was no 
23 hotel built. 
24 MR. RUSSELL: I don't think anybody intended to pay 
25 I  Mr. Norman back. 
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1 THE COURT: Did they have any discussions about it? 
2 Did Mr. Norman say, okay, look, I'm putting my property up, 
3 I'm signing the promissory note, but come on, guys, what are 
4 you putting up? 
5 MR. RUSSELL: I — 
6 THE COURT: The only evidence I see of that is the 
7 original joint venture agreement, where Mr. Norman was 
8 apparently happy to sign an agreement where he puts up eight 
9 acres of prime real estate in Moab, and the other three put 
10 up expertise and consideration. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: Uh-huh. 
12 THE COURT: Now, at least judged with 20/20 hindsight, 
13 the expertise — it wasn't expertise, it was expertise and--
14 MR. RUSSELL: There was expertise. 
15 THE COURT: --and something else. What? A business— 
16 let me go back to that. Expertise and consideration. 
17 MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
18 THE COURT: Yeah, expertise and consideration is what 
19 it said. But he signed an agreement with three other people 
20 at the very beginning of this thing, and all they were 
21 contributing was expertise, which--
22 MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. 
23 THE COURT: —with the benefit of hindsight, was worth 
24 squat, and he contributed eight acres of land, a hard asset, 
2 5 I and low and behold, at the end of all this, what's happened 
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1 I  is their expertise wasn't worth anything, his land was worth 
2 something, and it's — and he lost 80 percent of the value--
3 MR. RUSSELL: Okay. S o — 
4 THE COURT: --about, right? 
5 MR. RUSSELL: So you're with me now. And— 
6 THE COURT: But isn't that what he bargained for when 
7 I  he started? 
MR. RUSSELL: No. He—no. 
9 || THE COURT: He bargained for success, but whenever you 
10 bargain for success, you know there's the potential of loss. 
11 || Did Mr. Norman think, okay, well, what is going to happen if 
12 || their expertise turns out not to be successful and doesn't 
13 give me what I need? I've donated this property to this 
14 partnership. The partnership owns it now, they don't--I 
15 don't. 
16 MR. RUSSELL: He didn't—he didn't donate the property. 
17 THE COURT: Well, he signed a partnership, agreeing--
18 saying that he was contributing it. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: Saying that he was going to contribute 
20 it, and they signed a partnership agreement saying they were 
21 going to contribute things, and nobody contributed anything. 
22 That's—that's what I'm telling you, Judge. This Moab Land 
23 Development Joint Venture never operated. It was already--
24 it was finished before it started, when Four D went out and 
25 hired Larson and violated the terms of the agreement. 
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1 I  THE COURT: Well, unfortunately, the only pleadings I 
2 have to act on are your pleadings that say it did. It did--
3 it was created, it did come into effect. And the problem is 
4 that they breached it. 
5 MR. RUSSELL: I know, but—you know, like I said, this 
6 is what I've been trying to get the Court to see from the 
7 very beginning. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: Let's look at 10-27. I mean, what the 
Normans expected, very simply, was that if things didn't 
work out, they had a bunch of co-obligors on the note and 
they would share the liability for it. 
We roll around to 10-27-95 and the purchase agreement 
Now--and this is done without the Normans' knowledge. 
Although, if you believe the defendants' testimony, their 
own sworn testimony, they told Page and Barney what they 
were doing and they assumed that they were telling the 
Normans everything. So, if you believe their testimony, 
then you have to believe that the Normans did know and 
consent, because they didn't--they didn't object. 
THE COURT: Now, on the one hand, I've got your 
client's direct, unequivocal testimony, I didn't consent, 
and on the other hand, an inference, at best, that a 
conversation would occur, was expected to occur, but no 
proof that it actually did occur. 
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1 MR. RUSSELL: Well, and it didn't occur. I'm not 
2 trying to fool you—they didn't know. But if you believe 
3 the defendants, they—they say, look, Page and Barney were 
4 the, you know, they were our contacts with the Normans. And 
5 so you would have to believe that they believed that they 
6 knew. And, you know, and to come in here now and say, well, 
7 we did all this, but the Normans didn't expressly consent, 
8 so, you know, too bad, I think is--I don't see how the Court 
9 could accept that. And the little blurb that Mr. Lalli 
10 quoted that you don't become a partner against the will 
11 and—against the will and consent. And what the Normans 
12 have said was they didn't—they found out eventually. 
13 Lanto, in December or so, told Robert that Arnold had 
14 purchased his interest, and Mr. Norman's response was, 
15 great. Now I've got an attorney as a partner. That can't 
16 be bad. 
17 So, back to 10-25, and, Your Honor, I—you know, I 
18 asked you on the phone how—if we—how long we would have, 
19 and you said all day. I don't need all day. 
20 THE COURT: Well, you've got an hour and 15 minutes. 
21 MR. RUSSELL: Okay, good. We have the purchase of 
22 Lanto's interest. Lanto's the builder. No more builder. 
23 Same day, contemporaneous facts. Now, all these people are 
24 in Arnold's office, apparently. A fax goes from Arnold's 
25 office to Mr. Larson the same day Four D is dissolved. Now, 
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Four D is the management, financial, and operational arm, 
supposedly, of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture—also 
the outfit that hired Norman Larson to provide financing. 
That's dissolved. Is there any--is there anything left of 
the Moab Land Development Joint Venture? It has to be done 
by then, at the very latest. There is nothing left of it. 
Duane Barney goes to prison at the same time. There's a 
power of attorney, prepared by Mr. Arnold and witnessed by 
him, that gives Greg Page Duane Barney's general power of 
attorney, so there's nothing left of the Moab Land 
Development Joint Venture. 
Nevertheless, these defendants, by themselves, with 
nobody else, felt that it was alright for them to take money 
from the joint venture funds and say, okay, now we're in 
it--we are in. And the next thing that you see from them--
from them, not anybody else--is announcements to the world, 
to the financial people, we are in. I am a partner, I am a 
partner. I own the franchise. Give us the loan. And the 
reason that they got in is because still, at that point, 
they thought they were going to get the money. 
Now, the Normans did not consent to that. Didn't have 
a chance to. They probably would've, if they had been 
asked, but they didn't expressly consent. And so, these 
guys (inaudible) it's okay. Everything they did is okay and 
I we're going to give them summary judgment. That's why, Your 
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1 Honor, equitable estoppel, the doctrine of equitable 
2 estoppel, if I can't get you to go there, I'm going to lose. 
3 But I think that you have to go there, under the 
4 circumstances of this case. 
5 THE COURT: When did you first plead equitable 
6 estoppel? 
7 MR. RUSSELL: Plead it? 
8 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
9 MR. RUSSELL: I have not—I have not specifically pled 
10 it, but I've been trying to get it in from the very first 
11 time of the case. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. RUSSELL: Broadwater v. Old Republic, a case cited 
14 by Mr. Larson, and this is--and I don't think I--I could be 
15 wrong about this, but I don't think it's required that I 
16 plead it. 
17 THE COURT: It may not be. 
18 MR. RUSSELL: I think the Court can impose it, after it 
19 finds—after it knows what the (inaudible) . 
20 THE COURT: Well, the line between causes of action and 
21 legal theories is sometimes blurry. 
22 MR. RUSSELL: Uh-huh. So, quoting, "The right to 
23 equitable estoppel arises when conduct by one party leads 
24 another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of 
25 action resulting in detriment or damage, if the first person 
4 0 
1 is permitted to repudiate his conduct." Now, if this case 
2 is not a case where you should tell Mr. Larson and Mr. 
3 Arnold, I'm going to estop you from denying that you became 
4 partners in a venture with the Normans to develop a Holiday 
5 Inn on the Normans' property, then a case for equitable 
6 estoppel does not exist. I would respectfully submit--does 
7 1 not exist 
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THE COURT: Okay. Well, what were they to contribute 
to the partnership then? Let's--what are the terms of this 
partnership agreement? 
MR. RUSSELL: Arnold and Larson? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, by that time—by that time— 
THE COURT: Who were the partners— 
MR. RUSSELL: Okay, I'll — 
THE COURT: —who were the partners in this 
partnership? 
MR. RUSSELL: After 10-27, there's nothing left of the 
Moab Land Development Joint Venture, you can see that, I 
hope. There's nothing left of it. So, we have Robert and 
Diane, the property is still in there. We have Norm Larson, 
who has taken over the position of Duane Barney, certainly. 
I mean, but, I mean, into that role (inaudible). He's got 
all of the assets, he's got sole control of the checkbook, 
he's the one that's obtaining the financing. He owns the 
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1 franchise. He is the person--
2 THE COURT: Larson has the franchise. He's got all the 
3 proceeds of the loan. 
4 MR. RUSSELL: The checking account. 
5 THE COURT: And whatever that—well, whatever money 
6 there was. 
7 MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
8 THE COURT: He's got the franchise, control of whatever 
9 money there is, and the property hasn't been deeded, but it 
10 has been put up as security for a loan. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. RUSSELL: Larson's got everything. 
14 THE COURT: And what was your client contributing to 
15 this partnership? 
16 MR. RUSSELL: The property—they still had the 
17 property. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. So, they were contributing the 
19 property. What was Larson to contribute? 
20 MR. RUSSELL: Expertise. 
21 THE COURT: And what was a — 
22 MR. RUSSELL: Financial. 
23 THE COURT: --and who were the other partners besides— 
24 MR. RUSSELL: Arnold--
25 THE COURT: --Larson and the Normans. 
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1 I MR. RUSSELL: Arnold. Specifically, (inaudible) . 
2 THE COURT: Three partners then? 
3 MR. RUSSELL: And maybe Page, but Page never really did 
4 anything. I mean, he was hanging around to see if he could 
5 get something. 
6 THE COURT: So, you don't know whether Page was in or 
7 out? 
8 MR. RUSSELL: I (inaudible). 
9 THE COURT: I'm supposed to find that there's a 
10 partnership, but you can't even tell me who the partners 
11 are? 
12 MR. RUSSELL: Page. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Is that it? 
14 MR. RUSSELL: But he didn't do anything. Yes. 
15 THE COURT: So, Mr. Norman, at that time, was happy to 
16 have a partnership, where he contributed the land and there 
17 were these three other people, one of whom had the franchise 
18 and— 
19 MR. RUSSELL: Anything that may have (inaudible). 
20 THE COURT: —and what was their understanding or their 
21 agreement as to what would happen with respect to the 
22 losses? 
23 MR. RUSSELL: Without a written agreement, they're 
24 divided equally. No written agreement, Your Honor. And I 
25 don't know if you (inaudible)--
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1 I  THE COURT: What about profits? 
2 MR. RUSSELL: Divided equally. I don't know if there's 
3 a—if there's a distinction in your mind between partnership 
4 and joint venture, but—and if there--if there isn't, it 
5 doesn't matter, but if there is, I'd called it a joint 
6 venture. The definition is just two or more people working 
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on a—as co-owners for a business objective. It doesn't say 
that it has to be in writing, doesn't say it has to be 
named. The Normans--
THE COURT: There isn't—there isn't a distinction 
between joint venture and partnership, in my mind, at least 
in this case. 
MR. RUSSELL: The Normans were left out of the loop 
intentionally, through all—throughout all of this. They 
couldn't get information from anybody. 
THE COURT: Well, did the Normans — 
MR. RUSSELL: But they— 
THE COURT: --did the Normans agree to the creation of 
this partnership— 
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. They were— 
THE COURT: —this joint venture? 
MR. RUSSELL: —they were happy— 
THE COURT: So— 
MR. RUSSELL: —about anything that advanced the 
possibility of this project taking place. 
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1 I  THE COURT: Okay. Were they defrauded in the creation 
2 of this partnership? 
3 MR. RUSSELL: In the creation of the partnership? 
4 I THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. 
THE COURT: They were? 
7 || MR. RUSSELL: I would say so. 
8 || THE COURT: So, what relief do they want with that 
9 fraud? 
10 MR. RUSSELL: Pardon me? 
11 THE COURT: What relief do they want for that fraud? 
12 Anything? 
13 MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. 
14 THE COURT: What? 
15 MR. RUSSELL: They want to be paid back the $212,000. 
16 THE COURT: They want—do they want rescind the 
17 partnership agreement? 
18 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I don't know, but what we're doing 
19 is—no. We get into these neat, nice little legal theories 
20 that really don't--
21 THE COURT: Mr. Russell, that's one of the problems we 
22 keep coming back to in this case. You don't like nice, neat 
23 legal theories, but I'm stuck with them. 
24 MR. RUSSELL: You're not. You can apply equitable 
25 1 estoppel. You can say, I am telling you, based on what you 
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1 did--based on what you did, that it was dishonest, that it 
2 was secret, that it was intentionally trying to take 
3 advantage of these people. I'm telling you that you are not 
4 going to deny that you were part of this venture to do this, 
5 because they obviously were. They obviously were, Your 
6 Honor. You'd have to ignore reality to say that just 
7 because the Normans didn't agree that you guys can walk 
8 away. That is not the reality of it. So--
9 THE COURT: Well, why—why is your client the only one 
10 that should walk away from this thing whole? 
11 MR. RUSSELL: I'm not saying they are. 
12 THE COURT: Well, you say he wants all of his money 
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back. 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, if you notice in my--I said that, 
but if you notice in the pleadings, I say we are perfectly 
willing to get a ruling from you, as a matter of law, that 
the Normans are proportionally responsible to these 
defendants. 
THE COURT: But your client made an agreement, at the 
very start of all this, where he was going to put up eight 
acres of land for a joint venture. And the other people 
were only putting up experience. If he had come to me and I 
had reviewed that with him, I'd have said, Bob, do you 
understand that these people are putting up nothing and 
you're putting up eight acres of land? If this thing goes 
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1 I belly up, you lose your land, they lose nothing. That's 
2 what I'd have said to him, if he'd have come to me to look 
3 at this. Isn't that what he bought into from the very 
4 beginning, that he would—he was possible going to lose all 
5 of his land? And, yes, have the possibility of a 
6 partnership accounting, where they'd have to—if you could 
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identify there being a loss, that they would share it with 
him—but how to calculate that? 
MR. RUSSELL: I agree with—I agree with that 
perfectly, and that's exactly what happened. That's exactly 
what happened. And now all the — 
THE COURT: So, is the law supposed to—is the law 
supposed to protect people who, either knowingly or 
intentionally ignorant, make these kinds of deals? 
MR. RUSSELL: No. No. All we're asking you for is the 
right to get contribution from other—the other people that 
were involved. That's all. If they don't have it, you're 
right. If they—and if they can't contribute, you're right, 
the Normans lose their property, they're done. In this 
case, we have people who should pay and who can pay. I 
don't know if they can pay or not, but they certainly 
should. Wouldn't you, in that same analogy, have said, you 
know, when this thing fails and your property gets 
repossessed, your only recourse is going to be against those 
other people that are involved with you and who signed the 
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1 note, who became co-obligors? You wouldn't have said, 
2 that's it. That's the end of the story. You'll say, you're 
3 going to have to go and get the money from them, which is 
4 exactly what we're doing. 
5 And what I'm asking you for is a ruling that we are 
6 entitled to try to get it, as a matter of law, and that 
7 these defendants cannot say they're equitably estopped from 
8 saying that we weren't involved. These people who—Mark 
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Arnold and Norman Larson did everything. What did Bob and 
Diane do? They didn't do anything. They put up their 
property, in good faith. They said, go get that money, 
guys, let's put up a good project here. That's all they 
did. And to say that now, you know, you just have to live 
with that loss, I just--I just can't--
THE COURT: What you have pled here—what you have pled 
is this Moab joint venture. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
THE COURT: But you're telling me, right now, that 
thing never got off the ground. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
THE COURT: And what happened instead is that a new 
joint venture was created with the Normans, Greg Page, 
Arnold and Larson. And that your client agreed—wait a 
minute—whether or not your client agreed to the creation of 
that joint venture, they acted like partners and should be 
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1 I estopped from suffering the consequences of partners. 
2 MR. RUSSELL: Acted like partners, said they were 
3 partners. Took--used funds of the partnership for their own 
4 purposes. Had exclusive (inaudible). 
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THE COURT: When did you discover that this was the 
case? When did you discover that that first joint venture 
was—never got off the ground and a new one was created? 
MR. RUSSELL: When did I first discover it? 
THE COURT: Yeah. When did you discover it? 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, it was obvious, as soon as we 
started doing discovery and talking to—taking the 
depositions that — 
THE COURT: When did—when did you start doing the 
discovery? 
MR. RUSSELL: 1990--I can't—it's, I think, February 
and November or October of '99, the depositions were taken, 
and I immediately tried to amend my complaint. Do you 
remember? 
THE COURT: And did you? 
MR. RUSSELL: I did. 
THE COURT: To assert breach of fiduciary— 
MR. RUSSELL: (Inaudible) liability claim against— 
against Arnold. 
THE COURT: Okay. But you didn't assert the creation 
of this new joint venture with these four partners? 
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1 MR. RUSSELL: I didn't. Tried to amend the complaint 
2 again (inaudible). 
3 THE COURT: This was after their—after our first trial 
4 date? 
5 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. That one was denied. But if you 
6 look at the — if you look at the—even the first one, where 
7 it lists what we claim that they did, I mean, those things — 
8 those things haven't changed. 
9 THE COURT: Let me ask— 
10 MR. RUSSELL: And—and— 
11 THE COURT: I need to ask these folks a question. 
12 MR. RUSSELL: Okay. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Haskins, in your first answer for Mr. 
14 Larson, did you deny that he was a partner? 
15 MR. HASKINS: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: And did you assert that there was lack of 
17 consent to him being a partner as one of the reasons why he 
18 wasn't a partner? 
19 MR. HASKINS: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: How about you, Mr. Lalli? 
21 MR. HASKINS: But that's always been our defense. 
22 THE COURT: Did you do the same? 
23 MR. LALLI: That's always been our defense, and I can't 
24 recall—first of all, the answer was filed before I got 
25 involved in the case. But we've always denied that Arnold 
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1 was a partner and that there was consent on that. That--it 
2 seems to me it wouldn't be an affirmative defense, in any 
3 event, but it would just be a denial of the allegations in 
4 the complaint. I mean, it's not something we have the 
5 burden of proving. 
6 THE COURT: Yeah, but it affects the way I may approach 
7 Mr. — 
8 MR. HASKINS: The other problem is, though, they 
9 concede there, was no consent to the Moab Land Development. 
10 THE COURT: And I'm—all I'm asking for is whether you 
11 denied consent, whether you asserted lack of consent. 
12 MR. HASKINS: Yeah. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Russell. 
14 MR. RUSSELL: All right. Let me focus for a little 
15 while on the note—on the note, because I'm really at a loss 
16 as to how having signed the note, having bought — 
17 purposefully, intentionally bought a share of the liability 
18 under the note, expressly referring to the note, that they 
19 would be eligible for summary judgment, that they're not 
20 liable under the note. That—that is very curious to me. 
21 So, there's this third party beneficiary thing that's 
22 floating around. That's a red herring, Your Honor. We 
23 don't claim that the Normans—you don't have to find that 
24 the Normans are third party beneficiaries of the note or of 
25 the purchase agreement. All the purchase agreement does is 
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1 I substitute an obligor, and there is no benefit to the 
2 Normans in that transaction. Indeed, as I've stated before, 
3 it virtually doomed the venture, it removed the builder from 
4 the venture. But what it did do is put Arnold and W.E.A. in 
5 the position of having to pay Lanto's share. 
6 Now, do we have to--is--are the Youngs indispensable 
7 parties, to make a determination of that? We've got the 
8 note. We've got the fact that it was paid off by the 
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Normans solely. The purchase agreement, with Mr. Winkler, 
states — it's in evidence five or six times — credit for 
payoff from Norman, $212,000. We know the people that are 
obligated. So, we bring the Youngs in for what? What are 
they going to say that would advance anybody's position? 
Nothing. 
Do we have to bring in Lanto and establish that he's 
liable under the note? Well, his signature on the note does 
that. What is it going to add to have Mr. Lanto here 
saying, yes, your signature's on the note, you're liable 
under the note, (inaudible) contribution to the Normans? 
THE COURT: Well, I think the idea of privity is that 
it's theoretically possible Mr. Lanto would say, I signed, 
I'll stand for it. I don't want to exercise my right 
against — 
MR. RUSSELL: Okay. 
THE COURT: —against Arnold. 
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111 MR. RUSSELL: Good point. So, if he's indispensable, 
2 he's indispensable to the defendants. You know, when I ask 
3 my wife to do something that I'm perfectly capable of doing, 
4 she just says, what's the matter, are your hands painted on? 
5 What's the matter? If they think these people are 
6 indispensable, they have had, since the case was filed, 
7 I every right to file a cross-claim, every right to bring in 
the parties they think are indispensable. We don't think 
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they're indispensable. We think that they're clearly 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think they're indispensable 
either, but you still have a question of privity here. You 
have--you can only enforce contracts against people that you 
made a contract with, unless the contract was made by 
somebody else, with the purpose of benefitting you. 
MR. RUSSELL: It obviously benefits them. 
THE COURT: With the purpose of benefitting you. And 
do you want me to rule that Mr. Lanto negotiated for Arnold 
and Western Empire Advisors, to hold him harmless, because 
he was concerned about what would happen to the Normans, or 
because he was concerned about what would happen to himself? 
MR. RUSSELL: He was obviously concerned about what 
would happen to himself. But what's the practical effect of 
that? 
THE COURT: It isn't a practical effect. That's—the 
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1 idea of third party beneficiary contracts is what's 
2 intended, not what's the practical effect—what's intended. 
3 MR. RUSSELL: But again, pick your scenario—where the 
4 note is foreclosed upon, or where it's paid by somebody. 
5 Pick any scenario you want. Eventually, if the Normans 
6 either pay off the note or enter into a transaction, like 
7 they did, that pays off the note, they're going to have a 
8 right to contribution from the other people liable under the 
9 note. And, you know, you haven't ruled this, but I--and if 
10 I put words in your mouth, I apologize, but I could swear 
11 that I've heard you say that more than once. The least the 
12 Normans can expect from this case is a right to 
13 contribution. And I think that is the least that they—that 
14 they have an absolute right to expect. 
15 The reason—the reason that the pleadings aren't 
16 perfect, again, is not because the Normans filed bad 
17 pleadings, although I admit, they could've been better at 
18 the beginning, but they didn't have all the information that 
19 they needed. And we've been in here ever since trying to 
20 get the Court to see that we deserve to be able to tell you, 
21 now that we know it, what the actual facts are. 
22 I think that — I'm not asking the Court to reconsider 
23 any of its rulings, with only one exception, and that's the 
24 one about W.E.A. You recall that we did ask that the Court 
25 to allow us to amend our pleadings to name W.E.A., and that 
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1 was denied. There is no conceivable prejudice, and I can't 
2 imagine any prejudice that W.E.A. was—everything they did 
3 was done by Norm Larson personally. They were 
4 interchangeable throughout this case, and that's why—that's 
5 why it's true. You see it first in this motion for summary 
6 judgment, but, you know, as I said at the beginning, I 
7 understood this to be the last appeal to the Supreme Court 
8 I  to get the votes counted, and it seems to me something that 
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does fit in this case. 
Let's consider how the enfranchise fee was paid by 
Western Empire Advisors at Larson's first exhibit. But the 
franchise itself was owned by Norman Larson individually. 
Well, that kind of tells the story right there, doesn't it, 
Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Well--
MR. RUSSELL: Here's a franchise— 
THE COURT: — I think you'd better save your breath on 
that. I think you really do, if you want to pierce the 
corporate veil and treat a corporation as an alter ego to an 
individual, that's something you ought to plead, and not 
just throw in at the last minute with your motion for 
summary judgment. That's something that— 
MR. RUSSELL: Okay. 
THE COURT: --that there's--
MR. RUSSELL: I do want you to reconsider--
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111 THE COURT: That's a well-established legal principle 
2 that ought to be pled in the beginning. It's really a — it's 
3 a remedy that you seek as an initial matter, piercing the 
4 corporate veil, and then consequences follow from that. So 
5 you have to plead that, if you want to go there. 
6 MR. RUSSELL: I do want you to reconsider whether or 
7 n°t we should be allowed to amend our pleadings with W.E.A. 
8 as a partner and have everything revert back to the initial 
9 pleading, under Rule 15. I'll just throw that out there. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: So, again, Your Honor, I guess I should— 
12 I guess I can wrap up. If we're going to—if the Normans 
13 are going to get anywhere today, the Court is going to have 
14 to be willing to apply on the joint venture claim, equitable 
15 estoppel. Now, we have the position of Mark Arnold, why he 
16 should be equitably estopped, as the attorney for the joint 
17 venture. He admits that he was the attorney for the joint 
18 venture and, with full knowledge of everything that he and 
19 his client, Norman Larson—testified that Norman Larson was 
20 his client—had done up to that time, he bought into the 
21 joint venture. He took over all of Pete Lanto's interest in 
22 the joint venture. So, but now says that—you can't —I'm 
23 not in the joint venture as a matter of law, because the 
24 Normans didn't express their consent. I think that would be 
25 an injustice. 
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1 I Norman Larson knows that he was specifically required 
2 to become obligated on the loan, now by the Youngs and by 
3 his attorney, Mark Arnold, had complete control of all the 
4 assets of the venture, used them for purposes aside from the 
5 joint venture, bought in, with knowledge of everything that 
6 he'd done, up until that time, later stated publicly, I am 
7 I an equity member of this joint venture, but wants to be let 
out because of the technicality that the Normans didn't 
9 || expressly consent, and the only reason that they didn't 
10 consent is that they weren't asked. 
11 And with regard to the note, Your Honor, we have, as 
12 I've said, people after October 27th, you've got Robert and 
13 Diane, you've got Arnold, you've got Larson, you've got 
14 Page. Page is bankrupt, Barney's bankrupt. The Normans 
15 paid off the note. Where should that liability go? What 
16 reason is there to say to the Normans, it's all yours. You 
17 have to pay it all, despite the fact that you didn't do 
18 anything wrong, despite the fact that you didn't lose the 
19 money, despite the fact that you didn't destroy the Moab 
20 Land Development Joint Venture--you have to pay it all. You 
21 don't have right to contribution from the people who did all 
22 those things. I think that would be an injustice. 
23 So, what we're asking for, to rule as a matter of law, 
24 that Mark Arnold and Norman Larson are estopped, equitably 
25 estopped from denying that they were partners in a joint 
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1 venture to a develop a Holiday Inn on the Normans' property 
2 in Moab, and that they are liable for the losses of the 
3 joint venture. I mean, I don't know where this idea of an 
4 accounting comes from. The only asset--
5 THE COURT: Well, that's how you determine what the 
6 losses are, I suppose. 
7 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I realize that, but there were no 
8 assets. The property wasn't even contributed. There were 
9 no assets. There was a loan, there was a liability. The 
10 only thing that it had was a liability, and that loan 
11 resulted in a liability of $212,000. Tell me what—tell me 
12 an assets (inaudible). 
13 THE COURT: Well, I'm looking at your first amended 
14 complaint, it says, "Pursuant to the joint venture 
15 agreement, the Normans contributed 8.33 acres of property." 
16 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. They contributed for the 
17 use of the joint venture. They did not give it to the joint 
18 venture. The joint venture didn't own it. But even if it 
19 did, let's call that the sole asset of the joint venture. 
20 It is not disputed that, from the proceeds of that piece of 
21 property, $212,000 was deducted from the price for the note, 
22 and that the Normans absorbed all of that. So, that's 
23 number one. And number two, that, as a matter of law, the 
24 Normans are entitled to contribution from the other people 
25 liable on the note. Page is bankrupt, so he's out. I think 
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1 the only fair and equitable thing to do is, (inaudible) 
2 willing to have the Normans share in that loss, is to spread 
3 his liability over the remaining people. And so those 
4 numbers are set forth in my pleading. 
5 Any questions, Your Honor? 
6 THE COURT: No. Anything more to add, Mr. Haskins? 
7 MR. HASKINS: Just briefly, Your Honor. The original 
8 financing agreement with Mr. Larson was between Four D 
9 Development and Western Empire Advisors--not denied. The 
10 purchase agreement that is the only bridge in response to 
11 your queries that counsel could refer to—that was not 
12 signed by Mr. Larson, it was signed by Mr. Lanto and Mr. 
13 Arnold—stated that Mark Arnold and Western Empire Advisors 
14 were going to purchase Lanto's interest. Again, Western 
15 Empire Advisors is not a party. They haven't been named. 
16 For the first time two weeks ago, there's this 
17 allegation that's never been affirmatively pled, that now we 
18 realize we've got a problem, so we've got to make an 
19 allegation we're going to pierce the corporate veil. No 
20 discovery's even been done on that, because that issue was 
21 not raised until two weeks ago. Discovery started over 
22 two—well, over two years ago. All these claims that he's 
23 made, these facts that he's propounded there, where he 
24 claims Mr. Larson's involved, the letterheads are all under 
25 "Western Empire Advisors." (Inaudible) to be the one letter 
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1 that he showed you, the second paragraph, dated April 10, 
2 1996, is addressed to Western Empire Advisors, through Mr. 
3 Norm Larson. But it also says, "After conferring with the 
4 partners, we have decided to terminate our agreement with 
5 you to find financing for these projects immediately." 
6 That, in and of itself, establishes that Mr. Larson is not a 
7 partner. There's another letter, dated June 18th, that we 
8 attached to our papers, where they claim that the partners 
9 had a strategy resolution meeting regarding the Moab Holiday 
10 Inn. It's signed by Mark Arnold, Duane Barney, Greg Page, 
11 and Bob Norman. These are the partners that Mr. Norman 
12 acknowledges in June of *96, over a year and a half after 
13 this deal that he put together, this agreement he has 
14 signed, commenced. They just can't meet, as a matter of 
15 law, the standard that they impose when they filed those two 
16 causes of action. They can't bridge it to Mr. Larson. They 
17 just can't do it. Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Lalli, anything you need to add? 
19 MR. LALLI: Just briefly, Your Honor. I want to go 
20 back to the two points Mr. Russell started off with, and he 
21 said, the joint venture never existed. If the joint venture 
22 never existed, then no one can be liable under the contract 
23 that is the subject of the first cause of action. And so 
24 that takes away his first cause of action. 
25 I also wanted to address the equitable estoppel point. 
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1 First of all, that is something that needs to get 
2 (inaudible) pled, and it hasn't been. But even still, if 
3 you — I mean, he's contending that Arnold and Larson should 
4 be equitably estopped from denying that they were a partner. 
5 First of all, he says that the standard requires reliance, 
6 and there's no way that the Normans could have relied on 
7 something. I mean, if Arnold and Larson became a partner, 
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it was in October of 1995, which was eight or nine months 
after the original partnership agreement was signed, and it 
was after most or all of the money had been spent. So, it's 
unfathomable to me how the Normans could have — could meet 
the element of reliance in there. And moreover, I don't 
think you can be estopped--
THE COURT: You mean, your guy came in--or they found 
a--let's see, your guy came in after the loan? If he came 
in at all, he came in after the loan was made, is that what 
you're saying? 
MR. LALLI: Oh, long after the loan was made, and I 
believe—and I—and this was the subject of our motion in 
limine, but my recollection from a few months ago was that 
we had a—we had tracked that out and showed that most or 
all of the money was spent from the $160,000. There's just 
no way that the Normans could have relied on Larson and 
Arnold being a partner in any material way. And even if you 
believe Mr. Russell's story, all he's saying is that they 
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1 acquiesced by not objecting to Arnold and Larson being a 
2 partner. But, you know, there's no reliance there. And he 
3 also assumes that Arnold and Larson were necessarily acting 
4 as partners. 
5 THE COURT: So, is reliance an element of equitable 
6 estoppel? 
7 MR. LALLI: Well, according to the quote he read to the 
8 Court. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. And the idea was, the only thing— 
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the only act the Normans did in reliance was allowing their 
property to mortgaged—their property to be mortgaged, and 
that had already happened? 
MR. LALLI: Which occurred long before Arnold—I mean, 
even under their version of the facts, long before Arnold 
and Larson became partners, as they contend. 
THE COURT: Or at least became known to them as people 
involved in the partnership. 
MR. LALLI: Well, no. I mean, what they're contending 
is that Arnold and Larson became partners by purchasing 
Lanto's interest. 
THE COURT: That was in October of '90— 
MR. LALLI: That was in October of '95, and the 
pledge—I mean, the note and the pledge were in March/April 
and, you know, I mean, in that time frame, March to June. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. LALLI: So — I mean, it's just — it's just not 
2 possible. And the other point I was making is it—I mean, a 
3 part—you're a partner. A partnership is a legal 
4 definition, and you either are or you're not, under that 
5 legal definition. And the law that we've put before the 
6 Court says, in a variety of forms, that the contract at 
7 issue—the Utah Code, the Utah Supreme Court decision, all 
8 of that says, you can't become a partner without consent. 
9 You know, there—and that just doesn't permit itself of an 
10 equitable estoppel type of argument. You either are a 
11 partner or you're not a partner, and to be estopped from 
12 denying a partnership doesn't (inaudible) and what this has 
13 always been and it's the reason why Mr. Russell has had such 
14 a hard time articulating appropriate legal theories, and 
15 that is, simply, there's not a legal duty running between 
16 Arnold and the Normans. And we have addressed that in a 
17 variety of contexts in four or five or six different oral 
18 arguments. There's not a duty by contract between Arnold 
19 and the Normans, and there's not a duty by professional 
20 relationship. And the Court's appropriately ruled on those 
21 and should appropriately rule again today. 
22 And the—you know, the Normans tell what sounds like an 
23 unfortunate story, and I think, you know, everybody in this 
24 room probably agrees that it's too bad this development 
25 didn't work out, and it's too bad that they didn't make a 
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1 I  lot of money. But none of the other partners made money 
2 either. And I think the Court is right in saying, you know, 
3 the Normans, unfortunately, took a risk when they entered 
4 into this and, unfortunately, are bearing the brunt of that, 
5 but they don't have an legal right to sluff that off on Mark 
6 1 Arnold. 
THE COURT: Is there any question that needs to be 
resolved with respect to any of the memoranda that have been 
9 I  filed? Issues of timeliness or--? Are you all willing that 
10 I may consider all the memoranda that have been filed? 
11 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: You're willing? 
13 MR. LALLI: Yes, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. RUSSELL: May I respond to that briefly, Your 
16 Honor? 
17 THE COURT: No. I mean, back and forth, the person 
18 who--
19 MR. RUSSELL: We both had motions. 
20 THE COURT: I guess you—yeah, you get to respond. 
21 You're not just--you do have your own motion. So you can 
22 reply, with respect to your motion for summary judgment, 
23 which is on the promissory note, right? 
24 MR. RUSSELL: And the partnership. 
25 THE COURT: Oh, is it? 
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1 MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. RUSSELL: Oh, no, no (inaudible). 
4 MR. LALLI: No, I don't think that's right. 
5 (Inaudible). 
6 MR. RUSSELL: Cid you find that pleading that we were 
7 looking for before? 
8 MR. HASKINS: I got it. Here's the extra copy. 
9 MR. RUSSELL: Okay. I don't have any trouble 
10 articulating our position. What I have trouble with is 
11 dealing with defenses that say, you know, we have a legal 
12 theory that's going to ignore reality. Look at the April 
13 10th letter. I mean, this idea that you pick one sentence 
14 out of a partnership agreement and say that's our safe 
15 haven. Look at the letter of April 10th, and Larson's 
16 counsel gets up and uses that to say he's not in the 
17 partnership. Well, just read it. It says, in the second 
18 paragraph, this—the "Dear Norm," letter. "In regards to 
19 your share of the partnership." In the third paragraph, 
20 | Regardless of the decision you make about our partnership." 
21 Also, in the second paragraph, "or you can decide to give up 
22 your share of the development." But I'm not a partner. I'm 
23 not a partner. Bob Norman never said I was a partner, even 
24 though, right there, you see the—the ccrs to the other 
25 partners at the bottom, Norman, Barney, and Arnold. And I 
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1 just hope that the Court can see through what these defenses 
2 are. 
3 Look at the letter May 9, 1996. This was after Mr. 
4 Larson was called on the carpet by his other partners and 
5 said, Norm, you got to pay this back. You're responsible 
6 for this. So, this is Norm trying to save himself, but this 
7 also shows that Norm can act like a corporation when he 
8 wants to, in this joint venture proposal to the Normans, 
9 where he was just going to add this scene that, you know, 
10 that the words he saved, and if it doesn't work, he owes. 
11 But there, you see he refers to himself as Western Empire 
12 Advisors, Inc. all the way through. So he knows how to act 
13 like a corporation when it's to his benefit. 
14 And again, in Exhibit "F," which I think is a very 
15 important document, which is the first thing that comes out 
16 of the partnership, after the 10-27 destruction of Moab Land 
17 Development and the creation of the new venture. I mean, 
18 Your Honor, it continued. What were they doing? What was— 
19 what was it, after October 27th? They were still trying to 
20 get the loan? They were still spending the money? What was 
21 it? A phantom, for which nobody is responsible, except for 
22 the Normans? It was something. It was a joint venture, and 
23 they're saying we're in it. We own it. So, that's all I 
2 4 have. 
25|| THE COURT: Okay. Well, I've previously resolved some 
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1 of these issues. On the question of whether the lack of 
2 Normans' consent to the entry of Arnold and Larson into the 
3 partnership bars any joint venture claims, I previously 
4 denied summary judgment on the ground that there could be 
5 some evidence of consent through conduct. ' I've now become a 
6 little more familiar with this case, and I notice that 
7 Mr. Norman, from the very beginning, has alleged the lack of 
8 consent to their entry into the joint venture. Ironically, 
9 that's now turned against him. I think he—when he pled 
10 that, he thought that that was something that was—that 
11 counted against Arnold and Larson, but, in fact, that's now 
12 been turned back against him, under the doctrine that this — 
13 well, it's really a statutory principle, and it's also 
14 reflected in this joint venture agreement. You can't be a 
15 partner with someone without their consent. 
16 Now, no one has suggested in this case that that's a 
17 doctrine that applies only one way—that it only applies 
18 when someone wants to be a partner, and that it doesn't 
19 apply when someone doesn't want to be a partner. And in the 
20 absence of any authority suggesting that it's a one-way 
21 street, I have to treat it as a one-way street. And so, 
22 it's now clear to me that there isn't going to be any way 
23 that the Normans can establish—there's no—there's no 
24 genuine issue about that, as to whether consent was actually 
25 II given. And, therefore, I'm going to grant summary judgment, 
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1 || with respect to the claims that are based on the joint — the 
2 || theory that there's a joint venture. 
3 || I'm also--I think I'm also pushed in that direction by 
4 || Mr. Russell's contentions today that the joint venture that 
5 || he pled is a joint venture that never existed or, at best, 
6 || was destroyed in October of 1995. 
7 || The claims under the promissory note require a 
different analysis. Mr. Arnold never signed the promissory 
9 || note. He did sign an agreement to--he did sign the 
10 I  agreement to hold Lanto harmless, didn't he, Mr. Lalli? 
11 MR. LALLI: Yes, he did. 
12 THE COURT: You agree to that. It may very well be 
13 that if the Normans pursue their claim against Mr. Lanto, 
14 with respect to any obligation he may have under the 
15 promissory note, that he could assign to them their--any 
16 claim he has under the "hold harmless" terms of that 
17 agreement, and then they could pursue the claim against 
18 Arnold. 
19 But at this point, it's abundantly clear to me that 
20 Arnold never signed the note and he never--he never agreed 
21 to step into the shoes, he never agreed with the other 
22 makers of the promissory note to assume the responsibilities 
23 that Lanto had under that agreement. And that agreement 
24 between Lanto and Arnold was not made to benefit the other 
25 makers of the promissory note, it was made to benefit Lanto. 
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So they cannot be third party beneficiaries of that 
contract. 
With respect to the promissory note claim against 
Norman Larson, Norman Larson is a signer of the note, so all 
of the evidence that's been presented to me about the 
circumstances of his signing the note indicate that he 
signed it--the only reason he signed it was because of the 
insistence of the lender, and essentially did so as a 
guarantor. 
There is no evidence about any intent on the part of 
the co-makers of the promissory that Mr. Larson was doing so 
in order to evidence his responsibility to them, and there 
is no reliable contemporaneous documentation or even 
testimony that Mr. Larson, by cosigning on a secured note, 
with ample security, was doing so for any other reason than 
to satisfy the lenders. And just like the situation where I 
may act as a guarantor or a cosigner on a note for my son 
who wants to buy a car, there's no viable legal theory for 
him to come back and sue me, when he doesn't make the 
payments and the car ends up getting foreclosed on or 
repossessed. So, I'm granting Norman Larson's motion for 
summary judgment on that cause of action. 
I think I've indicated to all of you in private that 
none of these legal issues that I've had to rule on are 
crystal clear to me, and I'm happy to get guidance from a 
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1 I higher Court about this. I think I've now disposed of all 
2 the claims, which make it possible for this to be final and 
3 appealable, and I'd be happy to come back—I'd be happy, if 
4 this case comes back, to try to follow any instructions that 
5 1 might get from an Appellate Court, in order to proceed in 
6 I  this case. 
I do understand why the Normans are frustrated with 
this, but they--well, they started this case off agreeing to 
9 || give up eight acres of land in exchange for other people who 
10 had some expertise, and they had to consider the risks. 
11 They certainly should've considered the risks when they 
12 started, that it would all end up as not, and then wonder 
13 what would happen to their land, under those circumstances. 
14 It—unfortunately, it appears that there was insufficient 
15 discussion of this risk when they made the decision to get 
16 into the partnership or the joint venture. 
17 Mr. Haskins or Mr. Lalli, which one of you wants to 
18 volunteer to prepare the final judgment? 
19 MR. HASKINS: I'll prepare it. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Haskins, you've got the job. Circulate 
21 it, and the way I prefer that that be done is that once you 
22 have a proposed order, you attach it to what's called a 
23 "notice of proposed order" and serve it on all parties. 
24 File the original notice of proposed order, with a copy of 
25 the proposed order attached, so that I have in my file an 
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1 I  indication of what the proposed order is and when it was 
2 first circulated. And then when you feel that the time has 
3 run, you submit the original. 
4 MR. HASKINS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: The Court will be in recess until 12:00— 
6 BAILIFF: All right. 
7 THE COURT: --or is it 12:30? 
8 COURT CLERK: 12:00. 
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1 MR. RUSSELL: Your Honor, may -- never mind 
2 (inaudible). 
3 THE COURT: Everyone's here but Mr. Daisy. We're 
4 on the record without the bailiff. You folks can sit down. 
5 He's not out there? 
6 THE BAILIFF: I don't see him, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Well, maybe it's just as well he's 
8 not here. Members of the jury, this is disappointing to 
9 me, but I'm — I don't think it's going to hurt your 
10 feelings too much, we're not going to be able to try this 
11 case. What happened is after we'd gone through all that 
12 process Mr. Daisy told me that he'd been convicted of a 
13 felony, which disqualifies him from being a juror. And he 
14 had been, you heard me ask it in the courtroom this 
15 morning, he'd been asked it in his questionnaire and he 
16 didn't disclose it in his questionnaire that he returned. 
17 But I had to disqualify him. 
18 And we have been exploring for the past 45 
19 minutes whether there was some way we could agree to 
20 proceed without Mr. Daisy or with Mr. Daisy, and the 
21 parties have not all three been able to agree on any 
22 particular course of action. So I really don't have any 
23 viable options, except to declare a mistrial and to excuse 
24 you. And I'll have to reschedule this trial. I guess the 
25 I only good news about that, is that we didn't get three days 
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into the trial and then take this action. We're doing it 
right here at the start, so we havenft wasted too much of 
your time. 
I know it's disappointing to the parties that 
wanted to get this case tried. I've been, not personally, 
but I've seen close family members in these shoes before, 
and it's -- you know, you work yourself up, you think 
you're going to have this case resolved, and it doesn't get 
resolved, and that's disappointing. It's a failure of our 
system. I just wish I could have foreseen this, but this 
completely hit me out of the blue. 
So I'm going to let you go, and you're excused 
from any further obligation. I think I'm going to excuse 
you for the rest of the term as well, so if we summoned you 
between now and the end of the year, say Judge Anderson 
told me I could be excused. This case is going to be 
rescheduled, it's going to be rescheduled in early 2001, 
and you won't be on the jury list by then anyway. So thank 
you for being here, and I wish we could have accomplished 
something more than we did. We are going to talk about the 
case a little bit more here and I need to make some 
rulings, and maybe that will help the people in this case 
settle their dispute. 
All right, let's address, we have a motion in 
limine. What else do we have? 
4 / 
1 MR. LALLI: I think we have several motions in 
2 limine, Your Honor, and then Mr. Russell had filed, I 
3 believe, (inaudible) method of presenting the case to the 
4 jury. Although, I think that that entails (inaudible) 
5 issue that we could probably discuss and resolve. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you start with your 
7 motion, Mr. Lalli. 
8 J MR. LALLI: We made one motion, Your Honor, and 
9 if I could take the Court back to the summary judgment 
10 hearing we had a few weeks ago. At that time, the Court 
11 dismissed a fiduciary duty cause of action and the punitive 
12 damages claim that went along with that, leaving two 
13 I contract claims in place. 
14 The first cause of action is for breach of the 
15 joint venture agreement. And the Normans theory in that 
16 instance is even though my client, Mark Arnold, is not a 
17 J signatory on that agreement, that sometime Mr. Arnold 
18 purchased the interest of one of the joint venture 
19 partners, and that's a fact in dispute, but that's their 
20 contention. And then some several months after that, in 
21 May of 1996, they claim that they consented to admit Mark 
22 Arnold as a partner in the joint venture. And that when 
23 Arnold became a partner in the joint venture, he therefore 
24 became obligated on the joint venture agreement. We have 
25 trouble with various points of that, both factually and 
nr'7\ m n n n T-.TTT 
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1 legally. And I'd be happy to explain that to the Court if 
2 we need to address the legal issues. 
3 The second cause of action that remains is for --
4 THE COURT: Let me just ask, what does Norman say 
5 Mr. Arnold is obligated to do as a joint venture partner 
6 that he didnft do? 
7 MR. LALLI: Well, and, you know, Your Honor, I 
8 think the Court will have to ask them that because it's not 
9 really clear to me. And, you know, this goes to one of — 
10 the heart of our motion in limine, is there's not only a 
11 question, as the Court points out, of what did Arnold do 
12 that would have violated any provision in that agreement, I 
13 think the answer to that is nothing. But even assuming 
14 that they could point to something, the only evidence that 
15 they've talked about in this case, and it's the evidence 
16 that I want to exclude, is evidence that occurred before 
17 May 1 of 1996, when they claim that they somehow through 
18 their conduct consented to admit Arnold as a partner. 
19 And the Court may recall me arguing this at the 
20 summary judgment hearing. We put deposition testimony in 
21 the record where the Normans had both admitted that they 
22 never consented to admit Mark Arnold as a partner in the 
23 joint venture, and that's in the record. And from my 
24 perspective, the Court's question was, well, whether or not 
25 they may have consented by some constructive consent 
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through their conduct, and the Court bound this over for 
trial on that factual issue. But even if that were true, 
if the conduct that they're talking about is all conduct 
that occurred before they claim they even knew that Arnold 
had entered into this agreement under which he purportedly 
purchased the interest of Pete Lanto. 
Let me identify the five categories of evidence. 
There are terms concerning the Young loan, which is the 
loan for $160,000; there is information about a development 
in Park City that happened in the summer of 1995; there is 
information about the preparation of the promissory note 
and the deed of trust on the $160,000 loan; and there's 
information about the expenditure of the loan proceeds; and 
also, the fifth category is Mr. Arnold's relationship with 
Jim Winkler, who is the individual that eventually 
purchased the Norman's property. 
Maybe to try and make this easier, I can paint a 
time line for the Court. The joint venture was entered 
into in March of 1995. A couple of months later in June, 
that's when there was this, I've referred to it as the 
Young loan, or the $160,000 loan. And that's when the 
Normans signed a promissory note and a deed of trust. And, 
of course, the preparation of the note and deed of trust 
occurred in connection with that. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Arnold prepared those 
5U 
documents? 
MR. LALLI: He did not. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LALLI: They were prepared by a gentleman 
named Chris Durling. 
THE COURT: Okay. The loan was made to the 
partnership, or just to the Normans? 
MR. LALLI: The loan was made to the partnership. 
And this actually gets us to the second contract claim that 
remains, which is a breach, or it's styled in the 
complaint, a default on a trust deed note. On the trust 
deed note, there are six co-obligors, there's Robert 
Norman, Diane Norman, Greg Page, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, 
and Norman Larson. Mark Arnold is not a signatory on that 
promissory note, but that happened in June of 1996 — !95, 
excuse me, !95. Around, sometime after that, Page and 
Barney approached Mark Arnold and said that in addition to 
working to develop a Holiday Inn in Moab, they were also 
working to develop one in Park City. 
THE COURT: When was that? 
MR. LALLI: That was, I believe it was a couple 
of months after the trust deed. So I think it was sometime 
in July or August. And Mark Arnold went up to Park City, 
negotiated an earnest money payment with the seller of that 
property, obtained a check from the joint ventures bank 
1 account, and made a $10,000 earnest money payment that was 
2 later refunded. 
3 THE COURT: So this same joint venture — 
4 MR. LALLI: Well, that's a factual dispute. 
5 There will be testimony from the Normans that they were 
6 excluded from that Park City development. There will be 
7 testimony from others that the intent was that they be 
8 included. But it all really became a moot point because 
9 nothing ever happened, the $10,000 was refunded and that 
10 J development never went anywhere. 
11 THE COURT: The earnest money did come from the 
12 joint venture? 
13 MR. LALLI: It came from the proceeds of the 
14 $160,000 loan. After that, between really June of 1995 and 
15 mid August or so, most of the $160,000 was paid out, and 
16 there will be evidence about how that was paid out, if it 
17 I comes in, that's one of the things we're trying to exclude. 
18 I It was paid out for various construction costs and planning 
19 things, and some interest payments on the loan, and also 
20 as — for commitment fees, upfront money that they had to 
21 give to potential financiers in order to investigate 
22 whether or not they could make a loan on this property. 
23 Then on October 27 of 1995, that is when, again, 
24 the joint venture partners, Page and Barney primarily, 
25 asked Mark Arnold to negotiate a buyout of Lanto's interest 
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in the joint venture. And Mark Arnold did go and he 
negotiated that buyout for $8,500. And there is a one-page 
document entitled purchase agreement, in which Mark Arnold 
and Western Empire Advisors, which is Norm Larson's 
company, they purport to purchase the interest of Pete 
Lanto. And there's --
THE COURT: Who is this, Western Empire and who? 
MR. LALLI: And Mark Arnold. And there's a 
factual dispute about what the parties actually intended. 
Mr. Arnold will testify that he was asked to affect this 
buyout of Lantr »s interest on behalf of the joint venture, 
and that, you know, he wasn't intending to become a member 
of the joint venture, and didn't. The document actually on 
its face says that there is this purchase, so there's a 
factual dispute about that. Then that's October 27 of 
1995. 
Then the next significant event happens on May 
1st of 1996. And that's when the Normans claim that they 
first learned about the October 27, 1995 purchase 
agreement. And in their depositions I asked them both the 
question, did you consent to Mark Arnold becoming a partner 
in the joint venture, and they both said, no. They said, 
never. And I can pull those deposition cites out. 
Sometime after May of 1996, in the summer, Mark Arnold 
introduced the Normans to a fellow named Jim Winkler. 
1 THE COURT: This is when, in the summer of '96. 
2 MR. LALLI: This is the summer of '96. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. LALLI: And by that time all the money had 
5 long been spent, all the $160,000 had long been spent. 
6 Page and Barney had gone their separate ways, sort of 
7 abandoned the project, and Mr. Larson was in the process of 
8 phasing out at that time as well. And Mark Arnold was 
9 trying to help the Normans as best he could and he 
10 introduced them to Jim Winkler, who in 1996 assumed the 
11 Young loan. He actually paid the Youngs off and assumed 
12 that loan, the promissory note. 
13 THE COURT: When did he do that? 
14 MR. LALLI: He did that in July or August of 
15 J 1996. And then two years — nothing happened, Mr. Winkler 
16 didn't demand payment, he didn't threaten foreclosure, but 
17 two years later, the Normans were in need of money and they 
18 I approached Mr. Winkler about purchasing the property, and 
19 he agreed to do that. They agreed upon a price, he 
20 purchased the property for $420,000. And from the sales 
21 proceeds, $212,000 were deducted. And that $212,000 was 
22 the amount, which had included interest by that time, 
23 that's the amount that's really in dispute in this lawsuit. 
24 The Normans said they had to in effect pay that on the 
25 original promissory note. That money went to Winkler. 
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The point in our motion in limine, there are 
really two: One is that the five categories of evidence, 
and let me just run through those again: There's the 
information about the terms of the Young loan, what was the 
interest rate, what were the points and the fees, things 
like that; the Park City negotiations, is two; the third is 
the preparation of the note and deed of trust; the fourth 
is how the $160,000 loan proceeds were spent; and the fifth 
is Arnold's relationship with Winkler. 
Our first contention is simply that that 
information is not relevant to the two remaining claims. 
The first claim is for breach of the joint venture 
agreement. 
THE COURT: What's the third category again? 
MR. LALLI: The third category is preparation of 
the promissory note and deed of trust. One of the things 
that the Normans contend is that the original note that 
they signed was for $40,000, and they say that someone 
later switched that to make it 160,000. The only 
documentation that anybody has says 160,000, and there will 
be plenty of testimony, including from the people who were 
involved in preparing it, that it was always 160,000. But 
that's one of the categories of evidence. 
And our first contention is that on strictly 
relevance grounds, it's not relevant to either of the two 
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1 contract claims, for this reason: On the joint venture 
2 agreement claim, what they need to prove is, first of all, 
3 that Arnold did purchase Lantofs interest, that's a factual 
4 question. The second thing they have to prove is that 
5 there was unanimous consent of all of the existing partners 
6 to admit Arnold to the partnership. And as I've indicated, 
7 the Normans have both testified under oath that they never 
8 consented to that. And the third point they would have to 
9 prove, as the Court indicated earlier, that Arnold breached 
10 some provision of this joint venture agreement. 
11 Well, none of the five things allow you to help. 
12 I mean, the terms of the loan don't help you understand 
13 whether or not Arnold became a partner or breached a joint 
14 venture agreement. The Park City negotiation, that doesn't 
15 help you understand whether or not Arnold became a partner, 
16 J or whether he breached a joint venture agreement. And the 
17 same goes for the other five categories of evidence. 
18 I But even if you were to get past that hurdle, and 
19 I even if you could somehow fashion an argument that these 
20 I categories of evidence were somehow probative to a breach 
21 of a joint venture claim, there's a real problem with time. 
22 And that is that the earliest, the very earliest that 
23 Arnold could have become a partner in the joint venture, 
24 and this assumes that the Normans are somehow able to 
25 contradict their sworn testimony and convince the Court or 
1 the jury that somehow they consented by their conduct, the 
2 earliest that could have happened was May 1st of 1996, when 
3 they say they first learned about the Lanto purchase 
4 agreement. Well, if Arnold couldn't — if they couldn't 
5 have consented until May 1, f96, that is the earliest date 
6 on which Arnold could have become a partner. And itfs the 
7 earliest date on which he could have been obligated under 
8 the partnership agreement. And therefore, the acts that he 
9 had committed or omitted the previous year, they couldn't 
10 be the basis for him breaching a partnership agreement. In 
11 July or so of 1995 when he went up to Park City and 
12 negotiated this transaction, even under the Normans theory 
13 he wasn't a partner, he wasn't bound by the partnership 
14 agreement, and so that act, you know, six months or nine 
15 months earlier, that can't be considered a breach of the 
16 partnership obligation or partnership agreement when Arnold 
17 became a partner. 
18 The only one of the four categories of evidence 
19 at the subject of this motion that occurred after the 
20 Normans learned about Arnold becoming a partner is the 
21 relationship with Jim Winkler. And, you know, our motion 
22 on that is simply on relevance grounds, that Mark Arnold 
23 introducing Jim Winkler to the Normans who ultimately ended 
24 up assuming the loan and purchasing the property, that's 
25 just not probative of whether or not Arnold did something 
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in violation of the joint venture agreement. I mean, 
there's nothing in the joint venture agreement that 
prohibits a partner from introducing the other partners to 
Jim Winkler. 
THE COURT: Somebody with money. 
MR. LALLI: Somebody with money. So that's the 
first claim. And there's a similar analysis with the 
default on the promissory note claim. And the Normans 
theory is basically the same, that when Arnold became, or 
when he entered into this purchase agreement with Lanto in 
October of 1995, one of the things that it says in there is 
that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors will hold Lanto 
harmless for, among other things, liability on the $160,000 
promissory note. But, again, there's this timing problem, 
because with the exception, again, of the Winkler 
relationship, everything else happened before October 27 of 
1995. So if Arnold became obligated on the promissory note 
on the date he purportedly purchased Lanto's interest, the 
evidence still wouldn't come in for the same reason. The 
things he'd done before that date they can't become, you 
know, that can't be the basis for a breach of contract once 
he became a party to the contract. 
Now, aside from the timing problem, there is a 
much more fundamental problem on that purchase agreement, 
and that is — and it's really one of standing, that Arnold 
1 and Western Empire Advisors agreed in there to basically 
2 indemnify, to hold harmless, Lanto for any obligation that 
3 Lanto might have on the promissory note. And what that 
4 means is that Lanto may have a cause of action against 
5 Arnold or Western Empire Advisors, but the Normans don't. 
6 I mean, the Normans were co-obligors on the promissory 
7 note. If you look at the promissory note, therefs six 
8 signatures, the Normans are two of them, Page, Barney, 
9 Lanto, and Norm Larson. And so what they're claiming in 
10 effect is that Arnold became Lanto on that joint venture 
11 agreement. But that's not the legal effect of this October 
12 27, 1995 purchase agreement, even if you believe the 
13 I Norman's story. The legal effect of that is that it gives 
14 Pete Lanto an indemnification claim against Western Empire 
15 Advisors and Mark Arnold, at most, it doesn't give the 
16 Normans. 
17 So because of those things, that is the basis of 
18 our motion. There's the timing problem, there's just a 
19 straight relevance problem, that it's not probative. And 
20 finally, on the promissory note claim, there's a standing 
21 issue. And — 
22 THE COURT: Well, certainly the Normans could 
23 have sued Lanto and stepped into the shoes and ultimately 
24 acquired Lanto!s right to seek indemnification, right? If 
25 Lanto owes the Normans something, then ultimately the 
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1 Normans would have the right to obtain what Lanto has, 
2 which is the right for indemnification. 
3 MR. LALLI: If they -- well — 
4 THE COURT: Or Lanto --
5 MR. LALLI: Not unless Lanto assigned that to 
6 them. I assume Lanto could assign them whatever rights he 
7 had. 
8 THE COURT: Or they could have acquired it by 
9 executing on it. 
10 MR. LALLI: Well, I don't know that you can 
11 J execute on a contractual obligation, that would probably be 
12 an issue that we'd be arguing about if that had ever 
13 occurred, but it's really a moot point because that never 
14 J occurred. 
15 THE COURT: Where is Lanto, why is he not in 
16 this? 
17 MR. LALLI: Well, that's a question that you'll 
18 have to ask Mr. Russell. He's never been — I believe he 
19 was originally sued as a defendant, I don't know that he 
20 was served. He certainly hasn't been involved when I have. 
21 And you can even take it one step further than that, Your 
22 Honor, and what we're talking about is six co-obligors, and 
23 that they agreed to pay back the Youngs $160,000 plus 
24 interest. I mean, there is an obligation running between 
25 the co-obligors and the Youngs. And what the Normans are 
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saying is that somehow Arnold became Lanto, became one of 
the co-obligors, and they're trying to use this promissory 
note as saying that somehow the co-obligors now have a 
cause of action against their other co-obligor. And 
that — because they paid 100 percent of it, that they can 
shift that all to somebody else. 
THE COURT: Well, let me tell you what I think 
about that, because Ifm pretty clear on that. I donft 
think anybody's going to change my mind with argument, 
maybe with a case, but not with argument. If people 
jointly sign a promissory note, as far as the person in 
whose favor the note runs, any one of them is responsible. 
But it's between the makers, each of them is equally 
responsible. So --
MR. LALLI: Equally meaning --
THE COURT: Unless otherwise indicated, each of 
them has -- if there's seven signers, each of them is 
obligated to pay a seventh. Unless there's some other 
division of that. 
MR. LALLI: Well, and again, that's not a cause 
of action that's before this Court. They've never — 
they've never pled a cause of action for essentially 
contribution, is what I think you'd call that. 
THE COURT: Yeah, contribution. 
MR. LALLI: That's never been part of this 
01 
1 lawsuit. And what they're saying is that Mark Arnold is 
2 jointly and severally, that is 100 percent liable for 
3 whatever was paid out on the note. 
4 And, you know, there's also another point on 
5 payment on the note, the note was never declared in 
6 default, nobody ever foreclosed, nobody ever executed. The 
7 Youngs didn't come to the Normans and say, we're going to 
8 foreclose, you've got to get somebody else in. Winkler 
9 came in, he assumed the loan, and then he did nothing for 
10 two years, he wasn't going to the Normans asking them to 
11 pay. I mean, ultimately the Normans went to him. During 
12 that time, the Normans didn't ask any of their alleged 
13 partners to pay. And so there was really never a default 
14 on this promissory note. 
15 THE COURT: Let me tell you on that where I think 
16 I'd rule, if I were deciding, and where I think the jury 
17 would be instructed to go. That is that even though it 
18 wasn't ever formerly foreclosed and declared in default, if 
19 it ended up being paid, in effect, by deducting it from the 
20 proceeds of the sale, then it is paid, and they have the 
21 right to contribution from the other makers of the 
22 promissory note. 
23 MR. LALLI: Well, and that may be the correct 
24 legal analysis, and it's not really the point I'm trying to 
25 make. The point I'm trying to make, and I think this 
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1 really is an overarching point that's going to cover, not 
2 only our motion in limine, but the motions that Mr. Russell 
3 has made, and particularly his proposed method for 
4 presenting the case to the jury. Is Mr. Russell is not — 
5 I mean, he's trying to go outside the pleading. He's 
6 trying to present evidence, and evidence about causes of 
7 action that have never been a part of this lawsuit. And 
8 his theory is somehow that you can just get whatever 
9 information into evidence that you want, and that at the 
10 end of the day, at the end of trial, well, we'll just have 
11 the judge rewrite the pleadings to conform them to the 
12 evidence. But, of course, that's not what rule 15 permits. 
13 J Rule 15 permits him to get evidence in, so long as it is 
14 I relevant to the claims surviving existing in the complaint. 
15 And right now, that's a breach of the joint venture 
16 agreement, and a default on promissory note. It's not 
17 fraud, it's not breach of fiduciary duty, it's not even 
18 contribution. And that is the problem. 
19 He wants to litigate a case that's just not here. 
20 And for whatever strategic reason he's had, it's not here. 
21 And we can only go forward with evidence on the claims that 
22 exist. And as I've explained, the five categories that I'm 
23 talking about are not relevant to that. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Did you want to add anything, 
25 Mr. Haskins, do you have a position on that? 
1 MR. HASKINS: A couple things that I think 
2 probably if we1re trying this together, Mr. Larson's claims 
3 with regard to the contract, this joint venture agreement 
4 is relevant. Firstly, itfs agreed by the Normans that Mr. 
5 Larson was never consented to by them, not even in May of 
6 1996, to be a joint venture partner. So that gets us to, 
7 at least on the time line of October of 1995 that is 
8 claimed by Arnold, the first time you can address those 
9 particular issues. 
10 THE COURT: So Larson wasnft a partner? 
11 MR. HASKINS: Larson, it's admitted by the 
12 Normans. They claim now that he's a joint venturer, and 
13 he's jointly and severally liable now under their two 
14 causes of action, because he is a joint venturer, and thus 
15 he is jointly and severally liable on the promissory note. 
16 THE COURT: But he wasn't a party to the March 
17 1995 agreement? 
18 MR. HASKINS: No, neither was Mr. Arnold. 
19 THE COURT: Was he a party to the June 1995 Young 
20 promissory note? 
21 MR. HASKINS: He was, he signed the promissory 
22 note. What he had done was, Mr. Page had come to him and 
23 asked him to do the financing, to do the financing for this 
24 project. Well, because of the financial, respective 
25 financial positions of all the parties, hefs the only one 
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1 that qualified to get the franchise agreement. So he put 
2 out his $40,000 to buy the franchise agreement with the 
3 understanding that these parties, Page, Barney, and the 
4 Normans would repay him for the purchase of that franchise. 
5 He did that. They came to him and said, you're not going 
6 to get paid any $40,000 unless you sign on this promissory 
7 note. Well, he looked at the property that was encumbered 
8 on the note, the trust deed note was signed contemporaneous 
9 I with the promissory note, and he looked at it and says, I 
10 don't have anything to lose here because the property's 
11 I worth, according to their appraisal, $450,000. So I'm not 
12 J going to lose, and this is the only way I'm going to get my 
13 $40,000 back. I'm not part of this deal. 
14 THE COURT: So he believed he was liable on the 
15 promissory note only to the extent that there was a 
16 deficiency after application of the security? 
17 MR. HASKINS: That's right, that's right. And so 
18 plus that's the only way he was going to get his $40,000 
19 back. The misrepresentations by Mr. Page, who the 
20 plaintiffs in this case agree was the primary contact, he 
21 was the person that talked to them about everything other 
22 than Mr. Barney. And they were sued initially in this, but 
23 they've both filed bankruptcy, and thus we're left with two 
24 people standing, Mr. Larson and Mr. Arnold. 
25 THE COURT: Do you have any idea why Lanto isn't 
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here? 
MR. HASKINS: I have no idea. I do know I read a 
pleading submitted by Mr. Russell claiming they tried to 
contact him, and they never could. What efforts were done 
in that regard were never expressly stated in the pleadings 
that I did review. So I have no idea why in that shotgun 
approach of things Mr. Lanto was not -- or Mr. Rasmussen, 
Mr. Rasmussen originally signed on this joint venture 
agreement that was signed back in ?95, my client didn't 
even know existed until this lawsuit was filed, and he read 
it as part of the pleadings. 
However, further than that in October of !95 when 
Mr. Lantofs interest is allegedly purchased, and there are 
some factual disputes about all of that, that was 
between -- that was a document, we understand, drafted by 
Mr. Arnold, where it was going to be purchased by Mr. 
Arnold and Western Empire Advisors. Again, Western Empire 
Advisors was not sued in this case, just Norm Larson. 
Western Empire Advisors is the corporation that Mr. Larson 
does business under, and does all his financing. 
In fact, the service agreement that was signed 
between the parties, that was signed by Mr. Page 
representing the joint venture at that time was between 
Western Empire Advisors and the joint venture, as 
represented by Mr. Page, not Mr. Larson. So we agree that 
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1 this evidence should be excluded. 
2 Further with regard to the promissory note and 
3 the right to indemnification under that promissory note, 
4 I've done substantial research on this, and I just don't 
5 see how they can amend their pleadings under 15. I've 
6 heard a memorandum in response to this that I was going to 
7 argue, frankly, at the end of their case in chief. How 
8 they can now amend their pleadings and claim contribution 
9 and all these partnership issues when the only claim is 
10 they (inaudible) to the promissory note, and it's joint in 
11 several liability. Well, that joint and several liability 
12 went from the signers to the Youngs, it didn't go to the 
13 Normans. It didn't go to anyone else but the Youngs. And 
14 J it's all, everyone agrees the Youngs were satisfied. 
15 Anyway, based upon that and those facts we agree 
16 with Mr. Lalli that this evidence ought to be excluded. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. HASKINS: Thanks. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Russell, I appreciate you've been 
20 sitting there patiently. I'm sure there's lots of things 
21 you've heard you disagree with, so now you can tell me 
22 about it. 
23 MR. RUSSELL: Actually, Your Honor, it is 
24 necessary for us to go outside the pleadings in this case 
25 to some extent. Most of this you've heard before, and 
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obviously hope everything that we say is not evidence and 
falls, virtually, all of it disputed, I've never been 
involved in a case like this before, Your Honor. I've 
never been involved in a case where most of what the 
plaintiffs know about the case they didn't find out until 
after the case was filed. What the defendants are asking 
is that the Normans be placed in an ever narrowing and 
shrinking box, and let's just forget about everything that 
we did, because it occurred at a time before the Normans 
knew about what they were doing. 
The pleadings, I'll tell you quite frankly, don't 
go to the case, because we didn't know what our case was 
until -- Mr. Larson was deposed on February 17, 1999, Mr. 
Arnold was deposed after that, and we're still finding out 
things today. I got a fax from Jim Winkler last week of a 
document that I'd never seen before that answered a piece 
of a puzzle. One thing that I've said before that I really 
need the Court to — 
THE COURT: So starting in 1999 is when you first 
got a clue of what had really happened here? 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, we had clues, but we hadn't 
talked to these defendants before. We hadn't gotten the 
exhibits. Most of the exhibits that we're going to use in 
the trial came from the defendants, the Normans didn't have 
them until they were produced in discovery. We are not, 
1 the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreerr it thatfs 
2 mentioned in the claim, true, that was a piece of paper 
3 that we had. But we are not limiting ourselves to this 
4 agreement. When we say joint venture, we mean what it says 
5 in the statute, which is a group of two or more people 
6 doing business together as joint owners. There was a joint 
7 venture to build a Holiday Inn on the Norman's property in 
8 Moab, there was. And I don't think that the defendants 
9 will deny that. It didn't go by this agreement. This 
10 case, because the Normans thought that they were in 
11 business with these defendants, is why it was plugged that 
12 way. In truth, what we'll prove is that the Normans were 
13 just used because they had a piece of property that a loan 
14 could be secured on and, then the defendants did with the 
15 money what they wanted to. Now, what you'd call that I, 
16 frankly, don't know if what you'd call that is a cause of 
17 action, but that is what happened. 
18 THE COURT: Why don't you give me the time line 
19 of events as you see it. 
20 MR. RUSSELL: Okay. It starts — before their 
21 time line even starts Four D Development was composed of 
22 Page, Barney, and Lanto. And do you want to know why 
23 Lanto's not here, because he — his interest was bought by 
24 Arnold and Larson, paid for with the funds from the Young 
25 loan, and those defendants indemnified it. But Four D 
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1 Development, Page, Barney, and Lanto, had a franchise, for 
2 a Holiday Inn in Park City they got at the end of 1994, and 
3 they were dealing with defendant Larson. I don't know when 
4 it started, but we have correspondence from defendant 
5 Larson --
6 THE COURT: So by the end of 1994 Page, Barney, 
7 and Lanto had a franchise for a Park City Holiday Inn? 
8 MR. RUSSELL: Right. The Moab Land Development 
9 Joint Venture was signed on March 15, or at least partially 
10 signed on March 15. 
11 THE COURT: How did that happen? I mean, whose 
12 idea was that? Did these folks come to Mr. Norman and say, 
13 Mr. Norman we want to build a Holiday Inn in Moab also, or 
14 was Mr. Norman looking around for someone? 
15 MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Norman was interested in having 
16 a Holiday Inn developed. I think Mr. Norman contacted 
17 Duane Barney. Duane Barney was managing the Spanish Fork 
18 Holiday Inn, and they'd met there, or somewhere around 
19 there, and they got the idea to develop it. Four D came 
20 down — 
21 THE COURT: So Mr. Norman figures, I want to put 
22 a motel, or I want to put a motel on my property, and I 
23 want it to be a Holiday Inn, or at least that's one of the 
24 possibilities he's considering. And he goes — he's in 
25 Spanish Fork and sees that there's a Holiday Inn in Spanish 
1 Fork and talks to this guy, Duane Barney, there, and that 
2 starts, that's what makes this contact, that gets this 
3 going? 
4 MR. RUSSELL: I think so. Page Barney and Lanto 
5 then came down to Moab, looked at the property, started 
6 running numbers, started making plans. Mr. Arnold and Mr. 
7 Larson were down in Moab in April of 1995 at the Norman's 
8 house. 
9 THE COURT: Who were down there? 
10 MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Arnold and Mr. Larson both came 
11 I down with Page and Barney, they were at the Norman's house. 
12 Arnold as an attorney, Larson as a financial guy. Larson 
13 was offering to buy their house, and do this, and do that. 
14 But they met them before --
15 THE COURT: So they knew Arnold as a lawyer, 
16 Larson as a guy with money? 
17 MR. RUSSELL: Or — 
18 THE COURT: Who knows how to find it. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. RUSSELL: So the joint venture agreement that 
22 you've seen gets signed in March, and there's ongoing 
23 discussions about it. In April a letter from Larson to 
24 Greg Page, he's talking about a trip that he recently took 
25 down to Arizona to get funding for the two Holiday Ii Cnn 
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in 
pic 
Normans are the people who put up the property. 
?t know about this 
THE 
MR, 
COURT: 
RUSSELL: 
service agreement. 
But 
Page, 
and 
They 
So what is the service agreement? 
Service agreement is for Mr. 
get financing for two Holiday Inns, one 
Park City. 
Larson 
in Moab and one 
Now, what brings Larson directly into the 
ture is that this service agreement says that if he gets 
financing for the Moab project, he gets a 25 percent cut of 
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the project, an owner, a co-owner. Which immediately 
brings into play, I believe, very direct fiduciary duties. 
Then we see that --
THE COURT: So is there any payment made to 
Larson under this April 1995 agreement? 
MR. RUSSELL: $5,000, and $500 for expenses. 
MR. HASKINS: Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
one thing to get this straight from the beginning. He's 
mischaracterizing that service agreement was between 
Western Empire Development and (inaudible) not Larson. 
Larson is an officer in that corporation. 
MR. RUSSELL: Western Empire Advisors, that's 
correct. 
MR. HASKINS: You keep saying Larson, 
(inaudible). 
MR. RUSSELL: That's correct. 
MR. HASKINS: (Inaudible) they haven't been sued. 
MR. RUSSELL: We'll talk about that, Your Honor. 
(Inaudible) if you want to have protection of a separate 
entity as a corporation, you have to act like a corporation 
in all respects, and at all times and Mr. Larson has 
definitely not done that. There's no, we can see the 
wizard behind the curtain of Western Empire Advisors. 
MR. HASKINS: (Inaudible). 
MR. RUSSELL: So there's the service agreement. 
/J 
1 Then we see that Four D is attempting to acquire a 
2 franchise for Moab. And we even have — 
3 THE COURT: By April f95? 
4 MR. RUSSELL: This is May, June, I don't know 
5 when they started. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. RUSSELL: Even have a draft of it, it was 
8 supposed to be in Greg Page's name, or in Four D 
9 Development's name. And for whatever, for whatever reason 
10 they couldn't do it. But beginning in June of 1995, we 
11 start getting the letters going back and forth between 
12 Trust Guarantee, is the Arizona financial outfit, and 
13 Norman Larson. 
14 And what happened here, Your Honor, is that 
15 Larson and Arnold smelled big money, and so they got 
16 involved in a very serious, direct way. They didn't tell 
17 the Normans about it, but they did. And we have documents 
18 that the jury can disbelieve their eyes if they want to or 
19 not. June 6th, a letter from Norman Larson, not Western 
20 Empire -- well, it's on Western Empire Advisors's 
21 letterhead. A letter from Norman Larson to Trust 
22 Guarantee. "We need a commitment very quickly so we can go 
23 ahead and pay for the franchise fee of $40,000. Mark 
24 Arnold, the attorney for the project, will be calling you. 
25 The borrower," that's them, "is prepared to place the 
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1 amount of $100,000 in a trust account." Well, they didn't 
2 have $100,000 in the trust account, nor were they prepared 
3 at the time to place it there. 
4 THE COURT: Can you tell whether they were 
5 proposing to do that from loan proceeds, or in advance of 
6 the loan? 
7 MR. RUSSELL: This is in advance of the loan. 
8 THE COURT: Well, is that what it says, it says 
9 in advance of loan we're prepared to --
10 MR. RUSSELL: No, it doesn't say that. It tries 
11 to give them the idea that they actually have this money, 
12 but they don't. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I guess I need to see that. It 
14 may be they're just saying we'll put $100,000 of loan 
15 proceeds in a trust account to make sure that it's 
16 disbursed properly. 
17 MR. RUSSELL: That is what it says, it says, "The 
18 borrower's prepared to place the amount of $100,000 in a 
19 trust account approved by borrower and lender until funds 
20 can be confirmed." That's what it says. They didn't have 
21 it then. 
22 THE COURT: Okay, funds can be confirmed, so you 
23 think until funds can be confirmed means in advance of 
24 getting loan approval? 
25 MR. RUSSELL: The loan funds they're talking 
/ 3 
1 about, the $4 million that they're asking Trust Guarantee 
2 for can be confirmed. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. RUSSELL: On or about June 16, Mark Arnold 
5 went to a client of his, Anne Young, and negotiated a 
6 $160,000 loan. Terms of the loan were for 90 days at 18 
7 percent interest; ten points or $16,000 paid to the loan 
8 fees; two points to Anne Young. And the loan was to be 
9 secured by --
10 THE COURT: Hang on, ten points to whom? 
11 MR. RUSSELL: Arnold and Larson. 
12 THE COURT: Two points to Anne Young. 
13 MR. RUSSELL: Two points to Anne Young, $3,200. 
14 To be secured by Norman's property. This was before 
15 anybody ever talked to the Normans about that. And they 
16 got the money on June 17, and it was deposited first in the 
17 American Legal Title, of which Mr. Arnold was the 
18 principal, and the check was endorsed by him. And then 
19 immediately made payable to Mr. Larson's account, all 
20 $160,000. And on June 16 — it was deposited on June the 
21 19th. 
22 June 16th, Mr. Larson writes Trust Guarantee, he 
23 says, "Please be advised that Western Empire Advisors has 
24 $100,000 in their trust account," which is the 100,000 the 
25 trust guaranteed. 
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MR. 
apparently it 
COURT: What day was that letter written? 
RUSSELL: Pardon? 
COURT: When was it written? 
RUSSELL: It was written June 16. It was 
19th, which was the day that the deposit was 
COURT: Okay. 
RUSSELL: On the very same day, and 
was walked down there, because it was filed 
on the very same day, Venture Properties Two, LC, is 
formed. Venti 
Larson and Ma. 
THE 
MR. 
are Property Two, LC, consists of Norman 
rk Arnold only. 
COURT: What day is that? 
RUSSELL: June 19th. On June 20, Mark Arnold 
gets his $8,000 cut of the loan proceeds. On June 21st --
and to affirm 
use that inte. 
the counsel, when I say Norman Larson, we'll 
rchangeably with Western Empire Advisors. 
June 21st, Larson gets his $8,000 cut. Also on June 21st, 
a check from Western Empire Advisors. The deposition 
testimony is 1 
Arnold. Out < 
Morris and As. 
Lhat this is handwriting of both Larson and 
of the loan proceeds this $10,000 to Robert 
sociates is an earnest money for property in 
Park City. Now, the Normans have no knowledge of the Park 
City project, no interest in the Park City project, and yet 
these loan funds that their property is securing is used 
i — J 
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for that. 
THE COURT: Now, as it turns out, that earnest 
money came back and was put back in the account, right; is 
that true? 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, that's an interesting point. 
The earnest money, on July 25th we have a letter from Mr. 
Arnold to the real estate company saying, please give us an 
extension on this purchase so that we can finish up this 
transaction. If you can't do that, then you better return 
the money to us. Well, somebody, I don't know who, but 
somebody told the company to send the check back, not to 
Western Empire Advisors, but to Venture Properties Two, 
which is what they did. And the endorsement on the check 
is both Arnold and Larson. That check was eventually 
deposited in one of Mr. Larson's accounts. The $10,000 
doesn't show up on his accounting though. So we don't know 
what happened with that $10,000. 
The point that I left out, for whatever reason 
Four D, or Lanto, or Page couldn't get the franchise so 
Norman Larson got the Holiday Inn franchise personally, 
individually, not Western Empire Advisors but Norman 
Larson. 
THE COURT: Which franchise, for Park City or 
Moab? 
MR. RUSSELL: For Moab. 
1 THE COURT: So they actually did get a franchise 
2 for Moab? 
3 MR. RUSSELL: They did. 
4 THE COURT: When was that? 
5 MR. RUSSELL: June — well, the check was written 
6 on June the 16th, same day the loan was obtained from the 
7 Youngs. And it was faxed to Holiday Inn from Mr. Arnold's 
9 office on June 17, rush, big rush. This is the Holiday Inn 
9 project. The Holiday Inn project is what we will argue, 
10 and what the evidence will show is what these guys were 
11 really interested in, that was the big one. Moab, you 
12 know, maybe we can do a project down there, maybe we can, 
13 maybe we can't. 
14 THE COURT: Excuse me, I thought you said that 
15 Norman Larson got the Holiday Inn franchise for Moab. 
16 MR. RUSSELL: He did, he did. But see, they're 
17 dealing with the same people. (Inaudible) at Holiday Inn, 
18 you can see the note down there, Olympics in 2002, Park 
19 City. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. So did they get a Holiday Inn 
21 franchise for Park City also? 
22 MR. RUSSELL: That's the one that already existed 
23 in December of 1994. 
24 THE COURT: Oh, that's right, okay. 
25 MR. RUSSELL: So one of the first checks, if not 
1 the first check out of the Young loan proceeds was $40,000 
2 to Larson, reimbursed for the Holiday Inn franchise. But 
3 he didn!t transfer the Holiday Inn franchise to anyone, he 
4 kept it in his own name. It wasn't transferred for well 
5 over a year after that, and that was only when he was 
6 forced to do it. 
7 So I'm saying that's taking $40,000 and putting 
8 I it in your pocket. I'm saying that's $10,000 on venture 
9 properties, and putting it in your pocket. Mr. Arnold got 
10 the loan from his client at rates that Joe Kingsley will 
11 I testify is the most expensive loan he's ever seen in his 
12 life, bar none. 
13 THE COURT: The Young loan? 
14 MR. RUSSELL: The Young loan. 
15 THE COURT: What was the — I got the points, 12 
16 points, what was the interest rate? 
17 MR. RUSSELL: Eighteen percent. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: And they paid themselves $16,000 
20 off the top of that loan. Now, this is supposedly, 
21 supposedly all this money is needed for seed money so that 
22 they can get this financing, so they can get the franchise. 
23 Well, they got the franchise, and Larson has it 
24 individually. They've put $16,000 in their pocket and paid 
25 3,200 to Mr. Arnold's client, they've sent $10,000 to a 
ou 
1 project that these guys have no knowledge or interest in, 
2 theyfve spent $70,000 before they even got their signature 
3 on the trust deed. And — 
4 THE COURT: Well, of course, they had to pay 
5 $40,000 for a franchise fee, they had to set aside $100,000 
6 because they'd said they would. And then another $19,200 
7 in points, leaves them with $800 left, right? 
8 MR. RUSSELL: My point is this, well, we haven't 
9 even gotten there yet on the time line, but when Page and 
10 Barney came down, they said they came to the Normans and 
11 they said we need $40,000 for the franchise yesterday, we 
12 need it immediately. Once we have the franchise, once we 
13 have the property that you own, everything else --
14 everything is going to be easy. So we need to borrow that 
15 $40,000 in order to get the franchise. Well, they already 
16 had the franchise, Larson already had the franchise in his 
17 own name when they came down here and told them that. 
18 So if — so you need $40,000 for the franchise, 
19 that's fair, but having taken the money out of the loan 
20 proceeds, they should have gotten, or the group should have 
21 gotten the franchise, not Larson (inaudible). You see, 
22 here he — this is why he's in the group, and later he says 
23 he isn't, many times. But he's in, he's the franchise 
24 owner, and he's used those loan proceeds to pay for it. 
25 THE COURT: Well, what Mr. Lalli told me is that 
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duty, he doesn't have a duty to Bob and Diane Norman. And 
that is the big problem. The people with duties were the 
partners, Page, and Barney, and Lanto. 
And similarly with the promissory note, most 
favorable interpretation of the facts is that in October, 
Arnold steps into Lanto's shoes and becomes a co-obligor on 
the note. Well, that's not true, because that's not what 
the purchase agreement says. And even if the Court or the 
jury disbelieves Arnold's testimony on that point, that I 
was purchasing the interest for the other joint ventures, 
including the Normans, the jury can disregard that and 
believe that Arnold is liable under that note. It's an 
obligation that the Normans don't have standing to assert. 
They can still sue Lanto, which they've chosen not to do. 
But they can't bypass Lanto and sue Arnold. And with that 
claim you also have the timing problem. And as Mr. Russell 
indicated, by October, by the time Arnold signed that 
agreement, the money was spent. The money was gone. The 
Park City deal had been negotiated. The Young loan had 
been made and documented. And that's what we're trying --
we're trying to preclude that evidence for the very reason 
that, I think, is evident from everything that's gone on 
this morning. 
What Mr. Russell would like to do, and he 
realizes that Page and Barney can't pay, so he can't really 
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1 pursue them in this lawsuit. The only people left standing 
2 are Mark Arnold and Norm Larson, and so what he wants to do 
3 is get a big handful of mud and to throw it against the 
4 wall and hope a jury being sympathetic sees something 
5 dirty, but there's not a cause of action for bad acts. 
6 There are causes of action for breach of contract, which we 
7 have here. And this evidence doesn't -- is not probative 
8 of any liability on either of those points, on either of 
9 those claims. 
10 THE COURT: All the money, you're saying all the 
11 money was spent before May of '96? 
12 MR. LALLI: Absolutely before May of '96, yeah. 
13 Mr. Russell just said it was spent before October of '96 --
14 '95, excuse me. 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 MR. LALLI: So the timing issue, I think, is the 
17 simplest, most straightforward way of precluding this 
18 evidence. But it doesn't have to rely on that. The 
19 evidence, even if timing weren't a problem, it's not 
20 probative of a breach of a partnership agreement, or of 
21 default on a promissory note. But I do think that the 
22 timing of it precludes the evidence that we're trying to 
23 knock out. And, you know, unfortunately from Mr. Russell's 
24 perspective, that may knock out a lot of the jury appeal of 
25 this case, but we're here to deal with the facts and the 
ny 
1 law, and the law doesn't let him go to the jury without 
2 evidence. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. You know, it seems that there 
4 are some things that when you look at the whole picture are 
5 troublesome here. What -- Mr. Arnold is an attorney for 
6 this joint venture, right? 
7 MR. LALLI: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Thatfs an undisputed fact; isnft it? 
9 MR. LALLI: It is an undisputed fact. I think 
10 that there's a dispute about what was he doing as an 
11 attorney. I mean, the plaintiffs will attribute much more 
12 to Mr. Arnold than we think is (inaudible). I mean, he did 
13 do -- I mean he investigated water and sewer, he entered 
14 into some negotiations on behalf of the joint venture, but 
15 this is the key really, is that he was doing it for the 
16 joint venture. But this is a personal cause of action. 
17 THE COURT: He puts them in contact with another 
18 client, Anne Young, who makes a loan. 
19 MR. LALLI: Well, I think it's significant to 
20 know that the Normans, they entered the joint venture, they 
21 agreed to contribute their land, and they signed the note 
22 and deed of trust before they ever even met Mark Arnold. I 
23 mean, Mark Arnold was dealing with Norm Larson, and Greg 
24 Page, and Duane Barney who said, do you know anybody who 
25 can make a loan? And Mark Arnold goes out and he says, 
1ZU 
yeah, I have some clients that will make a loan, here are 
the terms. And then Larson, and Page, and Barney, you 
know, they negotiate the terms of a loan, they take that 
document to the Normans - and Greg Page will testify that 
he read it to them twice - and the Normans signed it before 
they ever even met Mark Arnold. I mean, Mark Arnold wasn't 
instrumental in getting the Normans to sign that loan. I 
mean, he made an introduction. 
THE COURT: I thought Arnold and Larson came with 
Page and Barney in April of '95, Arnold presented as a 
lawyer, Larson as a financier, this is before the Young 
loan; isn't that right? At least that's what they said. 
MR. LALLI: I don't believe that's right, Your 
Honor. I don't believe that Mark Arnold met the Normans 
before they signed the note and deed of trust. At least, 
that's what the Normans testified in their depositions. 
MR. HASKINS: Your Honor, with regard to Larson 
in their testimony, in their depositions the Normans 
testified they didn't even know who Norm Larson was until 
April of 1996. When they come to Salt Lake to get an 
accounting of what happened to their $160,000, that's the 
first time they ever determined that Norm Larson had any 
involvement with this alleged partnership. And they admit 
they'd never had any contact or consultation with Norm 
Larson about any of the issues that they've raised with 
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think that!s fairly common for brokers to be paid a 
finder's fee. And there's nothing unusual about that. The 
Normans, they signed the promissory note. And there are no 
usuary laws in the state of Utah. And the policy reason 
for that is because the legislature has determined that 
willing borrowers and willing lenders can negotiate 
whatever they want. 
THE COURT: And I donft have any problem with the 
terms, what I have a concern about is Mr. Arnold, without 
disclosing to one client, at least they claim he didn't 
disclose it. 
MR. LALLI: First of all, first of all, as the 
Normans can testify Page and Barney on behalf of the joint 
venture partners established the lines of communication 
with Arnold. And Arnold in return communicated back to 
Page and Barney. And that's the way that attorneys deal 
with clients who are legal entities and not individuals. 
There is a point person or persons. 
THE COURT: You communicate with the person you 
understand has the authority. 
MR. LALLI: Right. 
THE COURT: Until you have reason to believe 
otherwise. 
MR. LALLI: Yeah. And that's right. And that's 
what was happening here. And, I mean, but even more to the 
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THE COURT: Well, it doesn't, it doesn't. I'm 
ying to get at what I think are the reasons why the 
are upset here. One of the reasons they're upset 
they belonged to a joint venture that hires a 
and the lawyer puts them in touch with another 
to make a loan, and the lawyer ends up with five 
of the loan proceeds in his pocket, in his law 
pocket. And they didn't know about it, maybe Page 
and Barney did know about it and said it's fine. And maybe 
it was 
Barney 
that's 
reasonable for Mr. Arnold to rely simply on Page and 
saying that it was okay. But that's -- you know, 
a problem when an attorney does that without 
disclosure to the people who need to know. 
duty to 
MR. LALLI: Well, if he has a duty. I mean, a 
disclose, of course, is predicated on a 
relationship. 
THE COURT: A duty to disclose to his 
partnership, he was an attorney for the joint venture. 
there's 
to Page 
MR. LALLI: Right. And there's no evidence, 
not even a suggestion that Arnold didn't disclose 
and Barney the terms of this loan. And besides 
1 that, and you've got another timing problem, and at the 
2 time Arnold made the introduction of the Youngs to the 
3 joint venture, you know, he wasn't representing the joint 
4 venture at that time. I mean, the acts, the legal services 
5 he performed on behalf of the joint venture came after 
6 that. 
7 THE COURT: So according to your version of the 
8 facts, he became -- he started representing this joint 
9 venture after he put them in touch with Anne Young? 
10 MR. LALLI: Right. 
11 THE COURT: Well, if that's not true, then you 
12 could understand why the Normans would be upset. 
13 MR. LALLI: I think that the Normans are upset 
14 because they trusted Page and Barney primarily, and they 
15 ended up losing money. And the problem here is that the 
16 people that they should be suing are bankrupt. And so 
17 after the fact, retroactively they're trying to manufacture 
18 duties, and through a good lawyer they're trying to 
19 manufacture duties that Arnold had, because he's not 
20 bankrupt, and that Norm Larson had because he's not 
21 bankrupt. They're trying to share some of this loss. And 
22 while we can be very sympathetic with them, that doesn't 
23 make my client liable for it. 
24 THE COURT: The other dispersement that's a 
25 concern is $10,000 with respect to the Park City franchise. 
1Z0 
1 And that happened before Mr. Arnold was a member of the 
2 partnership, under the most generous reading of the facts. 
3 And I don!t know whether he even had anything to do with 
4 that. I don't know whether they alleged that he had 
5 anything to do with that. 
6 MR. LALLI: What happened there, Your Honor, is 
7 Mark Arnold was asked by Greg Page and Duane Barney to 
8 negotiate a purchase of property in Park City. Unlike the 
9 situation in Moab, they didn't have the property up there. 
10 Page and Barney had dealt with the owner of the Park City 
11 property, they had an acrimonious relationship, and they 
12 felt if they had their lawyer negotiate the transaction, 
13 that they would be able to get a more favorable price, so 
14 that's what they did. They sent Mark Arnold up there, he 
15 negotiated a price, he paid $10,000 earnest money with the 
16 full knowledge and consent of Page and Barney, who told 
17 Arnold and led him to believe that the Normans would be 
18 involved in that Park City development. And Greg Page will 
19 testify to that, that he had every expectation that if the 
20 Park City development were completed, that the Normans 
21 would be participants in that. And Norm Larson wrote the 
22 check out of his account and Mark Arnold paid it over. 
23 When the deal fell through, they transferred the 
24 money, they paid a check back to Arnold, Arnold signed it 
25 back over to the trust account that Larson held. 
1ZO 
THE COURT: But on this April 3rd letter from 
Western Empire Advisors, they list that as a dispersement 
from the loan proceeds, thatfs properly charged. You can 
concede that it wasn't, right? 
MR. LALLI: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: You'd concede that they had no 
business charging the loan, that $10,000 against the Young 
loan proceeds; is that true? I mean, the Normans had 
nothing to do with Park City. 
MR. LALLI: I don't think we know that. I mean, 
if -- you know, first of all, to my client's knowledge, 
he's been given instructions by the partnership liaisons 
for the attorney, and he's asked to go perform a service 
for the joint venture. And in his mind that includes the 
Normans. And in the mind of Greg Page who's giving Arnold 
the instruction, that includes the Normans. And if that is 
true, then the partnership, then, no, it's not improper to 
make that $10,000 out of that, out of the loan proceeds. 
But even if it's not Mark Arnold's duties of 
disclosure run to the partnership, and the representatives 
of the partnership, mainly Page and Barney. And the money 
went back, and I think --
THE COURT: It must have been after April 3, 
1996. 
MR. LALLI: I don't know. I mean, this is a 
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1 document prepared by Mr. Larson, and, unfortunately, I 
2 haven't had the opportunity to depose him because of the 
3 discovery cutoff after I got involved. I don't know the 
4 answer to that question. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. LALLI: But I do know that the check was 
7 signed back over to that trust account. 
8 THE COURT: Then there's $50,000 that goes, 
9 apparently ended up going to these people in Arizona, and 
10 they never gave it back. 
11 MR. LALLI: That's right. I mean, the $50,000 
12 went to Arizona. But the payment of that money followed 
13 the same process as the payment of all the monies. 
14 THE COURT: That was done before October of '95, 
15 right? 
16 MR. LALLI: I don't believe that's right. It 
17 was, according to this accounting, the 50,000 went out 
18 September of '95. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. LALLI: And, you know, more to the point on 
21 that payment, you know, that was for the purpose of 
22 obtaining a loan. Even under the Norman's theory, that was 
23 the purpose of this money, was to obtain a loan. You know, 
24 it wasn't Mark Arnold who lined up this connection. I 
25 don't see how he can be responsible for that $50,000. I 
1 mean, if somebody breaks into my car and steals money out 
2 of it, Ifm not liable for that. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. And what about this $8,500 to 
4 Pete Lanto? The Arnold's are upset — they're upset about 
5 the $50,000 with the folks in Arizona because, I guess, 
6 they say, you should have known better than to send it to 
7 these guys. The money to buy out Pete Lanto's interest, 
8 they're concerned about this, I think, from all the 
9 appearances of the documents and the transactions with 
10 Lanto, that $8,500 was so it would be purchased by Larson 
11 and Arnold, right? 
12 MR. LALLI: Well, and it seems to me that the 
13 I important fact there is that if Larson and Arnold did not 
14 pay the $8,500, then they never got Lanto's interest. 
15 THE COURT: Why should it come out of the loan 
16 proceeds? If Larson and Arnold want to buy an interest on 
17 their own behalf, why not use their own money, why are they 
18 calling it loan proceeds? 
19 MR. LALLI: Exactly. That's exactly our point, 
20 is that Larson and Arnold did not want to buy an interest 
21 in this. And that's why Mark Arnold's going to testify 
22 that the reason he did that was because there had been a 
23 falling out among, primarily, Mr. Larson and Lanto, and 
24 they wanted to negotiate a buyout of Lanto to get him out 
25 of the way, because he was causing problems. And they went 
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1 position is, these are all contract claims. I mean, all 
2 this is not relevant. He's claiming $50,000 
3 inappropriately done, that they were negligent with regard 
4 to their dispersement of that, based upon the fact that 
5 they should have known, or a reasonable person would have 
6 known. I don't think you can amend the pleadings at this 
7 point and start making negligence claims. There are only 
8 two claims in this case, and they're contract claims. 
9 They're claiming joint and several liability of 
10 the promissory note, even though that note was to the 
11 Youngs, not to them. And I don't understand that legal 
12 (inaudible). I'm even in this case later than Mr. Lalli. 
13 And secondly, they're claiming that for some reason they're 
14 all joint venturers, even though they agree, and it's 
15 acknowledged in their own testimony from their depositions, 
16 they can't meet the requirements of Utah law of that issue, 
17 they just can't. They agree that Mr. Larson was never, 
18 never a partner and/or a joint venturer. They have to show 
19 there was a joint proprietary interest in the subject 
20 matter; that there was a mutual right to control. They 
21 agree that they were the ones in control, or Mr. Page was 
22 in control. There was a right to share in the profits; and 
23 that there was an agreement and duty to share in the 
24 losses. And they agree in their own depositions, and Mr. 
25 Russell can't dispute this, on all those elements with 
1J1 
1 regard to Mr. Larson and Mr. Arnold up until May of 1996, 
2 there was no agreement. And if there was an agreement, it 
3 was only after May of 1996 with regard to Arnold. So our 
4 position is this evidence just isn't relevant. 
5 THE COURT: Now, I have just one question for 
6 you, Mr. Russell. How — Ifm trying to keep it in my head 
7 long enough to put it out. If — it has to do with the 
8 question of standing that!s raised by Mr. Lalli. Mr. --
9 let's suppose that Mr. Arnold did agree to buy out Lanto's, 
10 and actually personally acquire that interest, and that he 
11 then -- and that he promised to indemnify Lanto for any 
12 obligations that he had, how do you respond to Mr. Lallifs 
13 claim that's Lanto1s right to assert, not your clients' 
14 right to assert? 
15 MR. RUSSELL: That's right initially. My 
16 position with regard to the Normans is that they, in 
17 effect, paid off the entire note. Whether or not someone 
18 came to them with foreclosure papers or not, the note had 
19 now been outstanding for, by the time that Mr. Winkler 
20 bought their property, for in excess of three years. So I 
21 guess they could have waited for the rest of their lives 
22 until Winkler owned everything that they had, based only on 
23 interest. 
24 THE COURT: I'm not having a problem with that. 
25 That's a point that Mr. Lallifs raised, but I didn't buy 
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1 that. I think the Normans acted responsibly to make a 
2 deal, to cut their losses, and to get Winkler taken care 
3 of. And they didn't have to be foreclosed on to have a 
4 right for other members of the joint venture to share in 
5 the loss, if the joint venture agreement requires other 
6 people to share in the losses, and if those other people 
7 are, in fact, members of the joint venture. 
8 But he's saying, this is with respect to your 
9 theory that they are co-obligors on the promissory note, he 
10 says they didn't sign the promissory note, and the only 
11 thing they did is they promised to indemnify Lanto if he 
12 should ever become liable. But he hasn't ever become -- he 
13 has never had to pay anything. If Lanto ever has to pay 
14 anything, he can sue them. And, in fact, he can maybe 
15 assign his right to sue them to somebody else, but that's 
16 never happened. So you don't have the right to sue him, 
17 asserting Lanto's right to indemnification; isn't that 
18 right? I mean, what legal theory is there for suing and 
19 asserting Lanto's right to indemnification? 
20 MR. RUSSELL: That they're beneficiaries of that. 
21 THE COURT: So you're asserting that it was a 
22 third-party beneficiary contract? 
23 MR. RUSSELL: I'm saying that these people are a 
24 third-party beneficiary of that indemnification agreement, 
25 which specifically mentions the note and also (inaudible) 
1 liability. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. That seems to me, that's the 
3 thing that occurred to me it would have to be third-party 
4 beneficiary theory, but I know there's elements of that 
5 that may --
6 MR. LALLI: Well, and if I can address that, Your 
7 Honor. First of all, you have to be an intended 
8 third-party beneficiary. 
9 THE COURT: That's what I was going to ask. 
10 MR. LALLI: And certainly there's nothing in that 
11 one-page purchase agreement that suggests anybody's a 
12 third-party beneficiary. But more to the point, I mean, 
13 put yourself back at that time. At that time there's an 
14 obligation owed by Lanto to the Youngs. All right, if 
15 anybody is an intended third-party beneficiary, it's not 
16 the co-obligors, it's the obligee, it's Young. So even if 
17 you get over the hurdle that, which I don't think you can, 
18 that there is no evidence of any intended third-party 
19 beneficiary of that deal, you just can't get -- you can't 
20 get to the point where they also intended to be jointly and 
21 severally, or somehow otherwise liable to the co-obligors, 
22 I mean, it just doesn't work. 
23 THE COURT: Maybe that's not clinically to my 
24 decision anyway, because the theory on the note and trust 
25 deed -- the only thing I have to decide right now is 
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whether these things are relevant to proving obligation 
under the note and trust deed. And none of these things 
prove that Mark Arnold either was a co-obligor, or that he 
assumed the responsibility of a co-obligor. And all of 
these things do relate to, with the exception of his 
relationship with Winkler, all these things relate to 
things that took place before the earliest possible day 
that Arnold could have become a partner, or a member of the 
joint venture. So Ifm going to grant the motion in limine. 
The reason Ifm leaving out Winkler is I just 
think that's a distraction, and it doesn't seem there's a 
serious argument here that Winkler screwed over the 
Normans. In fact, Winkler treated them very fairly. And 
so regardless of what Mr. Arnold had an obligation or a 
duty to do under a contract, putting them in contact with 
Winkler actually worked to their benefit, and they're not 
complaining about what Winkler did. So that's just a 
distraction. It just consumes the jury's time 
unnecessarily. 
There is a real risk — with respect to the other 
items, there is a real risk that will get the jury confused 
with actions of Mr. Arnold that he took before he could 
conceivably have been a member of the joint venture, and/or 
before he conceivably agreed to indemnify a member of the 
joint venture. And so there's too great of a risk of 
1 Ji) 
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THE COURT: I wish I could give you 54(b) 
certification, but I'm sure I can't. 
MR. RUSSELL: You can if you feel like it's in 
the interest of the (inaudible). 
THE COURT: It's not just that. 
MR. RUSSELL: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: 54(b) says, "When more than one claim 
for relief is presented in an action, the Court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer 
than all of the claims of parties only upon an expressed 
determination by the Court that there is no just reason for 
delay, and upon an expressed direction for the entry of 
judgment." It seems to me like there's some case on that 
that is persuading me that I can hardly do it where 
everything hasn't been resolved. Let's see, well, maybe I 
better not try to resolve that today. You probably ought 
to file a rule 54(b) motion and let the defendants respond. 
I actually would like to see that resolved, 
because -- I want to be candid to all of you, I made the 
decision I did with respect to that breach of fiduciary 
duty as an attorney claim in an uncertain state as to which 
way I should go. And I was not knowing which way to go, 
thinking it was a close question, I granted the motion for 
summary judgment on this, that issue. Because I ultimately 
did not see how a lawyer can be expected to not just 
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represent a joint venture, but to inquire into and examine 
as to the best interests of every member of the joint 
venture. And I realize that I was running contrary to the 
Supreme Court's decision as to when a lawyer has an ethical 
duty to disqualify. And so I realize, you know, I'm 
swimming maybe against the current in doing that, but 
feeling that it's the only way the law can be. Otherwise 
lawyers will have no way of knowing what responsibilities 
they have whenever they represent a business entity. Whose 
interest do they have to look out for, and who do they get 
instructions from? Do they have to get permission from 
every shareholder in a closely held corporation? Do they 
have to get permission from every partner in a limited or 
even a general partnership? That's the concern I had, and 
I felt the best rule of law had to be that it's the 
partnership of the entity itself that has -- that is the 
recipient of the lawyer's duty. 
So I certainly thought it was, if not likely, at 
least a certain real substantial possibility that we'd have 
the trial and I'd get reversed on that and we'd do it all 
over again, so I would be happy to have that resolved if 
it's possible to do before we actually have a trial. But, 
you know, if you do that, you're going to end up in the 
Supreme Court for over a year while they gnaw on that and 
eventually resolve it. 
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1 MR. RUSSELL: Another clarification, if I may, 
2 Your Honor. Is it the Court's ruling that consent is 
3 necessary in order for someone to become a partner when the 
4 persons were seeking to be held responsible as a partner 
5 makes that consent impossible by not telling them what 
6 they!ve done? 
7 THE COURT: You mean, am I finding that there's 
8 an exception to the consent requirement where, since 
9 therefs been no disclosure, no consent --
10 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: — could be given? Yeah, Ifm finding 
12 that there is no such exception. It seems to me what you 
13 don't know can't hurt you in that case. 
14 MR. LALLI: Yeah. Until there's consent, you're 
15 not a partner. 
16 THE COURT: The one that was running the risk 
17 there, I guess, was Mr. — if you wanted to be a partner, 
18 was Mr. Arnold and Mr. Larson. They didn't ask for the 
19 consent, so they stood not to get what a partner would get. 
20 MR. LALLI: I don't know if you want me to 
21 respond to the motion to amend or — 
22 THE COURT: That's also something that I'm — in 
23 fairness, I think you ought to get a chance to see in 
24 writing. He's not even put in writing what his complaint 
25 would say. 
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MR. LALLI: Okay. I think that we could also 
accomplish, Mr. Russell made three or four motions in 
limine, that the Court's time permits. 
THE COURT: Let's talk about them. 
MR. LALLI: I'd like to have a ruling on them. 
THE COURT: What are they? 
MR. RUSSELL: The primary one was the 
reinstatement (inaudible) claim. We've heard it said here 
today that what happened was that this partnership went out 
and hired professionals who did what they did. And --
well, the Court just ruled that they didn't come up with a 
partner, so that's out. But I think that they had duties, 
fiduciary duties as professionals and as agents, which 
would bring that back into play, that's one. 
THE COURT: Well, okay, if your theory is that 
they had responsibilities to the Normans individually, I 
think that's foreclosed by my ruling that Mr. Arnold and 
Mr. Larson — I guess, it's only Mr. Arnold, had a 
professional duty to the joint venture only. And that's 
the thing that you want to severally and see if you can get 
the Supreme Court to change my mind on. But you also want 
to reinstate that punitive damages theory on -- or the 
punitive damages claim on the theory that you can commit 
the tortious act of breaching your duty to a partner in 
their partnership; is that right? 
1 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. But I think the Court just 
2 ruled that they weren't partners. 
3 THE COURT: No, I didn't. I just ruled that they 
4 were not partners until they -- until all the other 
5 partners consented of them being partners. And that -- and 
6 I've said earlier that consent can be other than in words. 
7 But most of these actions you're complaining about occurred 
8 before they could have been partners, so -- and maybe you 
9 don't have much left as far as a breach of fiduciary duty. 
10 MR. RUSSELL: That would depend on what the facts 
11 are as to when they found out. Another motion was to have 
12 bankruptcy pleadings from the United States Bankruptcy 
13 Court involving Duane Barney and Greg Page admitted into 
14 evidence. 
15 THE COURT: To prove what? 
16 MR. RUSSELL: They named the Arnolds — or the 
17 Normans and the other defendants as obligors under the 
18 note. 
19 THE COURT: And the exception to the hearsay rule 
20 is --
21 MR- RUSSELL: Official document, pleading in 
22 court. I can get certified copies, obviously. 
23 THE COURT: Why does that — is that all you 
24 wanted to say about it? 
25 MR. RUSSELL: Uh-huh. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Lalli, why is that not an 
exception to hearsay rule? 
MR. LALLI: Well, first of all, I think the 
official record exception applies primary to records in 
this case. The primarily reason for that, and we've put 
this in our papers in opposition to Mr. Russell's motion, 
that the fact that other defendants who were parties to 
this case and now have been dismissed are in bankruptcy, 
that's not something that can go to the jury. I mean, the 
jury can't be informed on why dismissed defendants are not 
here. There is a model Utah jury instruction on that very 
point. And, you know, aside from not being -- how is the 
fact that Page and Barney are in bankruptcy probative of 
whether Mr. Larson or Mr. Arnold breached either of these 
two contracts? It's not -- obviously the intent for 
wanting to suggest that Page and Barney are in bankruptcy 
or to put that into evidence is so that the jury will say, 
okay, somebody has got to pay the Normans, it can't be the 
other two, so it's got to be these two. And that's exactly 
why we have this standard jury instruction that says, 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when there are other 
defendants who have been dismissed, you're not to consider 
why they're not here, you're only to look at these 
defendants and consider their liability on the claims. I 
can look it up. 
1 THE COURT: So you're saying -- he's not asking 
2 to put it in for the purpose of proving that they're in 
3 bankruptcy, he's asking to put it in for the purpose of 
4 proving that they were partners. That these folks — the 
5 bankrupt partners thought Arnold and Larson were partners, 
6 right? 
7 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. And it also says 
8 co-obligors under the note, which is directly contrary to 
9 what they claim what the evidence -- and, you know, just 
10 backing up for a minute, all of the — all of what they did 
11 they say, well, we told Page and Barney. That was the 
12 method of communication, and the statute says that 
13 communication to one partner with authority is 
14 communication to all partners. And so if they did 
15 communicate these things to Page and Barney, then they did 
16 know. And they did continue -- and they did consent. I 
17 mean, you'd either have to take it one way or the other. 
18 And if they say that Page and Barney were the official 
19 conduits for official communications, and they made those, 
20 then it's knowledge of the partnership. And the 
21 partnership — and it moved forward, and therefore, they 
22 had knowledge. And they would be deemed to have consented. 
23 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, imputing knowledge of 
24 partners is a very different concept from giving consent. 
25 And this was an issue that we've briefed extensively in our 
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summary judgment papers. And it's not (inaudible) of the 
contract that says that there has to be unanimous consent. 
There's also a law, there's a statute on it, and there's 
plenty of Utah Supreme cases --
THE COURT: Well, we're off the subject of the 
motion in limine. The question is if we have a hearsay 
exemption that applies. 
MR. LALLI: Well, first of all, I've never seen 
the documents that Mr. Russell is talking about. I don't 
believe it's true that Mark Arnold's identified as a 
partner on the bankruptcy documents. 
MR. RUSSELL: (Inaudible) listed on Duane 
Barney's file as (inaudible), or his firm, at least. 
MR. LALLI: That's not being a partner. 
MR. RUSSELL: No. 
MR. LALLI: So I don't think it is probative of 
the point that Mr. Russell was saying, that the Court was 
concerned about. 
THE COURT: Well, which specific exception are 
you -- you say it's the business records exception, or the 
official records. Official records is 8038. 
MR. RUSSELL: There's an exception of certified 
copies of court documents. 
THE COURT: Well, certified copies is just a way 
of authenticating. But still if it's hearsay, it's still 
1 hearsay. And if you're offering anything in a court 
2 document for the truth of what's stated in the court 
3 document, you still have a hearsay problem that you have to 
4 get around. 
5 MR. RUSSELL: Greg Page lists Mark Arnold as a 
6 signer on note. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. So it's still hearsay. We 
8 don't have Greg Page here saying that, we have a court 
9 document saying that Greg Page said it. And Greg Page 
10 can't be cross-examined. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: He will be. 
12 MR. LALLI: He's been subpoenaed, Your Honor. 
13 And so it's also not the best evidence (inaudible). 
14 MR. RUSSELL: Well, if he's here, then I don't 
15 need it. 
16 THE COURT: You can probably get it from him. 
17 MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
18 MR. LALLI: Well, but the point about bankruptcy, 
19 I mean, that is something that should not be gotten into. 
20 And, for example, I don't think it's fair to question Mr. 
21 Page whether or not he took out bankruptcy. 
22 THE COURT: Well, we can deal with that by — I 
23 think you're probably right about that. I can just deal 
24 with that by requiring that Mr. Russell before he asks any 
25 questions that would suggest bankruptcy, that we have a 
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1 conference, we find out what he wants to get from the 
2 witness. And I — you can sometimes say to a witness, all 
3 right, do you agree that you did say this? Yes, I did say 
4 it. Well, then just tell the jury that you said it, but 
5 not that you said it in the bankruptcy case. So if Mr. 
6 Page is willing to admit that he did say that they were 
7 signers, I think we should be able to get that information. 
8 MR. LALLI: Well, whether or not they're signers 
9 is something that's evident from the face of the document. 
10 THE COURT: Excuse me, whether they're — if what 
11 Mr. Page thinks about it is relevant and admissible, then 
12 you can ask him what he thinks. And if he says, what he 
13 says is something different than what he said before, you 
14 can ask about the previous statement as well. But I think 
15 we need to do that in a way that protects the jury from 
16 knowing about the bankruptcy. So just alert me when we get 
17 to that point, and we'll have a conversation outside the 
18 hearing of the jury. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: I also filed a notice of intent to 
20 use hearsay with regard to Mr. Lanto. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. What's that about? 
22 MR. RUSSELL: 803 — or 4 --
23 THE COURT: The catch-all exception. 
24 MR. RUSSELL: The catch-all exception. 
25 THE COURT: Is he unavailable? 
1 MR. RUSSELL: Based on our records he is. And 
2 Mr. Lalli responded, I think, appropriately that he did in 
3 detail exactly what those efforts (inaudible), at least 
4 alluded to them. I can give you more detail. 
5 THE COURT: Well, the standard under 804, the 
6 unavailable declared is, "Whether the statement is offered 
7 as evidence and material fact, more probative on the point 
8 than any other evidence, which you can procure through 
9 reasonable efforts. And the general purposes of these 
10 rules in the interest of justice will best be served by 
11 admission of the statement into evidence." 
12 MR. RUSSELL: So in this case, we have the 
13 transaction where the interest is acquired, and that's 
14 certainly going to be important. 
15 THE COURT: So did he make a statement to someone 
16 about that, or write a letter, what? 
17 MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Norman, he told Mr. Norman 
18 about it well before May 1st, by the way, !96. 
19 THE COURT: So before May 1, 1996, Lanto told 
20 Norman that he had sold out? 
21 MR. RUSSELL: That he had sold to Mark Arnold for 
22 attorney's fees. Mark Arnold also told Bob Norman in 
23 December of 1996, which you made a contemporaneous note of, 
24 that he was thinking about acquiring Mr. Lanto1s interest 
25 (inaudible). Mr. Norman was fine with that. 
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THE COURT: Okay. What is the — ordinarily when 
talking about the catch-all exception, we're talking 
about something that is like another exception to the 1 
hearsay rule, but not quite. There's certain guarantees of 
trustworthiness about this that -- that's — I forgot, I 
didn't 
covered 
circums 
read that part. "A statement not specifically 
by the usual exceptions, but having equivalent 
tantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Ordinarily 
a hearsay statement to a party doesn't have equivalent I 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, as, for 
example 
person, 
, a hearsay statement to a doctor, or to an official 
a government official, or to somebody who is right 
there on the scene, or that's made when you're really 
excited I mean, what are the equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness? Was Mr. Lanto about to die? 
Was he 
priest 
we need 
wouldn' 
trying 
" 
MR. RUSSELL: No. 
THE COURT: Had he just been to speak with his 
about the importance of being honest? 
MR. RUSSELL: No. 
THE COURT: I'm not trying to be facetious, but 
something we can point to to say this is — people 
t lie in this situation. 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, I don't know if (inaudible) 
to start presuming that people won't lie. But Mr. 
1 Norman simply contacted him. He didn't know, again, about 
2 what had transpired, and he contacted him because he 
3 believed he was still in the partnership. All he wanted 
4 was some drawings back. There was no litigation, there was 
5 no threatened litigation. As far as anyone knew, the move 
6 was still on to get the funding and do the projects. And 
7 Mr. Lanto simply volunteered to him what his status was. 
8 THE COURT: Are you offering that for the purpose 
9 of proving that it was true, or just the purpose that it 
10 had been said? 
11 MR. RUSSELL: For the purpose that it had been 
12 said, and the Normans thereafter did not object. 
13 THE COURT: Well, you can have it for the purpose 
14 of showing that the Normans had notice. You can!t have it 
15 for the purpose -- if therefs some dispute about it. For 
16 example, if you want to introduce the statement to prove 
17 that there was some detail about Lantofs selling out that 
18 was --
19 MR. RUSSELL: What I would introduce it for is 
20 that they had notice that Mr. Arnold had become their 
21 partner, and they didn't object to it. 
22 THE COURT: Of course, there's a risk that the 
23 jury will use it for the other purpose, right? 
24 MR. LALLI: Well, what he said in his papers is 
25 that what he wants in is that Mr. Lanto informed Bob Norman 
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that Lanto had sold his interest in the joint venture, 
right? And what they're saying, I disagree with, but 
they're suggesting that selling your interest in a joint 
venture automatically makes you a partner without consent. 
Now, I disagree with that. 
And obviously the purpose, the purpose for 
introducing a statement Lantofs saying, I sold my interest 
is for that very -- and for the truth. I mean, they're 
trying to demonstrate that, in fact, Lanto sold his 
interest. I don't see what else it could be for. 
THE COURT: Well, they don't need it for that, 
because they already have a document that shows that Lanto 
sold his interest. 
MR. LALLI: Exactly. I mean, if that's -- and 
they don't need the hearsay statement. 
THE COURT: They're -- I think I believe that 
they just need it for the purpose of showing that Normans 
knew at that point. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
THE COURT: So I think it's not hearsay at all 
because it's not offered for the truth. 
MR. LALLI: That the Normans knew what? 
THE COURT: That the Normans knew that Lanto sold 
his interest. 
MR. LALLI: Okay. Then that contradicts their 
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deposition testimony. 
THE COURT: True. And that's a problem that I'm 
sure the Normans are going to have with the jury is — and 
that you'll point out. 
Mr. Russell, whether you decide to do anything 
about this or not is up to you, but I think I've said today 
that my understanding of the law about the obligation of 
co-obligors on a promissory note is that they have a right 
to seek contribution from one another, but not a right to 
sue as if they were in the position of the holder of the 
promissory note. And the claim you're asserting is that 
the claim that a holder of the promissory note would have, 
but the right of joint and several to collect jointly and 
severally from anyone. The beneficiary, the holder of the 
promissory note can collect from any one of five people 
that sign the promissory note, and doesn't have to care who 
signed it. Doesn't have to care who really was intended by 
all of these people as the one that would really pay it. 
If I co-sign a note for my son and he doesn't 
pay, the bank can come and make me pay. And they don't 
have to each prove that my son doesn't have any money, they 
can just collect from me. But if — but if my son doesn't 
pay and I end up paying, then I sue him on a different 
theory. I have to prove that it was intended that he would 
pay, and he failed to do so. It was his car, or whatever, 
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and he told me he'd pay the whole thing. 
MR. RUSSELL: Aside from his — did he sign on 
the loan? 
THE COURT: Yeah. He signed on the loan. 
MR. RUSSELL: Wouldn't that be proof that he 
intended to pay? 
THE COURT: As between the two of us that he 
intended to pay. But between the co-makers of a promissory 
note, there can be agreements as to who's going to be 
responsible. And those may not be reflected in the 
promissory note, because the holder of the promissory note 
doesn't care. The holder of the promissory note can look 
to every one of them and any individual one of them. 
MR. RUSSELL: I see your point there. 
THE COURT: So the Normans don't get to step in 
to -- who was the original holder of the promissory note's 
shoes? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: They don't step into his shoes. They 
have the rights of co-makers, they don't have the right of 
the original holder of the note. 
MR. RUSSELL: What if it was the intent of the 
co-makers that they be jointly and severally liable? 
THE COURT: To each other? 
MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. 
1 THE COURT: Sure. But I donft know how that 
2 could be. Each of them, if it has to pay can sue the 
3 others for the entire amount, then you have an endless 
4 circle. The five of us are each responsible to each other 
5 for the entire amount, I have to pay it, I sue him; he has 
6 to pay it, he sues him; he has to pay, he sues him; he has 
7 to pay, he sues me, and we're right back here. We just go 
8 in an endless circle. So I don't think anybody1s going to 
9 believe that that's actually the truth. Joint and several 
10 liability is an obligation that we have that the co-makers 
11 have to someone else, not to each other, because it doesn't 
12 make sense to have it to each other. 
13 Okay, I've got some stuff here I want to give 
14 back. A copy of the first amended complaint, a copy of 
15 this letter from Western Empire Advisors. 
16 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, I think there's one more 
17 motion in limine that Mr. Russell filed that I think we 
18 haven't addressed yet. 
19 THE COURT: Okay, what's that? 
20 MR. LALLI: It's entitled a motion in limine, re: 
21 interest, attorney's fees, and costs. 
22 THE COURT: Is that still ripe, or is that 
23 premature now, Mr. Russell? 
24 MR. RUSSELL: It actually went to how the jury 
25 would be instructed on the — finding damages. 
lb j 
THE COURT: Is it really a question of what jury 
instructions should be given? 
MR. RUSSELL: No. And letfs see if I understand 
the Court's ruling just now, the Normans would not be able 
to ask the jury for an award of attorney's fees under the 
note, because that was an obligation that ran between the 
maker and the borrowers. I still think that the jury 
should be able to assess --
THE COURT: But they may be able to ask for 
contribution for what they have to pay from other makers of 
the promissory note. 
MR. RUSSELL: And I still think it's legitimate 
for the Normans to ask that 18 percent interest be the 
applicable rate, since that is the rate under the note, and 
the rate that they were subjected to, and eventually had to 
pay. In -- from the point of payment --
THE COURT: So is all you want is to the extent I 
determine, or the jury determines that other people are 
responsible for all or a share of the promissory note, they 
should also be responsible for the pertinent interest, 
attorney's fees, and costs that were paid by the Normans? 
MR. RUSSELL: Correct. 
MR. LALLI: Your Honor, this is a promissory note 
between six co-obligors and the Youngs. And it has a 
standard provision that says, if there's a default, then 
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whatever we, the Youngs, spend in attorney's fees and 
trying to collect, we can recover those attorney's fees. 
They're now trying to use that against their co-obligors. 
THE COURT: You mean, you want to recover not the 
attorney's fees that the Normans had to pay for Winkler, 
but the attorney's fees that they're having to pay to you. 
MR. RUSSELL: They didn't have to pay any 
attorney's fees to Winkler. 
MR. LALLI: They didn't pay attorney's, and they 
didn't pay 18 percent interest, they only paid ten. 
MR. RUSSELL: They paid 18 up until August of 
19 --
MR. LALLI: But that's all assumed in the 
$212,000. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, I think I'm pretty 
clear on that then. If the Normans ultimately are able to 
convince the jury that Larson or Arnold were obligated 
under the promissory note, or obligated as partners, and 
should share in what the Normans had to pay, the Normans 
can recover an appropriate share of what the Normans had to 
pay from these other partners or other makers of the 
promissory note, which would include the interest that the 
Normans had to pay. But it would not include the interest 
that they might have had to pay, but didn't have to pay; 
and it will not include attorney's fees they might have had 
1 JO 
1 to pay, but didn't have to pay; and will not include the 
2 attorney's fees they incur in seeking the contribution from 
3 other partners or makers of the note. Clear? 
4 MR. LALLI: I think that's clear to me, Your 
5 Honor. But in the interest of clarity, I'm not sure I 
6 fully understood the Court's ruling on Mr. Russell's first 
7 motion to reinstitute punitive damages under different tort 
8 claims that are not in the complaint. 
9 THE COURT: I'm not sure I stated what my ruling 
10 was on that, but I didn't -- I guess I'm going to deny it 
11 now. In case -- I think we may have moved on without 
12 actually expressly denying that. 
13 MR. LALLI: Do we have a new trial date? 
14 THE COURT: Well, I have four days in a row 
15 available in January and again in February. For some 
16 reason I've scheduled -- I assume that Martin Luther King's 
17 birthday is going to be January 15th, celebrated January 
18 15th, so I think that's going to be a holiday. And also 
19 President's Day, February 19th, so those are the weeks that 
20 I have free, where I have a full week free, but 
21 unfortunately they're truncated by a holiday. Do you want 
22 me to go into March, and give you a full day? Or do you 
23 mind going over a weekend? Having a Tuesday through 
24 Friday, and then the next Monday trial. 
25 MR. LALLI: We would prefer not to do that, Your 
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Honor. 
enough 
We would pref 
MR. RUSSELL 
for five days, 
do it in four. 
January 
plainti 
THE COURT: 
er to do it straight through. 
: That's fine. I don't think we have 
Your Honor. I think we can probably 
Okay. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I prefer January. 
THE COURT: 
, run through 
MR. HASKINS 
ffs prevail on 
be stricken; is that 
suggest 
because 
require 
claims 
very di 
THE COURT: 
MR. HASKINS 
THE COURT: 
that you look 
Okay. We'll start on the 16th of 
the 19th. 
: Your Honor, and I assume if the 
the 54(b) motion the trial date will 
correct? 
Right. 
: Okay. 
On that subject, Mr. Russell, I just 
at the annotations under that, 
my recollection is that there's some cases that 
a real distinct separation between the different 
in order to certify under 54 (b) . 
MR. RUSSELL 
stinct. They1 
entirely different ro 
reading 
THE COURT: 
: I think you're right, but they are 
re coming at the defendants in an 
le. 
Well, this is just something I'm 
here, "When the degree of factual overlap between 
the issues certified for appeal and the issues remaining in 
the trial court is such that separate claims appear to be 
1 based on the same operative facts, or on the same operative 
2 facts with minor variations, they are not separate claims 
3 for purposes of subdivision (b)." So unless you can say 
4 these facts pertain to this claim, and these facts pertain 
5 to this claim and --
6 MR. RUSSELL: If I understand what happened, the 
7 Court just made that ruling. 
8 THE COURT: It could be. I'm just -- that's the 
9 way you'll need to lay it out for me to get a 54(b) 
10 certification. I'm inclined to do it, I'd like to do it, 
11 but I'm not going to do it if I'm 75 percent sure that the 
12 Supreme Court's just going to send it back to me. And 
13 there are cases where they indicate a certain willingness 
14 to do that. If I think I'm punning something I shouldn't 
15 be up to them, they'll pun it right back in a hurry. 
16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: So that's the analysis I'm going to 
18 be looking for in applying, is whether there are separate 
19 sets of operative facts. Are we finally done? 
20 MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Your Honor, for your 
21 time. 
22 MR. LALLI: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: The Court's in recess. 
24 (The hearing was concluded.) 
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